Will Section IV of the 25th Amendment be used during Trump's Presidency?

The 25th Amendment’s Section IV has never been used successfully in U.S. history, which matters because it requires an unusually high level of coordination, urgency, and political courage from the vice president and a majority of the cabinet. Even in moments of serious concern about a president’s behavior, advisers usually choose lower-friction alternatives such as persuasion, staff intervention, public signaling, or informal delegation rather than triggering a constitutional confrontation that could fracture the administration and trigger a rapid political crisis.

For a Yes outcome, the presidency would likely need a dramatic and widely acknowledged incapacity event: severe medical impairment, acute cognitive breakdown, or an extraordinary security crisis in which the president is clearly unable to discharge the powers and duties of office. The barrier is not just medical or behavioral evidence, but the coalition problem. Cabinet members are typically political appointees with strong incentives to avoid a move that could be seen as partisan, disloyal, or destabilizing unless the case is overwhelming and the vice president is fully prepared to lead the effort.

Against that, Trump’s presidency has always carried elevated volatility risk because of his age, style, and the possibility of sudden political or health shocks. The existence of a vice president and cabinet creates a mechanism that could be used if circumstances became extreme enough, so the probability is not negligible. Still, the market’s 25% Yes price looks too high relative to how rarely Section IV is invoked and how difficult it is to execute successfully. My estimate is materially below the market, closer to the mid-teens, because the default outcome remains that even serious concerns are handled without a formal 25th Amendment confrontation.