Edges for Sep 12, 2026

I think there is still a meaningful chance of at least one Fed cut in 2026, but the market is pricing in a very strong hold case for a reason. My estimate is that there is about an 11% chance of no rate cuts at all in 2026.

I think there is a strong chance that no qualifying Millennium Prize Problems will be counted for 2026 under this market’s rules, even though OpenAI’s Navier-Stokes claim makes the broader “AI solved a Millennium Problem” narrative look more plausible. The exclusion of Navier-Stokes from resolution is the key reason the zero-solved outcome still looks likelier than not.

My independent view is that OpenAI is less likely than the market implies to be the first of the two to IPO. The current reporting tilt favors Anthropic moving earlier, and OpenAI’s process appears more valuation- and timing-constrained.

I see a very low probability that Barron Trump receives a presidential pardon before January 21, 2029. The market’s 50% pricing looks far too high unless one assumes an unusual future criminal exposure that is not supported by the current facts.

I think Alito is materially less likely than the market to resign during Trump’s term. His public denial of retirement rumors, the absence of any confirmed intent to step down, and the strong incentives for justices to remain on the Court all point to a low-to-moderate probability rather than a coin flip-plus event.

Scottie Scheffler has a realistic path to the career grand slam if the remaining piece is the U.S. Open, and his sustained elite level makes this far more likely than the market implies. I make this a meaningful underpricing relative to the 5% quote.

I think there is a meaningful chance Resident Evil opens below 50 million domestically, but the market is probably overestimating how much a horror franchise reboot can reliably expand without unusually strong buzz. My estimate is that the under-50 million outcome is somewhat more likely than not, though not by a huge margin.

I estimate a 43% chance that Trump is impeached before the end of his term. The market looks meaningfully too high, because impeachment requires a House majority willing to spend political capital, and that is far from guaranteed even with Trump’s controversy profile.

A Fed rate hike in 2026 looks more likely than not, driven by the market’s rising conviction that labor strength and sticky inflation will keep pressure on policymakers. I put the chance of at least one hike at 67%, a bit below the current market price but still firmly in Yes territory.

A U.S. acquisition of any part of Greenland before 2029 is possible only in a very loose, exceptional sense, and a formal territorial transfer looks highly unlikely. My independent estimate is well below the market price, because the political, legal, and diplomatic barriers are enormous.

Google has a plausible path to finish 2026 with the top Arena-ranked model, but the field is crowded and leadership can swing quickly. I would put Google’s chance meaningfully above the market price, though still below a coin flip.

OpenAI announcing a Millennium Prize solution by September 30, 2026 looks unlikely. The market price is relatively high for an event that requires a public, official, and very specific claim of a solved Clay problem, so I would lean well below the current implied probability.

Democrats look likelier than Republicans to win control of the House, but the market is pricing in a fairly confident outcome that still depends on a narrow set of competitive districts breaking their way. I would put the chance of a Democratic House at 73%.

USAID has a meaningful chance of being effectively dismantled or formally absorbed, but full statutory elimination is still harder than a simple budget cut. I put the probability of a Yes outcome at 38%.

I think the chance of a U.S.-style recession occurring at some point in 2027 is meaningfully higher than the market implies, but still not the most likely outcome. My independent estimate is 36% Yes, so the current 25% Yes price looks somewhat too low.

A Trump-linked Greenland purchase remains a real policy interest, but an actual acquisition is still highly unlikely because it requires consent from Denmark and Greenland, both of which are firmly opposed. I would put the chance at 7%, well below the current market price.

I think the Hike-Pause-Hike path is unlikely. It would require the Fed to raise rates at two separate meetings with an unchanged decision in between, which usually only happens if inflation and growth data re-accelerate in a very specific way.

I put the chance of no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term at 98%. A formal purchase of Greenland is extraordinarily unlikely, with only a tiny tail risk of an unprecedented deal, legal maneuver, or extraordinary geopolitical shift.

A U.S. takeover of the Panama Canal during Trump’s term looks very unlikely. The most plausible outcome is continued rhetorical pressure or negotiation over fees, security, or port access rather than any actual transfer of sovereignty.

I put the chance of Trump having a meaningfully bad 2026 at 22%. A negative year is more plausible than the market implies, but the event still likely requires a fairly strong and specific threshold of harm rather than just ordinary political turbulence.

I put the probability meaningfully above the market at 29% that Trump formally invokes the Insurrection Act during this presidency. The combination of an aggressive law-and-order style, election-related tensions, and the availability of a broad emergency framing makes this more plausible than the current price implies, though still far from likely.

Trump resigning before the end of the term looks unlikely on the available evidence. There is chatter and speculative commentary, but no concrete sign of an actual resignation path, so I put the probability well below the market price.

Boeing has a plausible path to more than 640 deliveries in 2026, but it still needs a clean second half and no meaningful production or supply-chain setbacks. My independent estimate is 58%, a bit below the market’s 68% because the threshold is ambitious rather than routine.

Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer looks plausible as a candidate for an AI breakthrough, but the public evidence is still too thin to make it the most likely next Millennium Prize Problem solved by AI. I think it is meaningfully below the current market price because the strongest signals are vague and non-specific, while other problems appear to have stronger rumor momentum.

NVIDIA has a strong chance to finish 2026 as the world’s largest company, but the lead is not secure because its valuation is highly sensitive to AI spending expectations and market rotations. I would price the Yes outcome below the market at 68%.

I think the market is slightly underestimating the chance that Ye actually shows up and performs in Russia, but the event is still far from certain because his touring behavior, logistics, and geopolitical complications make any promised appearance fragile. My estimate is 34% Yes.

Robinhood is plausibly on track to keep adding funded customers, but clearing 30.2 million by the 2026 report still requires a meaningful year-end acceleration. I գնահատimate the Yes probability at 37%, modestly above the market’s 28% price.

Anna Kelly looks like the strongest of the named contenders, but the field still feels more open than the market suggests. I make her a moderate favorite among these options, not a lock.

I think the president is more likely than not to confirm zero or one Supreme Court justice in this term, with two confirmations possible but not the most likely path. My independent estimate for exactly two confirmations is 28%, below the market’s 43% yes price.

This is close to a coin flip, but I lean slightly against Mainz winning. The market has Mainz as a narrow favorite, yet Frankfurt’s overall squad strength and the volatility of a derby-adjacent Bundesliga matchup make the home edge less decisive than the price suggests.

The chance of the United States acquiring any part of Canada before 2029 is extremely low. Even allowing for political volatility and rhetoric, a territorial transfer would require an extraordinary collapse in Canadian sovereignty and would face overwhelming legal, diplomatic, and military barriers.

OpenAI is still the clear leader right now, and the current leaderboard position makes a Yes outcome the most likely single result. Still, the market price appears somewhat optimistic because the question is about where things stand at month-end, not today.

The odds of a U.S. invasion of Iran by the end of 2026 look meaningfully lower than the market price suggests. Ongoing strikes and direct conflict raise escalation risk, but a ground operation to establish control over Iranian territory still appears highly unlikely.

United Russia is still the clear favorite to emerge with the biggest seat gain in a tightly managed Russian parliamentary election, but the phrasing of the market adds some uncertainty because it is about net gains rather than simply winning the most seats. I would still lean Yes, though slightly below the current market price because the baseline for improvement is not very favorable and the result depends on how the authorities manage seat distribution.

The chance of Trump being impeached and removed from office before the end of the term is low, but not zero. I estimate roughly 8%, well below the market’s 16% price.

I put the chance of Trump’s 2026 “bull case” at about 11%, higher than the market but still clearly a low-probability outcome. The market looks too pessimistic if the event is defined broadly, though not by an enormous amount.

A >5% quarterly GDP print sometime from Q1 2025 through Q4 2028 is plausible but not likely enough to be a lock; I estimate about 30%. The market’s 23.3% looks a bit low, but not wildly off given how hard sustained 5%-plus U.S. growth is to achieve.

Anthropic announcing a genuine Millennium Prize solution by September 30, 2026 looks very unlikely. The market’s already-low price still seems a bit generous given the extreme difficulty of these problems and the lack of any visible evidence that Anthropic is near a verified breakthrough.

Hyperliquid reaching $90 by the end of 2026 looks plausible but not a lock. The current market price implies a strong chance, yet the move from an already elevated level to $90 still requires sustained momentum in a volatile crypto environment.

I think a rate cut is possible but not the base case. The market’s 40% implied probability for a decrease looks a little high unless inflation and demand cool further before the October meeting.

The United States is very unlikely to acquire new territory by January 1, 2027. The window is extremely short, and any qualifying acquisition would require a major diplomatic, legal, and congressional chain of events to close in time.

I make Brooke Rollins a meaningfully below-market candidate to be the next cabinet departure. She has some exposure as a low-visibility cabinet member, but the most fragile positions appear to belong to more controversial, higher-profile figures.

My base case is that 2033 GDP growth lands in the low-to-mid 1% range, with 1.1% to 1.5% the single most likely bucket. The market looks a bit too cautious on that center mass and too willing to leave weight on higher-growth tails.

I make this a low-probability but not negligible yes, around 27%. Trump’s baseline instinct is restriction, but business pressure and the need to keep the U.S. attractive for high-skill labor make some form of expansion or loosening plausible.

The latest official reading is right at the 1.9% cutoff, but the balance of evidence still leans against the annual 2026 figure finishing at or below that level. Near-term stability supports a meaningful chance of Yes, yet the broader 2026 inflation outlook suggests a modest drift higher over the rest of the year.

The market is pricing only a small chance that the 10-year Treasury yield falls below 4.45% at any point in September, and that seems directionally reasonable given the relatively high threshold and the limited time left in the month. I would put the chance of a Yes outcome somewhat above the market price, but still clearly low.

Marine Le Pen remains a credible contender because the far right is a durable force in French politics and she has repeatedly advanced to the runoff. However, winning the presidency still looks harder than reaching the final round, and the market price appears to give her somewhat more credit than the structural headwinds justify.

I estimate a low-to-moderate chance of a Chinese military offensive against Taiwan by the end of 2027, but still below one in five. The market price looks plausible; the most likely outcome remains no invasion, though the risk is meaningfully higher than a typical peacetime baseline.

Anthropic is still the likeliest name to be on top at the end of September, but the market looks a bit too confident given how quickly leaderboard positions can change. I would price Yes at 91%, with the main uncertainty coming from a late-month jump by OpenAI or Google.

SS Lazio have a live but limited path to victory in a matchup that the market already prices as an underdog spot. Given the away opponent’s likely strength and the absence of supportive recent news, a Lazio win looks possible but not likely, and I would put it slightly below one in three.

A direct Zelenskyy-Putin meeting before Jan. 1, 2027 is still unlikely, but not quite as close to impossible as the market suggests. I would price it modestly above the current level because any late-stage ceasefire, summit push, or prisoner/negotiation breakthrough could force a face-to-face encounter.

Leeds have a meaningful home advantage, but Newcastle are the stronger side on paper, so I slightly favor No. The market’s 40.5% Yes price looks a bit generous to Leeds, and I would price their win closer to the high 30s.

I think there is a meaningful but still minority chance that Section 4 of the 25th Amendment gets invoked during Trump’s presidency. The most likely outcome remains that it is not used, but the probability is higher than a trivial long shot because the mechanism can be triggered by acute incapacity, not just permanent removal.

I think the Department of Education is somewhat more likely than the market implies to be eliminated by January 20, 2029, but it remains a low-probability event because full abolition requires durable congressional and legal follow-through. My independent estimate is 18%.

I think the most likely 2035 outcome is a moderate-growth year centered around 2% to 2.5% real GDP growth, with recession-risk tails still material but not dominant. My independent view is modestly more optimistic than the market on the upper-middle growth bands.

The market is strongly favoring a sub-32 million opening, and that looks directionally reasonable given the limited downside needed for a Yes result and the absence of any clear signal that this title is tracking like a major blockbuster launch. I think Yes is very likely, though not quite as certain as the market implies because a strong nostalgia-driven debut could still push it into the low-to-mid 30s.

The market is already pricing this as very likely, and that looks broadly reasonable if the 30-year yield is currently near or above the upper-4% to low-5% range. With several months left in the window, even a modest backup in yields would be enough to trigger a Yes.

Trump is very likely to use money-scale words repeatedly in a business-focused speech, and this kind of appearance usually features frequent references to billions and trillions. The market is already pricing a near-certain Yes, and that looks mostly justified, though not quite absolute because the exact wording depends on how long and off-the-cuff the remarks are.

Erling Haaland has a strong path to the Top 5 because he remains one of the most globally recognized athletes in the world and football tends to dominate Google’s year-end athlete searches. I think the market is slightly high, but the Yes outcome is still more likely than not.