Edges for Sep 16, 2026

I think the Yes side is materially overvalued if Yes means OpenAI goes public before Anthropic. The public reporting currently points more strongly to Anthropic moving first, with OpenAI signaling a later 2027 timeframe.

The evidence favors New Hampshire not being the first Democratic contest in 2028. Recent calendar reporting points to South Carolina first, with New Hampshire early but not earliest.

Resident Evil is much more likely than not to open below 50 million domestically. The franchise has strong recognition, but this threshold is high enough that only a breakout, four-quadrant launch would clear it.

Barron Trump receiving a presidential pardon before January 2029 looks extremely unlikely because there is no evidence he faces any federal charge or pending clemency matter. I would put the chance in the low single digits, far below the current 50% market price.

Scheffler is still one U.S. Open away from the career grand slam, and he has enough time and enough chances before 2028 that the Yes side looks materially undervalued. I’d put the independent probability in the low-to-mid 30s, well above the current market.

I think Boeing is more likely than not to finish 2026 below 640 commercial airplane deliveries. The market looks too optimistic on the pace of recovery, and I put the chance of an above-640 outcome at 43%.

BbY WOW has strong momentum and could plausibly land at number two, but the U.S. streaming evidence still suggests it is more likely to sit just behind a stronger domestic leader rather than clearly control the runner-up spot. I would price a moderate chance rather than a favorite outcome.

Democrats can certainly compete for one chamber, but taking both the House and Senate in a 2026 midterm is a demanding path under normal political conditions. I think the market is overpricing the combined D Senate, D House outcome, so my estimate is well below the current implied probability.

I make an Illinois relocation by the first game of the 2028 season less likely than the market does. The most plausible path from the current reporting is a move to Indiana, while an Illinois site still has a meaningful but clearly secondary chance.

I estimate about a 41% chance Trump is impeached before Jan. 20, 2029. The odds are materially lower than the market because impeachment still depends on a specific political chain: Democrats winning the House, choosing impeachment over investigations, and sustaining party discipline through a contentious vote.

Samuel Alito resigning before Trump’s term ends looks meaningfully less likely than the market suggests. He is still actively serving, there is no resignation signal in the news, and justices generally do not leave office absent health issues or a carefully timed retirement.

Trump is fairly likely to use large-money language in a campaign-style North Carolina speech, but reaching 20 combined mentions of million, billion, or trillion is still a fairly high bar. I put the chance of Yes below the market price because repeated usage is plausible, yet not strongly supported by the specific context provided.

I put the chance of Trump resigning before the end of the term at low single digits, around 4%. Resignation would require an unusually severe political or personal shock, and history suggests presidents almost never choose to leave voluntarily.

Mike Lee looks meaningfully more likely than the market price implies to vote Yea if the Clarity Act reaches final passage in the Senate. He appears engaged in shaping the bill and is using land-use and permitting language as leverage, which points more toward conditional support than outright opposition.

I think the chance that Trump actually takes back the Panama Canal during this term is very low, because the reported facts show only rhetoric and rejection by Panama, not any plausible pathway to a real transfer of sovereignty. My independent estimate is far below the market price.

I put the odds meaningfully above the market because there is now a live, forced impeachment process aimed at a Cabinet member, and the window before January 1 is long enough for a post-midterm political shift to matter. Still, the current GOP control of the House keeps this from being a high-probability event.

My independent view is that 2032 GDP growth is most likely to land in the low-to-mid 2% range, with the 2.6% to 3.0% bucket slightly more likely than the 2.1% to 2.5% bucket. I see the market as too pessimistic on moderate growth and too generous on extreme outcomes, especially the 6.1% or above tail.

Ethereum has a meaningful but far-from-certain path to $3,000 by the end of 2026. The current market price is reasonable, but the evidence suggests a modestly bullish edge rather than a strong conviction call.

Democrats look like the likelier party to take the House in 2026, mainly because midterms usually punish the president’s party and the chamber is likely to be closely divided. Still, the current market price seems too optimistic, so I would shade the probability lower than the market implies.

My independent view is that 2035 U.S. real GDP growth is most likely to land in the low-to-mid 2% range, with 2.1% to 2.5% the single most probable outcome. I give some weight to a 2.6% to 3.0% outcome, but I think the market is still too anchored to a low-growth baseline and underprices moderate productivity upside.

Andrew Oldham is a credible Supreme Court contender, but the absence of any current vacancy or nomination makes the overall chance of him being the next Justice meaningfully lower than the market implies. I estimate about a 13% yes probability, with Oldham still the leading name among the listed contenders but not by enough to justify a 25% price.

The bear case for Trump in 2026 looks meaningfully more plausible than the market implies, but it is still far from a majority outcome. I estimate about a one-in-four chance that 2026 produces enough legal, policy, and political damage to qualify as a clear Trump down year.

Robinhood has a credible path to surpassing 30.2 million funded customers in 2026, but it is not a lock because the base is now large and growth rates can slow. I price the Yes outcome at 41%, above the market’s 28% because the threshold is reachable with only moderate net additions from here.

I put the odds that USAID is eliminated during Trump’s term meaningfully above the market, but still below a coin flip. The most plausible path is a serious attempted dismantling or absorption into another department, while full legal elimination remains constrained by Congress and the courts.

I think Section IV of the 25th Amendment is still unlikely to be formally used during Trump's presidency, though the probability is not zero given his age, volatility, and the possibility of a major crisis. My independent estimate is materially below the market, around 12%.

The chance that the United States acquires any part of Canada before 2029 is extremely low. Even under a highly permissive reading of “acquire,” this would require an extraordinary geopolitical rupture that is far outside normal policy odds.

I think a 2027 recession is more likely than the market implies, but still not the base case. My independent estimate is about 34%, reflecting meaningful downside risk from an AI/asset-price shock, sticky inflation, or a policy mistake, offset by a still-resilient baseline growth outlook.

The most likely outcome is no purchase, because acquiring even part of Greenland would require an extraordinary diplomatic, legal, and political breakthrough that has almost no historical precedent. Trump’s interest in Greenland keeps the probability above zero, but I still put it well below the market price.

I put the chance that Trump invokes the Insurrection Act during his presidency at 24%. The market looks a bit low, because the statute is an unusually plausible emergency tool for a president who has shown willingness to test executive power, but the event still requires a fairly specific combination of unrest, legal constraints, and political incentives.

Pete Hegseth looks like the single most plausible next Cabinet departure, but not by a wide margin. The strongest case is ongoing Pentagon turmoil and Trump’s willingness to cut losses if Hegseth becomes politically costly, yet explicit White House backing keeps this from being a high-conviction call.

I think the U.S. invading Iran before the end of 2026 is unlikely, but not impossible. The market’s 16.5% implied probability looks somewhat high given the scale of escalation required and the strong incentives for both sides to avoid a direct U.S. attempt at territorial control.

Maria Bartiromo is a plausible Trump-aligned media figure, but she is not the most likely choice for a demanding, low-pay, high-friction briefing role. I put her at about 12%, well below the market’s 21%.

I think the chance the U.S. acquires any part of Greenland before 2029 is low, but not zero. The most plausible path is expanded basing or access rights, which is meaningfully short of sovereignty transfer or formal acquisition.

The mission still looks plausible within the deadline, but the evidence is not strong enough to justify a majority chance. Given the repeated delays, weak official confirmation, and dependence on another mission’s schedule, I make this a modestly sub-50% outcome for Yes.

This market is leaning No, and I agree with that tilt. A Russia performance by October 31 looks possible if the scheduled October appearance actually happens, but the combination of travel, logistics, reputational issues, and geopolitical friction makes it far from reliable.

The department is being aggressively hollowed out, but true abolition still depends on Congress and remains materially harder than administrative downsizing. I estimate a moderate chance of formal elimination before January 20, 2029, higher than the market’s current price but still below even odds.

Solana reaching $140 by the end of 2026 is plausible but still more of an upside case than the central expectation. The market’s 24.5% implied probability looks a bit low to me, but the level still requires a strong continuation move through several technical barriers.

My independent estimate is that the chance Trump is both impeached and removed from office before the end of his term is low, around 8%. Impeachment alone is plausible in a politically explosive environment, but removal by the Senate remains the real bottleneck.

I estimate a materially lower chance than the market that the next president confirms exactly two Supreme Court justices. The most likely outcomes are still 0 or 1, with 2 plausible but not the modal case.

Starbucks looks likely to finish 2026 above 41,800 global stores. The reported Q3 base and the company’s own 2026 net-new store guidance both point to a comfortable margin above the threshold if execution stays on track.

Everton look like a slight favorite, but the market may be a bit too confident given the inherent volatility of a cup tie against a comparable Premier League opponent. I would put Everton’s win probability at 58%.

A Fed rate hike in 2026 now looks very likely, because market pricing and economist forecasts have shifted sharply toward at least one increase before year-end. The main uncertainty is not whether the Fed is considering a hike, but whether incoming data and the next meeting actually confirm it.

Mbappé is a very strong contender and the current leader, but the market is pricing in a fairly high likelihood for a race that is still early and still crowded. I think he is more likely than not to win, but not as likely as the current price suggests.

Normalization is possible but still more likely than not to fail by Jan. 20, 2029. The main obstacle is Saudi insistence on a credible Palestinian-state pathway, which remains unresolved despite active U.S. diplomacy and growing behind-the-scenes cooperation.

The market’s 17.5% implied chance for a return to 60-plus seven-day average transit calls by year-end looks somewhat low, but still plausible only if regional shipping normalizes quickly and stays stable. My estimate is modestly higher than the market, but still a clear minority outcome because the threshold is operationally demanding and the Strait remains exposed to geopolitical disruption.

Gavin Newsom is a credible national Democrat with strong fundraising and media visibility, but the 2028 nomination is still highly open and he faces substantial competition from the party’s next generation. I would put his chance modestly above the market, around 22%, but still clearly below a coin flip.

The market is pricing a very high chance that the Fed avoids any 25 bp cuts in 2026, and that looks broadly consistent with a still-restrictive policy environment and a high bar for easing. I agree the Yes outcome is the more likely result, though not quite as extreme as the current price suggests.

PSG look like a genuine contender, but the market price implies they are still much more likely to miss than win the title. Their early dominance and elite squad quality support a meaningful Yes chance, yet the Champions League format and the strength of rival clubs keep the probability well below one quarter.

United Russia is still the clear favorite to gain the most seats in the next Russian parliamentary election, given the highly managed electoral environment and the party’s structural advantages. The main uncertainty is not whether it remains dominant, but whether another party could edge out a larger seat increase from a lower base.

NVIDIA remains the front-runner to finish 2026 as the largest company by market cap, and the current lead over Apple and Alphabet is large enough that it would take a meaningful reversal to dislodge it. The market price looks slightly conservative relative to the latest positioning and the absence of a clear challenger.

Anthropic looks like the frontrunner, and the market is already pricing that in heavily. I agree Yes is favored, but the chance of a late leaderboard flip is still meaningful enough that I would leave a small but non-trivial No probability.

Variational clearing an $800M FDV one day after launch looks more likely than not, because current market signals and trading-volume momentum suggest a launch valuation comfortably above this level is plausible. I would still discount it somewhat from the market-implied price because launch timing, liquidity, and post-launch volatility can all pull the token below the threshold even if initial interest is strong.

Google has not yet publicly made the specific embedded-third-party-evaluator commitment described in the market, so the most likely outcome is No. The chance of a late announcement is real, but based on the available evidence it appears below one-third.

China’s September CPI is much more likely to remain above 0.4% than to drop to or below that level. The August reading was already 0.8%, and while inflation is still weak by historical standards, the threshold for a Yes outcome is low enough that only a sharp monthly setback would get there.

JD Vance has a plausible but far-from-dominant path to the presidency, and the market price around 23% looks directionally reasonable. I would place him slightly above that level because a sitting vice president, if he becomes the Republican nominee, would start with meaningful institutional and partisan advantages.

Bitcoin reaching $100,000 at some point in September looks possible but still unlikely. The market is pricing it as a very low-probability event, and without evidence of a strong near-term rally, the safest estimate is a modest single-digit chance.

Merz is under real political pressure, but the current evidence still looks more like a leadership crisis than a near-term exit. I put the chance that he is out as chancellor by year-end 2026 at 25%.

AC Milan have a real home-field path to victory, but the broader pre-match information still points to Benfica being at least slightly stronger overall. I would put Milan’s win probability below the market price, but not as low as the most bearish model estimates.

Elon Musk is still likely to tweet heavily over a two-day window, so the market’s No side is justified, but the Yes outcome is not negligible because a sub-40 count only requires an average below about 20 posts per day. I think the chance of fewer than 40 total posts is somewhat higher than the market implies, but still clearly a minority outcome.