Edges for Sep 22, 2026

The agreement appears to have been announced, but the formal signature is still described as coming next week rather than before the September 23 cutoff. That makes a Yes outcome possible only if the governments accelerate the signing unexpectedly, so I think the market is materially overpricing Yes.

I think Anthropic is more likely to IPO before OpenAI, so the Yes side looks overpriced if Yes means OpenAI goes first. The clearest public signals point to Anthropic being closer to market, while OpenAI is explicitly signaling a later timetable.

I think the chance Barron Trump receives a presidential pardon before Jan. 21, 2029 is very low, because there is no visible underlying federal offense or legal exposure that would make a pardon relevant. Absent an extraordinary future scandal, this looks far more like a speculative family-name market than a grounded clemency case.

Starbucks is growing, but the reported pace still looks short of the 41,800 threshold. I estimate only a modest chance that the company finishes 2026 above 41,800 total global stores, with the market appearing too optimistic.

The bear case for Trump in 2026 looks materially more likely than the market implies, because multiple legal, regulatory, and political setbacks are already active and could easily compound into a broader negative year. I’d price Yes at 44%, not 4.2%, because the market seems to be treating this as a rare tail event when the underlying drivers are already in motion.

Samuel Alito is an aging justice, but there is no clear public indication that he plans to resign, and Supreme Court justices usually leave on their own timing rather than under near-term pressure. I put the chance of a resignation during Trump’s remaining term at 18%.

Trump is very likely to insult Tucker Carlson publicly again before September 30. The feud is active, recent reporting already documents multiple Trump insults, and Carlson’s continued attacks give Trump strong incentive to پاسخ in kind.

I estimate a roughly 42% chance that Trump is impeached before Jan. 20, 2029. The market appears too optimistic on impeachment because the House has just blocked the latest effort and Democratic leadership is not currently prioritizing it.

Alibaba looks like the leading Chinese contender right now, with strong recent model releases and a broad infrastructure push. Still, the market is judging a single leaderboard snapshot, and active rivals make a near-certain Yes too aggressive, so I would put Alibaba’s chance meaningfully above even but well below the current price.

I think there is a solid majority chance that no additional qualifying Millennium Prize Problem will be announced solved by an eligible AI lab in 2026. The recent Navier-Stokes claim raises attention, but under this market’s rules it does not count unless a qualifying official solution announcement occurs for one of the five listed problems.

Democrats are the clear favorite to win the House, but the market is pricing in a very strong certainty that looks higher than the evidence supports. I would still lean Yes, though not nearly as high as the current price implies.

Ethereum has a credible path to $3,000 by year-end because it is already relatively close and technical commentary points to nearby breakout levels. Still, the current price action and mixed year-end forecasts make the market’s implied probability look a bit too high, so I would price this as a modest majority Yes rather than a near certainty.

I put the chance of a Bears move to a new location in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 season below the market, at about 40%. Illinois remains a live option, but the timeline is tight and the team’s public momentum is still stronger toward Hammond than toward a finalized in-state deal.

Trump resigning before the end of his term looks unlikely. The evidence points to political turbulence and staff churn, not to any concrete indication that he is preparing to leave office early.

The 30-year yield is already brushing against 5.40%, so only a modest upward move is needed for a Yes. I see a somewhat higher-than-even chance that a combination of sticky inflation, restrictive policy, and heavy Treasury supply pushes it over the line before year-end.

The chance that the United States formally acquires any part of Greenland before 2029 is very low. I put it at 4%, because the political and legal barriers are enormous even if Washington keeps interest in the island for strategic reasons.

Boeing is improving, but the reported year-to-date pace and production constraints make more than 680 deliveries in 2026 a long shot. I estimate a low-probability yes, but still materially higher than the market’s 4% price.

I think the chance Trump actually takes back the Panama Canal is low, around 8%. The rhetoric and pressure campaign are real, but a legal, diplomatic, or military reversal of sovereignty looks highly unlikely.

Trump has shown real interest in extraordinary domestic security tools, and there is enough plausible unrest/election-related disorder risk that an invocation cannot be treated as a long shot. I put the chance meaningfully above the market at 30%, but still below even odds because the legal and political barriers are substantial.

I put the probability of a 2027 recession at 32%. The baseline outlook is still for modest growth, but the margin is thin enough that a policy mistake, AI/market shock, or housing weakness could tip the economy into contraction.

New Hampshire still looks more likely than not to secure the first Democratic primary slot, but the DNC’s explicit 2028 calendar creates enough uncertainty that the market is probably overstating the certainty of a New Hampshire win. I would price Yes meaningfully below the market, though still as the clear favorite.

The most likely 2032 GDP growth outcome is still centered near the Fed’s long-run 2% trend, with a modest lean toward the 2.1% to 2.5% bin and substantial probability in the adjacent 1.1% to 2.0% range. I think the market is a bit too bearish on the middle-growth outcomes and underweights how sticky trend growth usually is over a six-year horizon.

Impeachment and removal before Trump’s term ends looks very unlikely, but not impossible if control of the House changes and a major scandal creates sustained bipartisan pressure. I put the chance meaningfully below the market at 7%.

The 1430 bar looks modest relative to recent OpenAI-style arena results, so if a qualifying GPT Luna 5.7+ model appears, it has a strong chance of clearing it on debut. The main drag on the probability is not performance but whether that specific model is actually launched, labeled, and added to the leaderboard in time.

My independent view is that 2035 US real GDP growth is most likely to land near the Fed’s long-run 2% trend, with the single best range being 2.1% to 2.5% or 1.6% to 2.0%. The market looks a bit too pessimistic on sub-2% growth and too dismissive of a mild upside drift from trend.

A cabinet impeachment before the deadline is still unlikely, but the Hegseth case makes it materially more plausible than a generic historical baseline. I estimate a modest chance, driven by an active impeachment effort that could break through if the House floor situation changes quickly.

I assign Andrew Oldham a low single-digit to low-teens chance of becoming the next Supreme Court Justice, with the most important point being that the provided evidence does not show he is actually under active consideration. The market appears to be overstating his odds relative to the absence of nomination evidence and the broader field of plausible picks.

My base case is that 2036 U.S. real GDP growth lands near trend rather than dramatically above or below it, with 1.6% to 2.0% the single most likely bucket. I give meaningful weight to 2.1% to 2.5% because current policy forecasts and AI optimism both leave room for a modest upside surprise.

I think this is somewhat more likely than not, but the market is a bit optimistic. OpenAI clearly has an active Sol line, yet the exact combination of a new 5.7+ Sol release appearing on the leaderboard and debuting at or above 1450 still leaves meaningful execution and timing risk.

2026 has a real chance to finish as the hottest year on record, but the evidence so far is stronger for a top-tier year than for a guaranteed record. I lean slightly below the market price because the year still needs to outperform an already extremely hot baseline across all twelve months.

Democrats have a modest polling edge and the race currently looks slightly favorable for Sherrod Brown, but the margin is small enough that this remains a true toss-up. I would still lean Yes, though only by a narrow margin because the state, turnout dynamics, and late movement can easily erase a few-point lead.

Scottie Scheffler is a live but still long-shot bet to complete the career Grand Slam by the start of 2028. His elite baseline and remaining prime years justify a higher probability than the market, but the need to win multiple specific majors in a short window keeps this well below coin-flip territory.

Anthropic is the clear favorite to finish October with the top arena-ranked model, but the race is close enough that a late OpenAI or Google release could still disrupt it. I put the chance of Yes somewhat below the market at 81%.

The likelihood that the United States acquires any part of Canada before 2029 is very low. Current tensions look like trade and security pressure, not a credible pathway to territorial transfer.

I think there is a solid but not overwhelming chance that the next Claude Opus model will debut at 1500 or above. The market is pricing a fairly high probability, but the evidence mainly supports an imminent release rather than a clearly established benchmark outcome.

Google has not publicly made the specific embedded-evaluator commitment yet, and the remaining time window is short. I think a deal or announcement is possible but still more likely not to happen than to happen, so I assign a lower-than-market chance of Yes.

Democrats have a credible path to winning both chambers, and the House looks more favorable than the Senate. Still, the Senate remains the main bottleneck, so I put a modest edge on Yes rather than treating it as the most likely outcome by a wide margin.

A literal purchase of Greenland, even of just part of it, looks highly unlikely. The new security deal satisfies Trump’s strategic goals without requiring sovereignty transfer, so I put the chance of an actual buy at a low single-digit probability.

Democrats look slightly favored to take Senate control, but the race is still close enough that a few late-state shifts could easily flip the outcome. I would put the chance of a Democratic Senate majority at 58%.

My independent view is that 2033 U.S. GDP growth is most likely to land in the low-to-mid 2% area, with the 1.1% to 1.5% bucket still the single biggest outcome but not by enough to justify a heavy favorite. I think the market is slightly too pessimistic about medium-run growth and underweights the chance that trend growth stays near 2% or modestly above it.

My independent estimate is that there is only a very small chance Elon Musk personally visits Mars before Aug. 1, 2099. The main reason is simple demographics and survivorship: he would need to be alive and physically capable at an extremely advanced age, and there is no concrete evidence of a personal Mars mission plan.

Core PCE looks more likely to stay above 3.0% in August than to slip below it. The latest readings and Fed projections point to gradual disinflation, but not enough to make a sub-3.0% result the base case.

The market is pricing a low but nontrivial chance that the Clarity Act becomes law in 2026. I think the Yes outcome is somewhat more plausible than the current price implies, but still unlikely because it requires agreement from both chambers and a presidential signature within a limited legislative window.

Arsenal look like the strongest single contender and deserve to be favored slightly over a coin flip, but the race is still far from secure. I would put their title chance a bit above the current market-implied probability, at 55%.

Democrats have a modest but real edge in Michigan’s Senate race, supported by recent polls showing Abdul El-Sayed narrowly ahead and by the fact that this is an open-seat contest in a state Democrats have remained highly competitive in. Still, the race is close enough that a Republican upset remains very plausible, so the true probability looks only moderately above even odds rather than decisive.

I estimate roughly a 22% chance Robinhood finishes 2026 above 30.2 million funded customers. Growth is still positive, but the company is too far below the threshold and the recent monthly pace is not fast enough to close the gap on time.

USAID is far more likely to be weakened, repurposed, or folded into other structures than formally eliminated. I put the chance of outright elimination at 14%.

Trump is very unlikely to abolish or materially end the Federal Reserve before January 20, 2029. The more plausible outcome is a continued political fight over interest rates and Fed independence, not the institution’s disappearance.

Trump appears far more likely to tighten than expand high-skill immigration, especially H-1B access. I գնահատ probability of a true expansion at 17%, with the most plausible outcome being continued restriction or cosmetic changes that do not materially increase admissions.

“Choosin' Texas” is the clear favorite and has substantial awards momentum, but the category is still competitive enough that an upset remains plausible. I estimate a high-probability win, though somewhat below the market price.

Pete Hegseth is a real contender to be the next Cabinet departure, but the market likely understates his vulnerability only modestly. I put his independent chance at 26%, with the larger view that no single contender is dominant enough to make the race feel close to settled.

There is real bipartisan momentum for an AI safety bill, but the remaining legislative calendar is tight and House leaders are signaling delay. I think the market is slightly underpricing the chance of enactment, but the most likely outcome is still that Congress misses the deadline.

Ethereum reaching $3,400 during September 21-27 looks possible but unlikely, and the market’s very low price suggests traders think it would require a sharp and immediate breakout. My assessment is modestly above the market-implied probability because crypto can move quickly, but still firmly in low-single-digit territory.

Ariana Grande is a credible contender, but she is not the favorite and appears to trail Taylor Swift on both market pricing and broader momentum. I would put her chances of winning Artist of the Year at about one-third.

Gavin Newsom remains a credible 2028 Democratic contender, but the market is right to price him as a minority outcome because he has not entered the race and has publicly conditioned his decision on Kamala Harris. I would put his nomination chance modestly above the current market price, but still well below one in four.

The current situation looks like an ongoing U.S.-Iran war with strikes, maritime pressure, and severe escalation, but not a classic ground invasion aimed at taking and holding Iranian territory. The chance of a true invasion before the end of 2026 is meaningfully below the market price because the operational, political, and strategic hurdles remain very high.

PSG look like a legitimate contender and are priced as one of the two or three leading favorites, but the Champions League is still highly competitive and the market’s current skepticism is reasonable. I would put their title chance modestly above the current market price, at about 18%.

BSD remains a real but not leading candidate for the next AI-announced Millennium Problem solution. The market’s Yes price looks somewhat optimistic given that public signals point more strongly to other problems, especially Hodge, rather than BSD.

Clavicular is currently only charged, not convicted or sentenced, so the Yes outcome still requires a relatively fast criminal resolution and a prison-eligible sentence before the end of 2026. That is possible, but the compressed timeline makes No the far more likely result.

The chances of a true U.S.-China agreement to slow or cap frontier AI development in 2026 look low, because the current diplomatic channel is focused on narrow safety coordination rather than mutual restraint. A limited dialogue or incident-notification mechanism is plausible, but that is not enough for a Yes outcome under this market’s definition.