Edges for Jun 10, 2026

I assess a low probability (~8%) that Elon Musk will be a trillionaire by 2027; current market pricing (~92% Yes) appears to be driven by speculative headlines rather than a realistic, near-term path to $1T in personal net worth.

I assess a 30% independent probability that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom will be the first G7 leader to leave office (blind to market prices).

I assess a low probability that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029 — roughly 8% — because there is no public legal exposure for him and pardoning an immediate family member is politically costly and rare, though nonzero because presidential clemency is broad and Trump has signaled willingness to use pardons expansively.

I assess a materially better-than-market chance that the 2026 “Trump” bull case will occur — not a coinflip majority outcome, but a substantial ~38% probability driven by a plausible Fed pivot, continued AI-driven earnings upside, and residual momentum in risk assets.

I assess a low probability that any U.S. quarterly GDP will exceed 5% between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — my independent estimate is 20%. Strong jobs numbers and rhetoric raise the possibility of a surprise, but hard output data and policy constraints make a true 5%+ quarter unlikely.

I assess a low probability (~5%) that Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his term — doing so would require extraordinary legal, diplomatic, or military steps that are highly unlikely in the 2025–2029 window.

Given likely near-term deficits, rising interest costs, and active additional spending pressures, I assess a strong but not near-certain chance that gross U.S. federal debt will hit $40T before 2029-03-31 — my independent probability is 70%.

I assess a very high probability (97%) that at least one of OpenAI or Anthropic will complete an IPO before 2040 — both firms have confidential S‑1 activity, strong incentives to list, and the time horizon is long.

Independent assessment: Elon Musk is the clear frontrunner to be the first trillionaire before 2030, but the market (93% Yes) is overconfident — I put the probability at 72% based on asset-concentration, SpaceX IPO upside, and plausible downside risks.

I assess a low probability (12%) that the United States will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029. Strong rhetorical intent from Trump and Arctic strategic value increase the chance slightly, but legal, political, and diplomatic barriers make an actual transfer unlikely within this term.

I assess a ~22% chance that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, reflecting his persistent base strength but significant legal, institutional, and electability headwinds that make his path unlikely but plausible.

I assess a 22% probability that Bitcoin will hit $200,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting a low-but-plausible tail outcome driven by outsized institutional inflows and macro easing but constrained by large market-cap requirements and regulatory and liquidity risks.

I assess a meaningful but minority chance (~35%) that the 2026 ‘bear case’ for Trump — a politically debilitating combination of legal defeats, institutional pushback, and coalition fracture — will materialize within the year.

I assess a 70% independent probability that the U.S. will fall below 7.60 on The Economist’s Democracy Index sometime during 2025–2028 under the Trump administration — significant risk but not a near-certainty.

I estimate a 40% chance Blake Lively will attend Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce's wedding. Public information is thin and speculative, but a nontrivial chance exists because the event is high-profile and likely to include many A-list invites despite current rumor framing.

Given high baseline legal and political friction but substantial institutional and political hurdles, I assess a modestly below-even chance that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 — a meaningful tail risk but not the most likely outcome.

Given Blanche's formal nomination and his incumbency as acting Attorney General, I assign a high probability that Todd Blanche will be confirmed and be Trump's next Attorney General, though confirmation risks and political shocks leave nontrivial downside.

Removal by Senate is historically unprecedented and requires a large bipartisan revolt; I assess the independent chance of impeachment + removal before term end at about 5%.

I assess ~25% probability that Justice Clarence Thomas will resign (voluntarily leave the Court) at some point during Trump's current term; given his recent activity, ideological alignment with the appointing party, and lack of public retirement signals, staying on is the far more likely outcome.

Marine Le Pen has a real but limited path to victory in the 2027 French presidential election; structural barriers of the two-round system and historical runoff dynamics keep her probability well below even odds, but party organization, voter realignment, and fragmentation of the anti-RN field create non-negligible upside.

Resignation remains unlikely; based on historical precedent, Trump's temperament, and institutional constraints I assess a low chance he will voluntarily resign before Jan 20, 2029.

I assess a 35% chance that Tread's official token will have an FDV above $100M one day after launch, reflecting a modestly higher probability than the current market price because FDV thresholds are often easy to reach by supply/pricing choices, but significant uncertainty around launch strategy, listings, and market conditions keeps the probability below even odds.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that Trump will complete a formal, comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement by Jan 20, 2029 — my independent probability is 22%. Ongoing tariff talks point to narrower deals, not an FTA, and political and structural barriers make a full agreement unlikely in this window.

I assess a 28% chance that USAID will be legally eliminated during Trump's term. Executive orders and administrative actions can hollow out or reassign much of USAID's work, but statutory abolition faces significant legal and political barriers.

I assess an extremely low probability that the United States will formally acquire any part of Canada before 2029 — the most plausible paths are extraordinarily remote and require breakdowns in normal political, legal, and diplomatic constraints.

I assess a high probability that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 15 will be above $54,000, but I discount near-certainty to account for minute-level microstructure risks and exchange-specific outages or manipulation.

I assess a roughly 30% chance that Trump will succeed in buying at least part of Greenland during his term — low for a full sovereign sale but materially higher once partial purchases, leases, or concessions are counted as 'buying'.

I assess a very high probability that there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during President Trump's term — this remains the default outcome given legal, political, and practical barriers; I assign a 90% chance of no acquisition.

I estimate a low-to-moderate chance that a second Trump term will expand high-skill immigration (H‑1B / STEM pathways) via administrative steps or limited legislative changes — most likely a modest, targeted administrative easing rather than a big statutory cap increase.

I estimate a ~15% independent probability that the Supreme Court will fully overturn Obergefell (national marriage-equality precedent) before 2029; the market price (~7%) looks meaningfully lower than my independent view and may be underpricing latent risk.

Given limited access to current IMF Portwatch data but factoring historical traffic patterns, regional geopolitical risks, and the remaining time window, I assess a modest but not negligible chance that the 7-day moving average will reach or exceed 60 by July 31, 2026.

I assess a ~12% chance that Scottie Scheffler completes a career grand slam before 2028. He is in his prime with multiple high-probability major starts, but the statistical difficulty of winning two different majors within the tight window makes the outcome unlikely.

I assess an 18% independent probability that the 25th Amendment will be invoked at least once during Trump’s presidency (2025–2029) in any section (temporary transfer, involuntary declaration, or replacement). This reflects routine medical-transfer risk plus a small chance of an extraordinary political/medical crisis, weighed against very high institutional hurdles and historical precedent.

I assess an 8% probability that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting a low but non-negligible tail outcome that requires a sustained, large-capital crypto bull market and favorable on-chain and institutional flows.

Based on public reporting of a serious Hammond, Indiana plan and strong political support but material timetable and approval risks, I assess a **60%** chance the Chicago pro football team will relocate to Indiana by the first game of the 2028 regular season.

I assess a high probability that the FOMC will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at its July 2026 meeting, but there are credible upside and downside surprises that make a nontrivial tail risk that the Committee will change rates.

Given Makerfield's strong Labour history, Andy Burnham's high profile in Greater Manchester, and current market sentiment, I assess a high but not certain probability that Burnham will win the 2026 Makerfield by-election.

I assess a ~15% chance Elon Musk personally sets foot on Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — plausible given his resources and SpaceX's program, but strongly capped by mortality, medical/age limits, and uncertain timelines.

I assess a modestly better-than-even chance that the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 will be enacted by December 31, 2026, with passage most likely through compromise or inclusion in a must-pass vehicle rather than as an unamended standalone bill.

Assuming the binary asks whether the 4‑year average (2025–2028) will be at least 2,000 measles cases/year, I judge **~35%** probability that the average will meet or exceed 2,000 — meaning continued high transmission through 2027–28 is possible but not the most likely path.

I assess a low but non-negligible 7% chance that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $68,000 on the 12:00 ET 1-minute candle on June 14, slightly higher than the market-implied ~2.6% probability due to short-term volatility and potential tail catalysts.

Although the market currently prices ~2.4% chance of BTC < $58,000 at the Binance 12:00 ET 1-minute close on 2026-06-10, I assess the probability is a bit higher due to one-minute candle and liquidity tail risks; my best estimate is 6%.