Edges for Sep 14, 2026

Starbucks looks materially more likely than not to finish 2026 above 41,800 global stores. Current guidance and the existing store base imply a comfortable buffer unless execution deteriorates sharply.

I think the market is heavily overconfident that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic. Based on the latest reporting, Anthropic has the more imminent and better-advanced path to a public listing, so I put OpenAI-first at about 34%.

I estimate Barron Trump’s chance of receiving a presidential pardon before January 21, 2029 at very low, around 4%. Absent a specific federal criminal exposure or public controversy, there is little reason to expect a pardon for a private family member.

Anthropic has a real path to finishing first because Claude Fable 5.1 is already reported near the top on some independent rankings, but the lead does not look secure. The current market price appears too optimistic given the mixed benchmark picture and the possibility that OpenAI or another company overtakes it before the end-of-month check.

Alibaba is a strong favorite because Qwen has consistently been one of the most competitive Chinese model families and Alibaba can iterate quickly. Still, the market price looks rich for a leaderboard-style outcome where a single strong release from DeepSeek, ByteDance, or another rival could easily take first place on the snapshot date.

Robinhood has been growing funded customers steadily, and crossing 30.2 million in 2026 looks more likely than not if recent momentum persists. I make it a moderate favorite, above the market’s implied probability.

I think Boeing is more likely than not to fall short of 640 commercial deliveries in 2026. The recovery in output has been real, but the threshold is high enough that it likely requires near-sustained execution across 737 and 787 programs with very little disruption.

It is more likely than not that no eligible AI lab will credibly announce a solution to any Millennium Prize Problem before the end of 2026. The remaining time is short, the bar for a qualifying announcement is very high, and even dramatic theoretical progress usually does not become a formal solved claim on this kind of timetable.

I think impeachment is closer to a coin flip than the market suggests, with meaningful upside only if Democrats win the House in 2026 and choose to make impeachment a priority. My independent probability is 48%, well below the current market price of 66%.

The song has a plausible path to the top spot if it breaks out quickly, but the market price looks a bit high for a track without clear evidence of broad U.S. streaming dominance. I would lean No, with a Yes probability slightly below the current implied level.

I think a U.S. acquisition of any part of Greenland before 2029 is very unlikely. The most plausible paths are diplomatic noise or expanded military access, not an actual transfer of sovereignty or territorial control.

I think the Fed is more likely than not to leave rates unchanged in December 2027, but the market is probably too confident about a hold. The long horizon leaves substantial room for either a late-cycle easing move or an inflation-driven hike before then.

Samuel Alito has a meaningful chance to leave the Court before Trump’s term ends, but resignation is still a fairly high bar for a justice who has shown no strong sign of stepping down. I put the probability below the market at 48%.

I think a Trump resignation before the end of this term is possible but still unlikely, with a materially lower probability than the market implies. My independent estimate is 8%, reflecting the historical rarity of presidential resignations and the absence of any concrete evidence that resignation is imminent.

This market looks unlikely to resolve Yes by September 30, 2026. OpenAI would need to publicly announce a full solution to one of the remaining Millennium Prize Problems, which is an extremely high bar and rare even for top research organizations.

I slightly favor the No side, because Japan’s core-core inflation has shown enough underlying stickiness that dropping to 1.9% or lower in the 2026 annual figure looks plausible but not the most likely outcome. The market is close, though, and a modest slowdown in services inflation or yen stabilization could still push the result to the Yes side.

I գնահատ/assess the chance that Trump secures any actual purchase of Greenland, even a partial one, as very low. The most plausible outcome is continued rhetoric, bargaining, or expanded U.S. access short of a territorial sale.

Democrats have a plausible path to winning both chambers, but it still looks like a harder-than-even outcome because the Senate map is the main constraint. I would price a D Senate, D House result below 50%, but not dramatically below because a midterm backlash could produce a broad anti-incumbent wave.

A U.S. reassertion of control over the Panama Canal during Trump’s term is extremely unlikely. I put the chance materially below the market, because rhetoric is cheap and any literal transfer of sovereignty would face enormous legal, diplomatic, and military barriers.

Kari Lake has a real path to confirmation, but the combination of controversy, the remaining Senate calendar, and the lack of visible movement makes the timing uncertain. I think the market is somewhat too bearish, with a modestly higher chance than 24% that she is confirmed before Apr. 1, 2027.

USAID has a real chance of being effectively dismantled or folded into another entity during Trump’s term, but formal elimination still faces major legal and congressional hurdles. I put the chance higher than the market, but not above a coin flip.

My independent view is that US real GDP growth in 2036 is more likely to land in the 1.6% to 2.0% band than anywhere else, with a meaningful but smaller chance of a mild recessionary or sub-1% outcome. The market looks somewhat too pessimistic on the center of the distribution and a bit too confident that growth will miss trend.

I think measles cases are more likely than the market suggests to end up elevated during Trump’s term, but the outcome is still highly uncertain because measles remains capable of being contained by strong local public health responses. My independent estimate is modestly below even odds, not a strong Yes.

A 2027 recession looks meaningfully possible, but not the base case. I would price Yes at 32%, above the market’s 22% because the time horizon is long enough for a slowdown to emerge even without an obvious current trigger.

I put the chance of the United States acquiring any part of Canada before 2029 at 2%. This is an extreme geopolitical event with no visible pathway under current institutions, allied relationships, or Canadian domestic politics.

Trump is more likely than not to keep H-1B policy restrictive, but there is still a meaningful chance he broadens access for high-skill workers under business pressure. I estimate a 25% chance of a true expansion by the end of the term.

The market is heavily tilted toward No because August inflation was still 3.4% and September would need a fairly large one-month improvement to land at 2.9% or below. A sub-2.9% print is possible if September monthly price growth is unusually soft, but the current data and momentum make it unlikely.

I think the market is pricing this too low. Even without a precise definition of “bear case,” Trump faces enough legal, political, and reputational downside in 2026 that the chance of a clearly unfavorable year looks closer to the low teens than to 4%.

Section 4 of the 25th Amendment remains possible but still unlikely to be used during Trump’s presidency. The political and procedural hurdles are enormous, and absent a dramatic incapacity event or a major internal rupture, the most likely outcome is that it is never formally invoked.

A direct U.S. invasion of Iran before the end of 2026 looks very unlikely. The market’s implied probability is already low, but the threshold for this event is so high that I would price it even lower, at about 9%.

Scott Jennings has a plausible path because he is a polished Trump-friendly communicator, but he still looks less likely than several more tightly embedded loyalists. I would price his chance materially below the market, around 14%.

I think a U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term remains extremely unlikely, so the no-acquisition outcome is materially more likely than the market implies. The most probable result is continued rhetoric, strategic cooperation, or perhaps some expanded U.S. presence, not a formal transfer of sovereignty.

I think the Doge-1 Lunar Mission has a slightly below-even chance of launching by June 30, 2027. The market is pricing a modestly higher probability than I would, mainly because this mission has a long history of delays and schedule slippage.

I put the chance of Trump being impeached and removed from office before his term ends at 7%. Impeachment is plausible under severe political or legal turmoil, but actual removal requires an extraordinary collapse in Republican support that has historically been very rare.

I estimate a slightly better than one-in-three chance that the next President confirms exactly two Supreme Court justices during the 2025-2029 term. The most plausible paths are either no vacancies or one vacancy, but the current Court’s age profile keeps two confirmations very much in play.

Pete Hegseth is still the most plausible next Cabinet exit, but the odds look only moderately above the market, not overwhelming. The evidence shows real internal strain and political vulnerability, yet not a clear firing or resignation path.

My base case is that 2033 US real GDP growth lands in the 1.1% to 1.5% range, with a substantial tail toward slightly stronger growth if productivity stays elevated. The market looks broadly efficient but a bit too concentrated in the first bucket relative to the odds of a 1.6% to 2.0% outcome.

I estimate a modest but not dominant chance of sub-0.1% U.S. real GDP growth in 2032, around 12%. That is below the market’s 20% and reflects that a deep slowdown is possible by then, but a near-stall year still usually requires an unusually severe recession or measurement shock.

The odds still look fairly low that H.R.3633 becomes law by the end of 2026. The market’s 23.5% Yes price seems a little optimistic, but the bill is not impossible if crypto policy becomes a top bipartisan priority and leadership decides to move it quickly.

I think there is a better-than-even chance that Variational's token clears an $800M FDV one day after launch, but the margin is not huge because early post-launch prices can be highly unstable. The market’s current price looks broadly reasonable, though I would trim it slightly given the uncertainty around launch timing, supply details, and initial liquidity.

Scottie Scheffler is good enough to complete the career grand slam, but the timeline is tight and he still needs to convert at least one of the two toughest remaining majors. I make this a low-probability yes, but meaningfully above the market’s 5% implied price.

There is a real scheduled basis for Yes because the event is reportedly planned for October 2026, but Kanye West’s history of unstable commitments, travel complications, and last-minute cancellations keeps the odds meaningfully below even. I would still place the chance of an actual live performance in Russia by October 31 at 34%.

I think a move to a new Illinois location is somewhat more likely than not, but not as close to certain as the market implies. The most plausible path is a stadium/land deal somewhere in suburban Illinois, though timing and financing remain the main obstacles.

Ethereum reaching $3,000 by the end of 2026 looks slightly more likely than not, but it still requires a meaningful breakout from the current price region. The market’s current pricing and the recent technical setup support a moderate Yes edge rather than a strong conviction call.

Republicans have a credible path to the White House in 2028, but the market’s 33% price looks a bit low only if the political environment turns sharply against the current governing party. My estimate is that Republicans are still more likely than not to lose, with a meaningful but minority chance of winning.

Texas remains structurally difficult terrain for Democrats in a Senate race, but the market is signaling a genuinely competitive contest. I slightly favor No because the state’s baseline partisan lean still gives Republicans a narrow edge even in a midterm environment that may be more favorable to Democrats nationally.

Gavin Newsom is a serious national figure with strong fundraising and media visibility, but the 2028 Democratic field is likely to be crowded and the nomination path is highly competitive. I put his chance modestly above the current market price, but still well below even odds.

I assign a modest chance that Strait of Hormuz traffic will get back to a 7-day average of at least 60 ship arrivals before year-end. The market’s low price is understandable because the threshold is fairly high and geopolitical disruption can linger, but a recovery is still plausible if shipping patterns stabilize over the next few months.

Democrats remain a clear favorite to control the House after the 2026 midterms, and the market price reflects that. I would still put the probability slightly below the current quote because House control can swing on a small number of close districts and late-cycle national shifts.

Bitcoin reaching $100,000 in September looks unlikely but not impossible, with the current market implying a very low chance and the remaining time window being the main constraint. I estimate a modestly higher probability than the market, but still clearly below 10%.

The market is pricing in a low recession probability, and that is reasonable, but I think the chance is a bit higher than 9.5% because only a modest deterioration in late-2026 GDP would be enough to trigger a Yes. My estimate is 14%, reflecting a still-resilient economy with a non-trivial risk that growth turns negative in back-to-back quarters.

Anthropic remains the likeliest winner because it is already leading this market and has shown sustained strength on the specific arena leaderboard that determines resolution. Still, the gap is not so wide that OpenAI or another provider cannot overtake it in the final check, so I would shade slightly below the current market price.

FC Midtjylland are a strong favorite at home, and the market’s very high price reflects that. I still see some upset risk because football is low-scoring and Brøndby are a capable opponent, but the most likely outcome remains a Midtjylland win.

Como are the clear favorite at home and the market is broadly aligned with that view, but the price is high enough that some caution is warranted. I still make Como a strong favorite, just a bit below the implied market probability.

Anthropic looks like the leading contender and should remain favored, but the margin is not so large that a late-month swap can be ignored. I put the chance of Anthropic finishing first at 83%.

The market is heavily tilted toward No, and that looks broadly justified. A brief dip below 4.45% is possible if Treasury yields soften on incoming economic data or a risk-off move, but the threshold is close enough that the remaining September window still leaves only a modest chance of Yes.