Edges for Sep 11, 2026

Anthropic now looks better positioned to list first, with OpenAI’s timeline slipping toward 2027 and multiple reports pointing to Anthropic as the earlier mover. I assign only a modest chance that OpenAI is the first of the two to IPO.

I think there is a strong chance that no qualifying Millennium Prize Problems will be counted for 2026 under this market’s rules, even though OpenAI’s Navier-Stokes claim makes the broader “AI solved a Millennium Problem” narrative look more plausible. The exclusion of Navier-Stokes from resolution is the key reason the zero-solved outcome still looks likelier than not.

2026 can still finish as an exceptionally warm year, but it is hard to justify it overtaking every prior year and ending as the single hottest on record. The market price looks too optimistic given the lack of a strong present signal that 2026 will surpass the recent peak years.

Starbucks has a credible path to clear 41,800 global stores by its 2026 reporting date, and I think the market is pricing in too little growth. My independent estimate is a 64% chance of Yes, not 11%.

I see a very low probability that Barron Trump receives a presidential pardon before January 21, 2029. The market’s 50% pricing looks far too high unless one assumes an unusual future criminal exposure that is not supported by the current facts.

Lindsay Clancy is very unlikely to finish in Google’s global Top 5 most searched people of 2026. The current market price looks materially too optimistic given how narrow and event-driven her public attention has been.

Scottie Scheffler has a realistic path to the career grand slam if the remaining piece is the U.S. Open, and his sustained elite level makes this far more likely than the market implies. I make this a meaningful underpricing relative to the 5% quote.

OpenAI has already made one Millennium Prize announcement, but there is little evidence that a second qualifying announcement is imminent. With only a few weeks left, the chance of another public claim by September 30 looks low, though not impossible given the apparent pace of internal math work.

I think Boeing is more likely than not to fall short of 640 commercial deliveries in 2026. The market appears to be pricing in a fairly aggressive production recovery that is possible but not yet the base case.

I estimate a 43% chance that Trump is impeached before the end of his term. The market looks meaningfully too high, because impeachment requires a House majority willing to spend political capital, and that is far from guaranteed even with Trump’s controversy profile.

I think there is a meaningful chance Alito steps down during Trump’s term, but not as high as the market suggests. My independent estimate is 43%, with the biggest reason being that he is old enough that an ordinary retirement window exists, while the strongest reason against is that he has every incentive to stay unless health or personal factors force the issue.

End of Beginning has a recognizable viral profile, but being Spotify’s global #2 song for 2026 would require extraordinary sustained or renewed popularity. I think the market is pricing in too much persistence from an older hit, so I put the chance noticeably below the current implied probability.

A U.S. takeover of the Panama Canal during Trump’s term looks very unlikely. The most plausible outcome is continued rhetorical pressure or negotiation over fees, security, or port access rather than any actual transfer of sovereignty.

Aryna Sabalenka looks like one of the strongest remaining contenders on hard courts, but the U.S. Open is a high-variance event and the field is deep. I put her chance of winning at a little above the market price, but still well below coin-flip territory.

A U.S. acquisition of any part of Greenland before 2029 is possible only in a very loose, exceptional sense, and a formal territorial transfer looks highly unlikely. My independent estimate is well below the market price, because the political, legal, and diplomatic barriers are enormous.

I think the president is more likely than not to confirm zero or one Supreme Court justice in this term, with two confirmations possible but not the most likely path. My independent estimate for exactly two confirmations is 28%, below the market’s 43% yes price.

The most likely outcome is that 2036 U.S. real GDP growth lands in the 1.6% to 2.0% band, with a meaningful chance of slightly slower growth and a smaller but real chance of a stronger year. I put the central range at 34%, which is materially above the market’s 19% for that outcome.

A Trump-linked Greenland purchase remains a real policy interest, but an actual acquisition is still highly unlikely because it requires consent from Denmark and Greenland, both of which are firmly opposed. I would put the chance at 7%, well below the current market price.

The mistrial keeps the case alive, but a conviction by year-end now depends on a fast prosecution decision, a quick retrial schedule, and a unanimous verdict, all within a tight window. I think the market is underpricing the possibility of a rapid retrial, but the overall odds of a murder conviction before December 31, 2026 are still modest.

I think Why Did I Get Married Again? is still the most likely number one global Netflix movie this week, but the market looks a bit too confident given the lack of fresh confirmation. I would price Yes around 84%.

I put the chance of no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term at 98%. A formal purchase of Greenland is extraordinarily unlikely, with only a tiny tail risk of an unprecedented deal, legal maneuver, or extraordinary geopolitical shift.

I put the chance of a move to a new location within Illinois at 63%, modestly above the market. The most likely path is still an in-state relocation rather than a cross-border move or no move at all.

I put the chance of Trump having a meaningfully bad 2026 at 22%. A negative year is more plausible than the market implies, but the event still likely requires a fairly strong and specific threshold of harm rather than just ordinary political turbulence.

USAID has a meaningful chance of being effectively dismantled or formally absorbed, but full statutory elimination is still harder than a simple budget cut. I put the probability of a Yes outcome at 38%.

I estimate a fairly high chance of at least one Fed rate hike in 2026, though not quite as high as the current market price suggests. The odds favor a hike if inflation proves sticky or growth re-accelerates, but there is still meaningful room for the Fed to stay on hold if disinflation continues.

I put the probability meaningfully above the market at 29% that Trump formally invokes the Insurrection Act during this presidency. The combination of an aggressive law-and-order style, election-related tensions, and the availability of a broad emergency framing makes this more plausible than the current price implies, though still far from likely.

I think the chance of a U.S.-style recession occurring at some point in 2027 is meaningfully higher than the market implies, but still not the most likely outcome. My independent estimate is 36% Yes, so the current 25% Yes price looks somewhat too low.

New Hampshire is still the most likely first Democratic contest, but the probability is a bit lower than the market implies because the DNC has meaningful latitude to front-load another state or reshape the calendar. I would price Yes around 82%.

Trump resigning before the end of the term looks unlikely on the available evidence. There is chatter and speculative commentary, but no concrete sign of an actual resignation path, so I put the probability well below the market price.

OpenAI has created strong AGI-era rhetoric, but the available evidence still points to no formal company announcement that AGI has been achieved. I think the market is somewhat overpricing the chance of a clean, explicit declaration before year-end, so I assign a lower probability than the current price.

Democrats look clearly favored to win the House, but the current price may be a bit too confident given the inherent volatility of a close national midterm. I estimate a solid Democratic advantage, though not quite as extreme as the market implies.

Solana reaching $140 by the end of 2026 looks plausible but not assured, with the market currently pricing in a meaningful chance of failure. I would put the probability somewhat above the current implied price because the time horizon is still long enough for a strong crypto rally, but the target is high enough that it still requires favorable market conditions.

I think there is a meaningful chance Doge-1 launches by June 30, 2027, but the repeated history of delays keeps this from being a clean majority case. A slightly below-even probability is more appropriate than the current market price suggests.

Robinhood is plausibly on track to keep adding funded customers, but clearing 30.2 million by the 2026 report still requires a meaningful year-end acceleration. I գնահատimate the Yes probability at 37%, modestly above the market’s 28% price.

NVIDIA has a plausible path to becoming the second-largest company, but the market is right to treat it as a low-probability outcome because it must outrun at least one of the other mega-cap leaders by month-end. I think the true chance is higher than the current market price but still clearly below 50%.

I think the Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer Conjecture has a relatively low chance of being the next Millennium Prize Problem solved by an eligible AI lab by the end of 2027. The market’s current price looks somewhat optimistic given how little verified progress exists on any of these problems and how demanding the announcement standards are.

Anthropic announcing a verified solution to one of the Millennium Prize Problems by September 30, 2026 looks very unlikely. The market’s 14.5% Yes price seems generous relative to how extraordinary and externally verifiable such a claim would need to be.

OpenAI looks like the most likely winner, but the market is pricing in a very high chance that may already reflect its current lead and brand momentum. I think OpenAI has a strong edge, though the possibility of a late-month leaderboard reversal keeps this below the implied 89.5%.

Anna Kelly looks like the strongest of the named contenders, but the field still feels more open than the market suggests. I make her a moderate favorite among these options, not a lock.

The chance of Trump being impeached and removed from office before the end of the term is low, but not zero. I estimate roughly 8%, well below the market’s 16% price.

Section IV of the 25th Amendment is possible but still unlikely to be formally invoked during Trump’s presidency. The most realistic path to a Yes would be a sudden, obvious presidential incapacity or a severe crisis that forces cabinet-level action, but the political and practical threshold is very high.

The chance that the United States acquires any part of Canada before 2029 is extremely low. I would put it at 3%, well below the current market’s 14% Yes price.

I put a modestly higher-than-market chance on a Trump H-1B expansion, but still think No is more likely than Yes. The most plausible path to Yes is a targeted, pro-business adjustment rather than a broad ideological shift.

The Hike-Pause-Hike sequence is possible but looks unlikely because it requires the Fed to tighten at the September meeting, stand pat in October, and then tighten again in December. With no strong evidence of an inflation resurgence or a policy regime shift, the market-implied 13% Yes price appears slightly rich, and I would lean closer to 8% for Yes.

I lean toward Yes, but not as strongly as the market does. If Variational launches a governance token at all, the combination of launch hype, low initial circulating supply, and thin early trading can keep implied FDV above $800M, though first-day volatility makes a miss entirely plausible.

Alibaba is still the most credible candidate to finish September with the top Chinese model, but the lead is not secure because the Chinese frontier leaderboard is highly competitive and can shift quickly. I estimate a solid but not overwhelming Yes probability.

Pete Hegseth looks like the single most vulnerable cabinet member, but the race is still fairly open. I put his chance of being the next to leave at 28%, a bit above the market because his profile combines controversy, visibility, and a relatively low tolerance for sustained negative attention.

A rate hold is still the single most likely outcome, but the probability is not as high as the market suggests because there is plenty of time for the policy path to shift before December 2027. I see a roughly even chance of no change versus some cut or hike by then.

I think a U.S. invasion of Iran before 2027 is unlikely, but not impossible given the potential for rapid escalation from regional conflict. The market’s implied probability looks somewhat elevated to me, and I would put Yes at 11%.

The market is strongly pricing in no Fed rate cuts in 2026, and that looks broadly defensible given the absence of evidence for imminent easing and the remaining uncertainty around inflation. Still, with several FOMC meetings left and the economy capable of softening late in the year, I would assign a slightly lower probability than the market, not a dramatic one.

I put the chance of Trump’s 2026 “bull case” at about 11%, higher than the market but still clearly a low-probability outcome. The market looks too pessimistic if the event is defined broadly, though not by an enormous amount.

I think the market is slightly overestimating the chance of a qualifying announcement by the deadline. The event is possible, but the combination of a very high bar, a narrow eligible-announcement definition, and a short time window makes a No outcome somewhat more likely.

Marine Le Pen remains a plausible contender, but I think her path to victory is still meaningfully narrower than the market price suggests. Between the strong runoff barrier, likely anti-Le Pen consolidation, and significant legal or campaign uncertainty, I put her at about 30% to win the 2027 French presidential election.

Ethereum has a near-even chance to clear $3,000 before the end of 2026, and I lean slightly toward Yes because the remaining time window is long enough for a modest rally or volatile spike to get it there. However, the market is already pricing meaningful uncertainty, so this is not a strong conviction call.

Base launching a token by June 30, 2027 looks plausible but still far from certain. I place it slightly above the market at 40%, reflecting meaningful upside from ecosystem maturation but persistent strategic and regulatory reasons to avoid a token.

Ulf Kristersson has a plausible path to returning as prime minister, but the election is competitive and the current governing bloc has meaningful headwinds. I would put his chance of being the next prime minister at 22%, modestly above the market price but still clearly a minority outcome.

The market is pricing a very low chance that Strait of Hormuz transit activity gets back to a 7-day average of 60 or more by October 31. I agree with the broad bearish view on the Yes outcome, but I think the market may be somewhat overstating how unlikely a temporary rebound is, so my estimate is modestly above the current price.

I put this at 16%. A Mars visit by Elon Musk is unlikely, but it is not a long-shot fantasy given his resources, intent, and the open-ended time horizon.

Practical Magic 2 is likely to open below 38 million domestically. The current market price already implies a strong Yes probability, and the combination of a legacy sequel, a likely adult-skewing audience, and a non-event release window points more toward a mid-range opening than a breakout blockbuster launch.

The market is heavily leaning toward No, and that looks broadly reasonable given the current yield environment and the short remaining window in September. I think Yes is possible if there is a sharp risk-off move or dovish macro surprise, but it remains a low-probability outcome.