Edges for Jun 9, 2026

I assess a low probability (~8%) that Elon Musk will be a trillionaire by 2027; current market pricing (~92% Yes) appears to be driven by speculative headlines rather than a realistic, near-term path to $1T in personal net worth.

I assess a high probability (72%) that the 25th Amendment will be *used at least once* during Trump's 2025–2029 presidency — most likely via Section 3 (voluntary, temporary transfer); Section 4 (involuntary removal) remains very unlikely.

I assess a 30% independent probability that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom will be the first G7 leader to leave office (blind to market prices).

I assess a low probability that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029 — roughly 8% — because there is no public legal exposure for him and pardoning an immediate family member is politically costly and rare, though nonzero because presidential clemency is broad and Trump has signaled willingness to use pardons expansively.

Given very high measles counts already in 2025 and through mid‑2026, I assess a substantially greater-than-market chance that the 2025–2028 average will meet the market's 'Yes' condition; my independent probability is 65%.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance (25%) that the Chicago team will actually relocate to Indiana and play home games there by the first game of the 2028 regular season; an Indiana announcement is significantly more likely than on-field readiness by 2028.

I assess a low probability that any U.S. quarterly GDP will exceed 5% between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — my independent estimate is 20%. Strong jobs numbers and rhetoric raise the possibility of a surprise, but hard output data and policy constraints make a true 5%+ quarter unlikely.

Given likely near-term deficits, rising interest costs, and active additional spending pressures, I assess a strong but not near-certain chance that gross U.S. federal debt will hit $40T before 2029-03-31 — my independent probability is 70%.

I assess a low probability (~5%) that Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his term — doing so would require extraordinary legal, diplomatic, or military steps that are highly unlikely in the 2025–2029 window.

I assess a better-than-even chance that the U.S. will fall below 7.60 on the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index during the 2025–2028 Trump administration, driven by cumulative hits to 'functioning of government' and 'civil liberties' even if catastrophic breakdown is unlikely.

I assess a low probability (12%) that the United States will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029. Strong rhetorical intent from Trump and Arctic strategic value increase the chance slightly, but legal, political, and diplomatic barriers make an actual transfer unlikely within this term.

I assess a 45% probability that Ilia Topuria will be the UFC Lightweight champion on December 31, 2026, reflecting strong upside if he moves up and gets favorable matchups but substantial downside from elite incumbent lightweights, injuries, or promotional choices.

**Independent assessment:** Given the SpaceX IPO filing at a reported $1.77T valuation, I assess there is a *high* but not certainty-level chance Elon Musk will become the world's first trillionaire before 2030 — approximately **72%** — because the headline valuation makes it plausible on paper but substantial execution, pricing, and stake/dilution/tax uncertainties remain.

Given high baseline legal and political friction but substantial institutional and political hurdles, I assess a modestly below-even chance that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 — a meaningful tail risk but not the most likely outcome.

I assess a ~22% independent probability that a clear “bull case” for Trump will materialize in 2026 — plausible but unlikely given policy execution risk, legal/political headwinds, and the high bar for a convincing, broad-based upside narrative.

Removal by Senate is historically unprecedented and requires a large bipartisan revolt; I assess the independent chance of impeachment + removal before term end at about 5%.

I assess ~25% probability that Justice Clarence Thomas will resign (voluntarily leave the Court) at some point during Trump's current term; given his recent activity, ideological alignment with the appointing party, and lack of public retirement signals, staying on is the far more likely outcome.

I assess Marine Le Pen has a modest but meaningful chance of winning the 2027 French presidency, driven by an open-field race, RN's consolidation, and potential fragmentation of anti-RN forces, but the two-round system and broad anti-RN voting make her victory unlikely; my probability estimate is 18%.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that Trump will complete a formal, comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement by Jan 20, 2029 — my independent probability is 22%. Ongoing tariff talks point to narrower deals, not an FTA, and political and structural barriers make a full agreement unlikely in this window.

I assess a 28% chance that USAID will be legally eliminated during Trump's term. Executive orders and administrative actions can hollow out or reassign much of USAID's work, but statutory abolition faces significant legal and political barriers.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, reflecting his residual base strength but substantial legal, health, and party-cohesion obstacles.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026; the market-implied probability is extremely low, but macro, liquidity, and institutional shocks could produce a rapid rally that reaches that level.

I assess a modest but meaningful chance that a North American country wins the 2026 World Cup, driven mainly by home advantage and improved player pools, but still constrained by historical patterns and the concentration of elite talent in Europe and South America.

I assess a strong but not certain chance that Andy Burnham will win the Makerfield by-election, primarily because Makerfield is a safe Labour area and Burnham is a high-profile, popular Greater Manchester politician; however the key uncertainty is whether he chooses to stand and whether Labour selects him as candidate.

I assess ~20% chance that U.S. government spending will register a net decrease of “250” (most plausibly $250 billion) before 2028; cuts of that magnitude are possible but materially unlikely given structural budget drivers and political constraints.

I estimate a 60% probability that Joshua Van will be the UFC Flyweight champion on December 31, 2026, reflecting his strong contender trajectory and favorable matchup potential balanced against injury, divisional depth, and booking uncertainty.

My independent assessment: Blake Lively is unlikely but not extremely unlikely to attend — I place a ~30% chance she attends Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce’s wedding on Dec 31, 2028.

I assess a very low probability (2%) that President Trump will *end* (abolish/dissolve) the Federal Reserve during his term ending Jan 20, 2029 — abolition would require major congressional legislation, face enormous institutional and market resistance, and is unlikely to be accomplished within the available timeframe.

I estimate a 72% probability that the Fed will not cut rates at all in 2026, reflecting continued Fed reluctance to ease until there is clearer and sustained evidence of disinflation or a tangible weakening in labor markets, while acknowledging nontrivial tail risks that could force one or more cuts.

I assess a roughly 30% chance that Trump will succeed in buying at least part of Greenland during his term — low for a full sovereign sale but materially higher once partial purchases, leases, or concessions are counted as 'buying'.

I assess a very high probability that there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during President Trump's term — this remains the default outcome given legal, political, and practical barriers; I assign a 90% chance of no acquisition.

James Ho is a credible and plausible nominee; I assign him a 24% independent chance of being the next Supreme Court Justice, higher than the market's 16% because his credentials, ideological fit, and clerkship ties make him a regularly shortlisted option if a conservative vacancy opens.

I assess a very low chance that the United States will acquire sovereignty over any part of Canada before Jan 21, 2029 — most plausibly a tiny, negotiated border adjustment; large-scale annexation is effectively impossible. My independent probability: 4%.

I assess a modestly lower-than-even chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's next Prime Minister after the 2026 election, with the main balancing forces being his strong core support and coalition skills versus legal exposures and the prospect of a united opposition or coalition breakdown.

Todd Blanche is the clear front‑runner but not a lock; I assess a 62% chance he becomes Trump's next Attorney General, with Lee Zeldin and Ron DeSantis as the strongest secondary possibilities.

Given both fighters' high finishing rates and aggressive styles, a strike-based stoppage is likely, though tactical grappling or a decision remain realistic alternatives; I assess a 72% chance the fight ends by KO/TKO.

I assess a ~12% chance that Scottie Scheffler completes a career grand slam before 2028. He is in his prime with multiple high-probability major starts, but the statistical difficulty of winning two different majors within the tight window makes the outcome unlikely.

I assess a ~15% chance Elon Musk personally sets foot on Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — plausible given his resources and SpaceX's program, but strongly capped by mortality, medical/age limits, and uncertain timelines.

I assess an 85% chance Conor McGregor fights again before 2028, with Max Holloway the clear favorite (my estimate 76%) given multiple media reports and strong promotional incentives, though lack of an official UFC announcement and typical McGregor volatility leave meaningful tail risk.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability (12%) that the United States will commence a military offensive to seize control of any portion of Iran before 2027, with occupation-style intervention remaining unlikely absent a major new trigger.

I assess a modestly favorable chance that Karen Bass wins the 2026 Los Angeles mayoral election, with a 62% probability driven by incumbent advantages, coalition strength, and fundraising, but offset by exposure to voter backlash on crime, homelessness, and the possibility of a well-funded challenger or scandal.

I assess a low probability that Ethereum will hit $10,000 by December 31, 2026; the market-implied probability is extremely low and my independent estimate is 8% based on supply/market-cap math, macro constraints, and required short-term upside.

I assess a 15% probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $68,000 on the 1-minute candle at noon ET on June 14, slightly higher than the market-implied ~11.5% price but still a low-probability event given available information.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that China will launch a military offensive to seize territory in Taiwan by the end of 2026, with a best estimate of 12% given current capabilities, political incentives, and strong deterrence factors from the United States and partners.

I assess an 18% chance the New York Yankees win the 2026 World Series, reflecting their organizational resources and historical competitiveness but counterbalanced by roster uncertainty, pitching variability, and strong league competition.

I assess McLaren's chances of winning the 2026 Constructors' Championship as low but non-negligible, around 8%, because structural advantages and driver strength give them upside while modern F1 dynamics and probable rival superiority make victory unlikely.

I assess an 18% chance that George Russell wins the 2026 F1 Drivers' Championship, slightly above the market-implied ~14.5% because Mercedes and Russell retain credible upside if development and reliability trends swing in their favor.

I assess that OpenAI is more likely than Anthropic to IPO first — my independent probability is 72% that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic (by 2040). Timing uncertainty is substantial, but OpenAI’s product momentum, revenue signals, and visible intent outweigh the structural and governance risks that could slow it down.

Given the very short time horizon and the market-implied near-certainty, I assess a high probability that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 13 will be above $50,000, while assigning a small but meaningful tail risk to sudden shocks or exchange-specific issues.

I assess roughly a 30% chance that XRP/USDT closes between $1.30 and $1.40 on the Binance 1-minute candle at 12:00 ET on June 10, a bit above the market-implied 26% but still a minority probability given typical intraday moves and the narrowness of the band relative to likely spot levels.