Edges for Sep 19, 2026

I think OpenAI is much less likely than Anthropic to IPO first, so the yes outcome looks heavily overpriced. My independent probability for OpenAI being first is about 15%.

I put the chance of Barron Trump receiving a presidential pardon before Jan. 21, 2029 at 2%. There is no visible legal predicate for a pardon, and absent a federal case or at least a credible public controversy, the event is extremely unlikely.

A signed U.S.-Denmark Greenland deal by September 23 looks unlikely on this timeline. The market price appears too optimistic for a formal bilateral agreement that would require coordinated signatures within just a few days.

I think the bull case for Trump in 2026 is meaningfully more likely than the market implies, though still far from assured. My estimate is that there is roughly a 38% chance the favorable Trump-and-markets narrative remains intact through 2026.

New Hampshire still has a strong path to preserving first-in-the-nation status because state law pushes its primary earlier than any other similar contest, but the DNC’s move to put South Carolina first creates a real chance that the party calendar prevails. I’d rate Yes at 67%, below the market’s enthusiasm but still the most likely outcome.

The most likely 2032 GDP growth outcome is a mid-range print around 2% to 3%, with 2.1% to 2.5% the single best bucket. I think the market is leaning too hard toward the No side if it is treating this as a broad growth-distribution question rather than a sharply defined downside bet.

United Russia is overwhelmingly likely to gain the most seats in the next Russian parliamentary election. The main uncertainty is the size of its victory, not whether it finishes first.

The most likely outcome is still that no eligible AI lab will make a qualifying announcement for any of the five counted Millennium Prize Problems before the end of 2026. Recent AI claims raise the odds of a breakthrough, but the verification and announcement standard remains a major obstacle.

Trump voluntarily resigning before the end of his term looks unlikely. The evidence provided shows political turbulence and staff churn, but nothing that meaningfully suggests he is preparing to leave office early.

The bear case for Trump in 2026 looks meaningfully more plausible than the market implies, driven by a real combination of legal defeats, institutional resistance, and the risk of a politically damaging midterm environment. I would price it closer to one-in-four than one-in-nine.

Starbucks looks highly likely to finish 2026 above 41,800 global stores. The latest reported count and management’s net-new store guidance already place the company on a path comfortably above the threshold unless there is an unusually large reversal.

I think a 2027 recession is more likely than the market implies, but still not the base case. My independent estimate is 38%, reflecting a meaningful downside risk from valuation shocks, tightening financial conditions, and delayed effects from today’s investment and labor dynamics.

I think there is a meaningful chance USAID is effectively abolished or formally eliminated during Trump's term, but it is still far from the base case. My independent probability is 35%, above the market price because the political appetite to dismantle it appears stronger than the market is implying.

Ethereum has a real path to $3,000 by the end of 2026, but it still needs a decisive breakout above nearby resistance and a stronger market tailwind than current price action suggests. I would price the Yes outcome below the market at 46%, with the No side slightly favored because several near-term forecasts and technical signals remain below the target.

My view is that 2036 U.S. real GDP growth is most likely to land in the mid-2% range, with 2.1% to 2.5% the single most probable bucket. The market looks a bit too pessimistic on the chance that growth stays near trend rather than slipping into the sub-2% range.

I գնահատestimate a meaningfully lower chance than the market that Alito resigns before Trump’s term ends. The evidence points to continued service unless health, personal circumstances, or a deliberate retirement plan emerge.

Anthropic is still the likeliest winner because Claude Fable 5.1 appears to be leading the relevant leaderboard right now, but the lead does not look unassailable. OpenAI’s GPT-6 Astra is close enough that a late-month swap is a meaningful risk, so I would price Yes high but below the market’s near-certain level.

I put the chance of the United States acquiring any part of Greenland before 2029 at 8%. The more plausible outcome is expanded basing or access rights, not a formal transfer of sovereignty or land ownership.

Boeing is on a strong delivery trajectory, but getting above 680 in 2026 still requires a sustained step-up that does not look fully in place yet. I estimate about an 18% chance of a Yes outcome.

Scott Jennings is a live contender, but the field remains genuinely open and the lack of any formal selection keeps this from being a strong favorite. I put his independent chance at 31%, modestly above the current market but still well below a coin flip.

I think a sub-$10 million second weekend is possible but still not the most likely outcome. The opening was soft enough to raise concern, yet a $30 million debut still gives the film a lot of room to stay above that threshold unless the drop is unusually severe.

There is a real near-term path to a House impeachment vote against Pete Hegseth, but the odds still hinge on whether enough Republicans break ranks. I make the chance that at least one cabinet member is impeached before Jan. 1, 2027 at 17%.

Olivia Rodrigo is a credible contender, but the field looks crowded and the market already prices that in. I think her win chance is meaningfully below 50%, with a modestly lower estimate than the current price because Album of the Year usually rewards either dominant cultural consensus or unusually broad industry coalition support.

I think the Bears are more likely than not to leave Soldier Field in some form, but the chance that the destination is specifically a new Illinois site is closer to a coin flip than the market implies. Indiana remains a serious contender, and the risk that the process drags beyond the 2028 opener is still material.

I think the chance that Trump actually regains U.S. ownership or formal control of the Panama Canal is low, around 12%. The rhetoric is real, but the evidence points to leverage, security cooperation, and signaling rather than any plausible legal transfer.

I assess a low probability that Trump will both be impeached and removed before his term ends, with the main obstacle being the very high Senate conviction threshold even if a future House were to act. The market looks materially too bullish on the Yes side given how much political control would need to change and how much evidence of removal-level support would be required.

Scheffler is still the best long-shot candidate in golf to complete the career Grand Slam, but the event is still meaningfully unlikely because he must not only stay healthy and elite, but also convert one or more majors before the cutoff. My independent estimate is higher than the market’s, at 14%, because the market looks too dismissive of his sustained major-winning baseline.

I estimate only a very small chance that Elon Musk personally visits Mars before Aug. 1, 2099. The dominant issue is simple longevity: he would be 128 by then, so the event requires an extraordinary combination of survival and a successful human Mars transport program.

A completed purchase of Greenland, even of a partial area or sovereign slice, still looks very unlikely. The more plausible path is continued pressure, investment interest, or a limited strategic arrangement that falls short of an actual purchase.

My read is that 2033 GDP growth is more likely to land around the 1.6%–2.5% zone than in the market’s dominant 1.1%–1.5% bucket. The available long-horizon forecasts cluster near 2% for mature economies, so I see the market as slightly overweighting a softer-growth outcome.

My view is that 2035 U.S. real GDP growth is most likely to land in the low-to-mid 2% range, with a meaningful but not dominant chance of a sub-2% outcome. The market looks somewhat too pessimistic overall, though not wildly so.

I estimate a moderately higher-than-market chance that the Fed leaves rates unchanged in December 2027, with the hold outcome the clear baseline unless inflation re-accelerates. The most plausible alternative is a cut, not a hike, so the market appears a bit too willing to price in policy drift away from the Fed’s current projected path.

Elon Musk is more likely than not to exceed 40 counted X posts over this three-day window, given his recent cadence and the market’s own expectation of a fairly active period. I estimate a modest chance of fewer than 40 posts, around 18%, mainly if he has an unusually quiet weekend or shifts attention away from X.

The film still looks more likely than not to finish below $70 million, but the strong preview-driven upside means the threshold is not as safe as the current market price suggests. I would still make Yes a very likely outcome, just not at the extreme level implied by 95.5%.

The market appears to be pricing in a broad reading of invasion, but the resolution text is stricter and seems to require a military offensive aimed at establishing control over Iranian territory. On that reading, the chance of a true U.S. invasion by the end of 2026 looks meaningfully below the current implied price.

Andrew Oldham is a credible future Supreme Court candidate, but the current evidence does not support him as the most likely next justice. I put his independent probability at 14%, with James Ho and D. John Sauer looking somewhat stronger on the present shortlist dynamics.

Anthropic looks like the most likely winner because it is currently leading the relevant arena leaderboard and has multiple recent snapshots supporting that position. Still, the margin is not unassailable, so I put the chance somewhat below the market price.

Robinhood is growing, but the latest disclosed pace still looks too slow to clear 30.2 million funded customers by year-end 2026. I put the Yes probability at 35%, with the main risk being that the market may be underestimating a late-year acceleration in customer acquisition.

The most likely outcome is that the Department of Education is severely weakened and partially hollowed out, but not formally eliminated before January 20, 2029. I put the chance of true elimination at 22%, which is higher than the market price because the administration has multiple ways to accelerate a collapse if political control and legislative timing align.

Paris FC look like a narrow home favorite, but the match is close enough that a draw or Strasbourg result remains very live. I put Paris FC’s win chance slightly below the market-implied midpoint because the draw risk is meaningful and the pre-match estimates do not support a strong edge.

Germany is more likely than not to print a small positive year-over-year GDP growth rate in Q3 2026, with the latest tracking estimates clustering just above zero and the broader 2026 backdrop still constructive. A flat or negative reading is possible if the Q3 slowdown was stronger than expected, but it looks like a minority outcome.

The bill is still alive procedurally, but the failed Senate cloture vote makes enactment by year-end look unlikely. I place the chance of a 2026 signature well below 20%, though not at zero because a renewed vote could still succeed if negotiations shift enough senators.

Democrats look favored to win the House, but the Senate is still the limiting factor, and the combined outcome requires them to clear two separate hurdles. The market is a bit more bullish than I am, so I’d price D Senate and D House at just above even odds rather than near two-thirds.

Merz faces real political pressure and weak approval, so an exit by the end of 2026 is plausible, but the legal and coalition hurdles to removing a sitting chancellor are substantial. I think the market is a bit low, but not dramatically so.

Vučić is the ruling party’s announced prime-ministerial pick, which gives him a real path to the office if SNS wins enough seats and keeps coalition discipline. Still, the outcome is not close to certain because the election result, coalition arithmetic, and his own willingness to complete the move all remain meaningful hurdles.

I put only a low single-digit-to-mid-single-digit chance on the United States acquiring any part of Canada before 2029. The current rhetoric is serious enough to keep the tail risk alive, but there is still no credible legal, diplomatic, or military pathway that looks close to producing territorial transfer.

Benjamin Netanyahu remains a live possibility because he still performs well in personal-preference polling and could benefit from coalition fragmentation, but the broader polling picture currently points away from a clear path to power. I would price his chances at modestly above the market but still well below even odds.

Democrats remain favored to win the House, with multiple forecasts and seat-based models pointing to a modest but meaningful edge. The market is pricing an even stronger chance, but the combination of narrow control and still-open toss-up races keeps some real upset risk alive.

NVIDIA remains the favorite to finish 2026 as the largest company, but the margin is not secure because its valuation is already extremely high and any sharp multiple compression could let Apple or Alphabet catch up. I would price the Yes outcome slightly below the market, but still clearly above even odds.

Trump invoking the Insurrection Act is still a low-probability event, but the combination of his stated willingness to use extraordinary force, recurring election-security rhetoric, and plausible unrest scenarios makes it more likely than the market implies. I put the chance at 24%.

The odds of a second AI-lab Millennium Prize announcement by September 30 look modest but nontrivial. The recent Navier-Stokes claim makes another public declaration more plausible than in a normal period, but the short time window and the rarity of such announcements still keep No favored.

A qualifying senior-level US-Iran meeting before September 30 looks more likely than not to fail to materialize, even though diplomatic contact remains active. The market’s high Yes price is broadly justified because current reporting shows discussion and signaling, but not a confirmed bilateral in-person round that clearly meets the rules.

I think Yes is more likely than not, but not close to certain. The market’s pricing looks a bit rich relative to the launch-timing risk and the chance that the token’s first-day price settles below the threshold after initial hype fades.

Infantino faces meaningful public pressure, but there is still no concrete sign of resignation, dismissal, or a formal removal process before year-end. The market is right to keep Yes above a token level, but No remains the clear favorite.

The ceasefire looks politically fragile, but the market resolves on whether the United States actually launches a qualifying strike before September 20, and there is still no confirmed evidence of that happening. I think Yes is still the most likely outcome, though the risk is meaningfully higher than the current price suggests.

OpenAI has already made one high-profile Millennium Prize claim this month, and there is some reporting that it may be close on another problem. Even so, the odds of a second qualifying announcement within the remaining days still look limited, so I put the chance of Yes below the current market price.

I think the Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer Conjecture has a real but still limited chance of being the next Millennium Prize Problem solved by an AI lab. The market’s 15.5% implied probability looks somewhat aggressive, so I would lean a bit lower, but not dramatically lower, because there is genuine speculative momentum around AI-assisted advances in arithmetic geometry.

The market is asking for a very specific three-meeting sequence, and while September already matched the first leg, the remaining path still needs both an October pause and a December hike. That makes the Yes outcome plausible but not the base case, so I would price it below the current market-implied level.

A further Fed hike in the remaining 2026 meetings looks more likely than not, with policy guidance and market pricing both leaning toward at least one more increase. The main uncertainty is timing, not direction, so I place the Yes probability slightly below the market price but still high.