Edges for Jul 11, 2026

**Very likely Yes.** A sitting Cabinet member (Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte) is already being tried in the Senate impeachment court, which in the Philippines follows a House impeachment — so the factual threshold for “impeached” has effectively been met and the probability of at least one Cabinet member being impeached before 2027 is extremely high.

I think the chance that Evil Dead Burn opens below $16M is quite low, roughly 8%. The latest tracking and franchise comparisons point much closer to the mid-20Ms than the teens.

I think claude-opus-4-6-thinking is a clear underdog here. It is currently near the top of the leaderboard, but it is not the leader today, and the latest frontier releases make it more likely to stay around second or third than to reclaim first.

Based on reported mid-2026 metrics and required growth rates, I assess a low probability that Robinhood will report above 30.2M funded customers in 2026 — roughly a 12% chance.

Miami is more likely than not to finish below $1,017,000 on September 30, but the margin is not huge because premium neighborhoods can push the citywide reading higher. The market’s current No pricing looks too confident, yet the threshold is close enough that a luxury-heavy mix still matters.

Independent assessment: USAID has been effectively eliminated during Trump's term; given the documented functional dismantling and transfer to State, I assign a high probability that the market resolves 'Yes' (absent a narrow legal-definition clause).

I think the market is mispriced on the low side: Elon Musk is more likely than not to stay under 40 counted posts in this 48-hour window, and I would put the Yes chance in the mid-80s.

Independent view: a December 8, 2027 25bp hike is unlikely — I put the probability at 15% because FOMC projections and market forward curves point to easing through 2027 unless a material upside shock occurs.

I think the market is overstating the chance of a new pandemic in this window. There are real outbreak risks, but the current evidence looks more like serious regional or multi-country emergencies than the kind of fast-moving global event that would justify a yes.

I assess a very low chance (6%) that any US quarterly GDP reading will exceed 5% in Q1 2025–Q4 2028: the recent growth trajectory, outside-of-cycle drivers required for a 5% quarter, and official forecasts make a boom highly unlikely.

I assess a substantially below-market chance that Justice Samuel Alito will resign during Trump's term: I estimate ~27% that he leaves the Court before 2029-01-20 despite heavy market speculation and recent false reports.

I assess a low probability that Barron Trump will be granted a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029 — the president can issue preemptive pardons, but political cost and lack of any federal exposure for Barron make this unlikely.

I judge a substantial, but not dominant, chance that the bear-case narrative for Trump fully crystallizes in 2026 — I put the independent probability at 45%. The macroeconomic, crypto/asset, and geopolitical pressures make a bad-year outcome plausible, but strong political insulation and several offsetting paths reduce the odds below coin-flip parity.

I assess a better-than-even (65%) probability that the 2025–2028 average annual measles case count in the U.S. will be at or above ~2,288 cases/year, driven by the 2025 record, a large 2026 mid‑year total, persistent transmission chains, and weakened/fragmented public‑health countermeasures.

I think the market is underpricing the Yes outcome. The evidence revealed in the preliminary hearing is unusually strong, and there appears to be enough time before July 2027 for either a trial conviction or a plea that still counts as a homicide conviction.

Extremely unlikely — I assess roughly a 1% chance that President Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his next term; the action is effectively precluded by legal, diplomatic, and military-political constraints, though tiny tail scenarios remain.

**Independent assessment:** Given the House is on the floor debating and a vote is scheduled today, I assess a high probability that the House will pass articles of impeachment — this is the event’s decisive trigger — so the independent probability of

I assess a better-than-even chance that NYC will register a modest population increase of 0.01%–0.99% from July 2025 to July 2027, driven primarily by the 2025 housing completion surge and a strong office leasing rebound, but with meaningful downside tail risks from demographic structure and measurement/timing uncertainty.

Given the Bears' formal site selection of Hammond, a Board vote advancing the move, and active geotechnical work — balanced against a credible Illinois counter-offer — I estimate a materially better-than-even chance the team will officially relocate to Indiana by the 2028 season opener.

I assess a roughly one-in-four chance (24%) that a pronounced, politically useful 2026 stock-market 'bull case' for Trump materializes — i.e., a sizable market rally that he successfully frames as his economic vindication despite weak approval.

Extremely unlikely — I assign ~1% probability that Donald Trump will 'buy' any part of Greenland during his term; legal, political, and practical barriers make a sovereignty sale effectively impossible, though tiny tail risks (odd legal or political change, or reinterpretation of the question as private land/mineral purchases) keep the probability above zero.

I assess a very low independent probability (4%) that the United States will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029; the legal, political, and military barriers make a voluntary or forcible transfer highly unlikely, though remote edge cases keep the probability above zero.

Google looks slightly favored because it is currently first on the Math leaderboard, but the lead is thin and Anthropic remains very close behind. I would price Google at a modest edge rather than a lock.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability — about 12% — that Section IV of the 25th Amendment will be used during Trump's presidency; the legal and political hurdles make invocation unlikely, but age- and event-driven tail scenarios keep the risk above zero.

I assess a very high probability that there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term — about 96% — with only a tiny tail chance of an outright purchase or transfer of sovereignty.

I think Yes is the more likely outcome, but not nearly as certain as the market price implies. June gasoline weakness and a softer demand backdrop point to 0.1% or lower, while sticky services inflation keeps the No side alive.

United Russia is still the likeliest party to post the biggest net seat increase, but this is not a lock because the market measures change from the current Duma rather than simple seat plurality. The latest campaign and polling coverage still favors United Russia, though New People is the most plausible spoiler if there is a meaningful reshuffle.

Keith Sonderling is the clear favorite given his Acting Secretary role and formal nomination, but I assess somewhat less than the market — about an 82% chance — because of Senate uncertainty and turnover risk over the remainder of the term.

I think Yes is slightly more likely than not, but not as likely as the current market price suggests. The threshold is modest relative to pre-war traffic, yet the latest week has been marked by renewed attacks and traffic that still looks well below normal.

I assess a low probability that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends — roughly a 10% chance — because current behavior, incentives, and institutional constraints all favor him staying in office absent a dramatic, rapid collapse or sudden incapacity.

NVIDIA is still the most likely company to sit at the top of the market-cap table on July 31, but the gap to Apple is not enormous and Apple's July 30 earnings create a real, if still minority, chance that NVDA ends the month at second place.

I think Yes is possible but still more likely than not to miss. The broadcast would need an unusually wordy, high-event match or a long knockout finish to get to 60 mentions, and I put that at about one-third odds.

I think the market is still leaning No, but I see a modest chance of a late-summer slide that could pull the Parcl-based LA metro value below $1,137,000. My estimate is 14% Yes, meaning 86% No.

Taylor Dearden has a real nomination path but an unusually narrow winning path. The Pitt’s broad acting strength helps her get noticed, but the defending winner from the same show and several established rivals make her a longshot.

Scheffler still has one clear path to the career Grand Slam before 2028 (the 2027 U.S. Open); given his long-term class but recent wobble, I assess about a 12% chance he'll win that U.S. Open and complete the Grand Slam before 2028.

**Independent assessment:** I assign a 72% probability that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic (i.e., OpenAI is the first of the two to complete a public listing before 2040).

I think a July rate cut is possible but still not the most likely outcome. The Bank of Russia has clearly kept easing on the table, yet the latest inflation print, fuel pressures, and the central bank’s own caution make a hold more likely than a cut.

I think Ethereum has a meaningful but still minority chance of reaching $3,000 by the end of 2026. The market looks too pessimistic at 14.5% yes, but the target still requires a very large rally from today’s level, so I would price it above market yet well below a coin flip.

I lean Yes, but only moderately. The Fed's own June projections and the July 8 minutes point to a real chance of at least one hike in 2026, while the weak June jobs report and still-upcoming inflation data keep this from being close to certain.

Argentina are still the better side and I lean to Yes, but Switzerland’s structure and penalty resistance make this far from a lock. My fair price is higher than the market, around 64%.

I rate Alexander Sørloth at 18% to score at least once. He is likely to play a meaningful role for Norway, but the finishing burden still sits mainly with Haaland and England’s knockout setup makes a Sorloth goal the less likely side of the prop.

Independent assessment: a low but non-negligible chance (~10%) that Trump will be both impeached by the House and removed by the Senate before his term ends — impeachment is plausible politically, but Senate conviction/removal is unlikely without extraordinary, bipartisan-turning evidence or catastrophe.

The latest supply-chain reports still point to a 2026 foldable iPhone release, so I lean Yes, but not as high as the market because Apple has not officially confirmed timing and the product is still a first-generation hardware risk.

I assess a low probability that the Department of Education will be fully eliminated by 20 Jan 2029 — despite Trump’s unpredictability, legislative, legal, and programmatic barriers make outright abolition unlikely.

Very unlikely — I assess a 3% independent probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029. Political, legal, military, and diplomatic barriers make transfer of Canadian territory highly implausible in the given timeframe.

Spider-Man: Brand New Day looks much more likely to open above $200M than below it, but the latest tracking has left a real, if small, path to a sub-$200M debut. I estimate the under-200 outcome at 16%.

I assess a 20% chance that total federal government outlays will fall by at least $250 billion in nominal terms at any point before the end of 2027—plausible under a rapid, large austerity package or a sharp interest-rate driven relief, but unlikely given historical trends and political constraints.

I think Yes is more likely than No, but the 60+ threshold is still high enough that I price it a bit below the current market. My estimate is 63% Yes.

Toy Story 5 looks likely to fall below $19 million in its fourth domestic weekend. The current run rate, holiday distortion from last weekend, and the arrival of Moana make a sub-$19 million frame more probable than not.

Norway have a real upset path after beating Brazil, but England still look more likely to advance. I put Norway's win chance slightly above the market at 31% because their current form and England's minor availability issues make the underdog more live than the price suggests.

The June CPI print is likely to cool from May, but the latest official nowcast still points to about 3.9% year over year, which leaves the 3.6% cutoff as a low-probability outcome. I would price Yes at 9%, well above the market but still clearly a No-leaning call.

I put the chance of a return to normal traffic by August 31 at 18%. The strait is still operating well below the 60-call threshold, and the latest week of attacks makes a sustained recovery look less likely than the current market price implies.

I assess a low probability that Elon Musk personally visits Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — it's possible but unlikely given his stated priorities, typical human lifespan limits, and lack of any public plan for him to go himself.

Spain are a live but not dominant title contender: their run to the semifinals is real, but France in the last four makes the path difficult. I rate their chance modestly above the market at 26%.

Marine Le Pen is still a live contender and the latest court ruling materially improves her path to the ballot, but the race is still structurally difficult and far from certain. I would put her win probability modestly above the market at 32%.

Nvidia remains the clear favorite to finish July 31 as the largest company in the world, but the lead is not so large that Apple’s late-month earnings cannot matter. I’m a bit less bullish than the market because one strong Apple print or a sharp AI-trade selloff could still change the ranking.

Nigel Farage looks overwhelmingly likely to win the Clacton by-election. The combination of a deeply favorable seat, a strong personal base, and major parties refusing to stand makes the No outcome look like a long shot.

I assess a 52% chance the next President will confirm exactly one Supreme Court justice during the 2025–2029 term: most likely a single vacancy occurs and the Senate yields to confirmation, but nontrivial risks push probability away from certainty.

Very unlikely — I assess a ~2% chance that Donald Trump will *end* the Federal Reserve (legal abolition) before Jan 20, 2029. Abolishing the Fed requires Congressional legislation and a political/technical mobilization that is implausible in the given timeframe.

Given the administration's sustained, multifront effort to tighten H‑1B eligibility, raise wages/fees, and block extensions, an actual expansion of high‑skill immigration under Trump's term is unlikely; I assess a low but nonzero chance that politics or legal developments produce an expansion.