Edges for Sep 2, 2026

USD is very likely to remain below 1.7 million Iranian rials by the end of September. The threshold is high relative to typical recent free-market levels, so a No outcome is favored strongly.

Elon Musk’s net worth is very likely to remain below $600B by September 30, 2026. The market’s current pricing is directionally sensible, but I think the Yes outcome still deserves a slightly higher probability than the implied 4.85% because crossing above $600B in a single month would require an extraordinary jump in the value of his holdings.

Starbucks is likely to clear 41,800 global stores in 2026 if it continues even a modest net opening pace. My independent estimate is materially above the market, because the threshold is not especially ambitious relative to Starbucks’ existing scale and historical expansion.

I think a Barron Trump pardon is unlikely absent a concrete legal exposure, and the current market looks dramatically too high. My independent estimate is 8%.

I estimate Boeing is materially more likely than the market implies to finish 2026 below 620 commercial deliveries. The threshold is demanding and requires sustained near-maximum production across multiple programs for the full year, which Boeing has historically struggled to achieve consistently.

Robinhood looks materially more likely than not to finish 2026 above 30.2 million funded customers. The market price implies a very low growth bar for a company that has continued to add customers steadily, and that seems too bearish unless growth stalls sharply.

Samuel Alito is still plausible to step down before Trump’s term ends, but the most likely outcome is that he remains on the Court through January 2029. I would price this at about 28%, well below the current market implied probability.

2026 has a real chance to finish near the top of the record, but being the single hottest year is still a demanding threshold. The market looks somewhat too optimistic, because a new annual record requires both persistent warmth and unfavorable year-to-year variability to line up in 2026’s favor.

I think OpenAI is more likely than Anthropic to be the first of the two to go public, but the market is pricing that outcome too aggressively. My independent probability for Yes is 68%.

Arsenal are a credible title contender, but winning the Premier League is still a difficult outcome in a league with several elite rivals and a lot of variance over 38 matches. I would price Yes well below the current market, closer to 28% than 50%.

My independent estimate is that Trump has a meaningful but not dominant chance of being impeached again before the end of the term, closer to the low-to-mid 40s than the market’s 64%. The market appears to be pricing in a fairly aggressive political assumption that the House will flip and that a sufficiently severe scandal will emerge.

I think the market is too dismissive of the chance that 2026 turns into a genuinely bad year for Trump, but the bar for a clear Yes is still fairly high because the exact contract definition is opaque. My independent estimate is 27%, well above the current 10% price but still a minority outcome.

I think Democrats are favored to win the House in 2026, but not nearly as strongly as the market price suggests. The combination of midterm backlash dynamics, narrow Republican defensive depth, and the historical tendency for the out-of-power party to gain seats makes a Democratic takeover more likely than not, though redistricting, candidate quality, and national conditions could still keep Republicans in control.

Solana has a meaningful path to $140 by the end of 2026, but the market is still correctly pricing in substantial uncertainty. I see a slightly better-than-even chance that the price touches that level before year-end, though not by a wide margin.

I think a conviction on at least one murder count is somewhat less likely than the market implies, but still a real possibility. The strongest path to Yes is a jury rejecting a full mental-responsibility defense, while the strongest path to No is acquittal by reason of lack of criminal responsibility, a plea to a lesser outcome, or delay past the deadline.

Elon Musk is capable of exceeding 40 counted posts over a 48-hour window, but that requires a fairly active stretch and is not guaranteed. With no strong evidence of an unusually intense posting burst, I think the under-40 outcome is somewhat more likely than the market price implies, but still far from certain.

Grand Theft Auto VI is still one of the most attention-grabbing entertainment properties in the world, but an “Extended Look” is less likely to match the extraordinary debut of a first reveal trailer. I lean toward a majority chance of staying below 20 million views in the first week, though the margin is not as large as the market price suggests.

The most likely outcome is that Trump does not meaningfully take back the Panama Canal during his term. This would require a dramatic and unprecedented shift in U.S.-Panama relations, so I put the independent probability of Yes at 6%.

Trump has a long pattern of publicly praising Benjamin Netanyahu, and the relationship is politically and personally aligned enough that at least one qualifying remark in August looks more likely than not. The market is currently at a coin flip, but I would lean meaningfully toward Yes.

I think a hold at the December 2027 meeting is still the single most likely outcome, but the true probability is meaningfully lower than the market implies. The long runway to that meeting leaves enough time for either a recessionary easing cycle or an inflation-driven tightening episode to make a change more likely than a 76% hold price suggests.

United Russia is still the clear favorite to end up with the largest seat gain, mainly because Russia’s election system strongly favors the incumbent and the pro-government bloc has the widest access to administrative, media, and organizational advantages. The main uncertainty is not whether ER stays dominant, but whether its net seat change is large enough to exceed any gains by smaller parties or whether it merely holds steady or slips slightly.

Chinese AI labs are strong enough to plausibly place a model in the top 3 at some point before the end of 2026, but the field is highly competitive and leaderboard leadership can shift quickly. I think the market is underpricing the chance of a Chinese model cracking the top 3 at least once, though it is still far from certain.

Section 4 of the 25th Amendment is possible but still unlikely to be formally invoked before Trump leaves office. The legal threshold is extremely high and politically dangerous, making this a low-probability event despite the president’s historically volatile political environment.

Anthropic looks like a strong favorite, but the market may be pricing in too much certainty for a leaderboard that can move quickly. I would still assign Anthropic a solid edge, though not quite as high as the current price implies.

I rate a Fed rate hike in 2026 at 58%. The market is clearly leaning Yes, but with only the final months of the year left and the Fed typically needing clear inflation or growth pressure to reverse course, there is still meaningful room for No if conditions stabilize or soften.

A Trump purchase of Greenland, even just part of it, remains extraordinarily unlikely. I would place the true probability in the low single digits, far below the current market price.

I think USAID has a meaningful chance of being eliminated or functionally dismantled during Trump’s term, but the legal and institutional hurdles are substantial. My independent estimate is lower than a coin flip, yet notably above the market’s current 26% Yes price.

NVIDIA has a strong path to remain the largest company by market cap through the end of 2026, but the market is pricing in a very high degree of confidence. I think the Yes outcome is more likely than not, though not as likely as the current price implies.

Ulf Kristersson remains a plausible next prime minister, but the market is pricing in a substantial risk that the post-election coalition math changes and another candidate takes office. My independent estimate is that he is underpriced only slightly on the Yes side, with No still the more likely outcome.

My independent estimate is that Trump resigning before the end of the term is very unlikely, but not impossible. I put the chance materially below the market, around 6%.

A U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term remains extremely unlikely. My independent estimate is that there is about a 96% chance of no acquisition, with the small remaining probability spread across speculative deal-size outcomes.

The market is heavily tilted toward no Fed cuts in 2026, and that remains the most likely outcome if inflation is still sticky and the labor market is not deteriorating sharply. Still, with several FOMC meetings left in the year, the chance of at least one cut is meaningfully higher than the market implies.

I think a move to a new Illinois location is slightly more likely than the market suggests, with the main path still being a suburban relocation rather than staying put. Indiana is the only meaningful alternative, but it remains a secondary outcome unless Illinois financing or approvals bog down.

I put Trump’s chance of invoking the Insurrection Act during this presidency at 27%. It is still more likely than not that he never uses it, but the probability is meaningfully higher than the market implies because the threshold is low if he faces sustained unrest, major civil disorder, or an electoral-security crisis.

Anthropic looks like the favorite, but the market is probably a bit too confident. I still lean Yes because Claude has been highly competitive in arena-style rankings, though a late-month move by OpenAI, Google, or another frontier lab could still overturn the lead.

I put the chance of Trump’s 2026 bull case landing at 12%. That is still a low-probability outcome, but meaningfully above the market’s 5.3%, because 2026 could plausibly deliver at least one or two favorable political, legal, or economic developments for him.

Alibaba is a strong contender to finish September with the top Chinese model on the Arena leaderboard, but the field is competitive and leaderboard positions can shift quickly. I think the market is slightly too optimistic, though Yes is still the more likely outcome.

I think the chance is very low, around 3%, that the U.S. adds a new state before Trump’s term ends. The market’s 12% looks materially too high given the constitutional hurdles and the limited time window.

I estimate a 20% chance that Elon Musk physically visits Mars before Aug. 1, 2099. The market’s 12% looks somewhat conservative, but not wildly off given the extreme execution, health, and willingness constraints involved.

The odds of a true U.S. invasion of Iran before the end of 2026 look low, even though the two countries are already in an active military confrontation. Current reporting points much more toward continued strikes, blockade pressure, and sanctions than toward a ground campaign intended to seize territory.

Apple is still highly likely to release a foldable device by the deadline, but the market price looks somewhat aggressive given how little public confirmation Apple has provided and how tight the remaining launch window is. I would still lean yes, but with meaningful execution and timing risk.

I put the chance of a U.S. recession in 2027 at 36%, higher than the market’s 29% Yes price. The market appears to be pricing a relatively soft-landing path, but recession risk over a full calendar year remains meaningfully elevated given cycle maturity and the long lead time involved.

HYPE has meaningful upside if Hyperliquid continues to grow quickly, but overtaking Solana’s market cap by year-end would require an exceptionally large and sustained re-rating. I see this as a low-probability event, well below the current market-implied chance.

I think the most likely 2036 U.S. growth outcome is the 1.6% to 2.0% band, with a meaningful secondary chance of 2.1% to 2.5%. The market looks a bit too pessimistic overall and slightly overweights weak-growth outcomes relative to the CBO-style long-run baseline.

New Hampshire is still the most likely state to go first, but not by as wide a margin as the market suggests. I think the Yes outcome is more like a strong favorite than a near-lock, given the real possibility of a revised Democratic calendar or an early challenge from another state.

Marine Le Pen still has a plausible path to the presidency if she remains eligible and the anti-incumbent mood stays strong, but the combination of legal uncertainty, runoff dynamics, and her long-standing ceiling of support makes a win less likely than the market price suggests. I put her chances at 27%.

Hyperliquid reaching $90 by the end of 2026 looks more likely than not, but the market is pricing in a fairly aggressive continuation of momentum. I think the true probability is somewhat below the current market-implied level, because the target still requires a meaningful rally and crypto conditions can turn quickly.

I lean slightly toward US real GDP growth in 2033 landing in the 1.1% to 1.5% range, with a modestly higher probability than the market implies. The distribution still leaves meaningful tails on both the downside and the upside, but the modal outcome looks centered just above 1%.

I see the chance of the U.S. acquiring any part of Canada before 2029 as extremely small, on the order of 1% or less. The current market price looks far too high for an outcome that would require an extraordinary geopolitical rupture and Canadian consent or defeat.

I think NYC is slightly more likely than not to post a very small population increase over July 2025 to July 2027, with the modal outcome being growth in the 0.01% to 0.99% range. The market looks a bit too focused on flat-to-down outcomes given immigration support and the city’s tendency to stabilize after shocks.

I think End of Beginning by Djo has a real but limited chance to finish as Spotify’s number two song of 2026. The current market price looks a bit high for a track whose breakout peak was likely earlier than the 2026 leaderboard window, so I lean No.

Astra has been publicly acknowledged, but there is still no confirmed public release date or public access path as of now. Rumors point to an early-September launch, yet the evidence remains too thin to justify a high probability of release by September 2, 2026.

The market is pricing a very high chance of a September 25 reading at or below 280 million barrels, and that looks directionally justified because the SPR is already close to the threshold and recent weekly moves have been large. I still put the probability a bit below the market because the path depends on continued drawdowns for several consecutive weeks, and the reserve can sometimes flatten out when operational or policy constraints bite.

A removal from office is possible but still unlikely. My estimate is below the market because impeachment alone is easier than impeachment and conviction, and the latter has a very high historical and structural bar.

Alibaba has some chance of being removed, but the bar is high because delisting would require an explicit official DoD update and there is no clear sign of a policy shift. I think the market is still somewhat optimistic, and the true odds are closer to the low-teens than to one-in-four.

There is a meaningful chance Kanye West does perform in Russia by October 31, but the event remains highly execution-dependent and vulnerable to cancellation, delay, or changes in venue or routing. I would price Yes below the market at 38%.

I make this a modestly unlikely event, but not a long shot: about a one-in-five chance that at least one quarter of GDP prints above 5% annualized during 2025-2028. The market is a bit high, in my view, because sustained 5% growth is hard to achieve outside of rebound periods or unusually large stimulus.

I think the Department of Education is unlikely to be formally eliminated by January 20, 2029, but the chance is not zero because a future Trump administration could push aggressively for restructuring or partial dismantling. My independent estimate is 12%, below the market’s 17% but not dramatically so.

I assign a very low probability that Trump actually ends the Federal Reserve before January 20, 2029. The institutional, legal, and political barriers are so large that even an aggressive administration is far more likely to pressure, restructure, or weaken the Fed than abolish it outright.

I lean slightly toward a rate cut, but not decisively. The market’s 38% implied probability looks plausible for a cautious central bank that may wait for clearer disinflation before easing.