How much will US democracy weaken under Trump?
I assess a better-than-even chance that the U.S. will fall below 7.60 on the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index during the 2025–2028 Trump administration, driven by cumulative hits to 'functioning of government' and 'civil liberties' even if catastrophic breakdown is unlikely.
Analysis
**Stage 1 — Blind analysis (ignore market price):**
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index is a composite of five subindices (electoral process and pluralism; functioning of government; political participation; political culture; civil liberties). Historically the U.S. has been in the high 7s/low 8s; falling under 7.60 within a 3–4 year window requires either concentrated, large declines in one or two subindices or smaller declines across multiple categories. Given the recent documented spike in policy uncertainty after January 2025 and sustained elevated volatility into 2026, there is a plausible pathway for measurable erosion — most notably in "functioning of government" and "civil liberties" — but not an automatic or inevitable slide.
Arguments that make a drop below 7.60 plausible include: aggressive executive actions that undermine independent institutions (e.g., politicized removals, curbs on administrative independence), repeated delegitimization of electoral opponents and election officials, legal and regulatory actions that restrict press freedom or protests, and synchronized policy shocks that lower perceived government effectiveness. The 2025 uncertainty spike (index ~495 in January 2025) and later elevated readings around 395 by March 2026 indicate sustained governance stress; combined with an unfavourable economic backdrop (OECD slower growth projections) this raises the political stakes and incentives for confrontational measures.
Countervailing forces are significant. U.S. institutional complexity — federalism, multiple centers of authority, professional civil service, state election administration, independent courts (including an ideologically mixed ecosystem of state and some federal judges), a competitive media ecosystem, business and civil-society pushback — provides friction against rapid, large declines in EIU scores. The EIU scoring process is evidence- and indicator-driven and tends to incorporate multiple years of behavior; therefore isolated episodes of volatility or rhetoric do not automatically translate into large point decreases. The judiciary and state governments have in practice constrained executive overreach in several high-profile episodes since 2020, and similar dynamics could limit sustained institutional capture.
Weighing these factors, I assess the probability that the U.S. falls below 7.60 between 2025 and 2028 at **64%**. This reflects a view that erosion is more likely than not given current political trajectories (escalating executive assertiveness, high polarization, concentrated efforts to delegitimize opponents), but not near-certain because of institutional resilience, legal constraints, and political backlash risks that moderate and slow changes in the EIU's measured democracy score.
**Stage 2 — Market calibration (considering current market price Yes = 0.901):**
The market price (≈90% Yes) is substantially higher than my independent estimate (64%). Several plausible explanations for this gap:
- *Recency and narrative bias*: Traders may overweight high-salience events (the January 2025 policy shock, repeated inflammatory rhetoric) and conflate short-term volatility with durable institutional damage. The policy uncertainty spike provides vivid evidence that traders often use heuristics rather than the multi-indicator approach the EIU uses.
- *Risk aversion and tail-focus*: Many market participants focus on tail risk and regime-change scenarios and are willing to pay to hedge against catastrophic declines in democratic quality. That bidding pressure can push Yes prices above a fully rational aggregated mean probability.
- *Information asymmetry / event-driven bets*: Some traders may be acting on private or specialized information (e.g., expectations about specific executive orders, classified policy moves, or coordinated state-level actions) that the public news summary does not reflect. That can legitimately justify a higher market price, though it also increases variance.
- *Liquidity and momentum effects*: With >109k contracts traded, momentum and trend-following strategies may have amplified a directional price move once Yes began to dominate.
Why the market might be mispriced (overstating the chance): the EIU index is not a single high-frequency "sentiment" gauge; it aggregates multiple domains and often lags immediate political shocks. The market price seems to assume fast, substantive changes to legal and civic norms across multiple domains, whereas plausible paths often produce slower, incremental declines that may not sum to a >0.4–0.5 point fall before 2028. Additionally, the U.S. has many veto points and plural power centers — states, courts, private sector — that historically blunt abrupt democratic backsliding.
Why the market could be correctly high: if multiple risk vectors materialize together — sustained attack on election administration (including criminalization or mass decertification attempts), broad restrictions on press and protest, systemic non-compliance by courts or enforcement agencies, and state-level collusion to suppress opposition — then cumulative downshifts across several EIU subindices could plausibly breach 7.60. Market participants may be pricing in a non-linear cascade rather than a slow linear decline.
Bottom line: the market's ~90% yes reflects strong conviction and tail-focused risk pricing. My independent assessment (64%) places substantial probability on a drop below 7.60 but views the market as likely overstating near-term inevitability, albeit not impossibly so. Traders should consider whether they are pricing a realistic aggregation of indicators or overweighting singular high-salience events.
Arguments
For
- Elevated and sustained policy uncertainty since January 2025 indicates governance stress and greater likelihood of institutional mistakes and aggressive remedies that erode functioning of government.
- Multiple plausible executive pathways (use of emergency powers, politicized firings, directives constraining independent agencies) could materially lower EIU subindices for 'functioning' and 'civil liberties'.
- Political polarization and economic slowdown increase incentives for exclusionary or illiberal tactics to maintain power, raising the probability of coordinated actions that the EIU would penalize.
- Precedent of incremental backsliding in other democracies shows that small, cumulative changes across categories can add up to >0.4 index-point declines over a few years.
Against
- Institutional resilience: federalism, state officials, courts, civil society, and private-sector pushback create multiple veto points that historically have slowed or reversed executive overreach.
- EIU index is multi-dimensional and typically requires sustained, cross-cutting deterioration; episodic volatility alone often fails to produce large immediate downgrades.
- Domestic political costs and international reputational concerns may deter the most extreme measures; some forms of attack (e.g., explicit disenfranchisement nationwide) are politically and logistically difficult to sustain.
- Recent evidence (policy uncertainty easing from 495 in Jan 2025 to 395 in Mar 2026) suggests shocks can attenuate rather than accelerate, reducing the likelihood of continuous deterioration through 2028.
Key drivers
- Executive actions that affect independent institutions (appointments, removals, directives to regulators and agencies)
- Judicial responses and compliance (Supreme Court, federal and state courts' willingness to check executive actions)
- Election administration integrity and disputes during 2026 midterms and early 2028 cycle (state-level control, certification processes, challenges to results)
- Civil liberties constraints (press freedom, protest restrictions, surveillance, gag orders)
- Federal-state interactions and countervailing power from state governments, businesses, and civil society
Risk factors
- Concentrated institutional capture — rapid stacking of oversight bodies and regulatory agencies with partisan loyalists
- Legal normalization of restrictions on protests or press (statutes or executive actions that erode civil liberties)
- Successful delegitimization and criminalization of large political opposition blocs leading to disenfranchisement or reduced pluralism
- Cooperative state governments implementing restrictive voting access laws or decertifying results that create perception of systemic failure
- Measurement and timing risk: EIU scoring methodology may react strongly to qualitative changes, causing abrupt-rated declines if several components show negative trends in the same assessment year
Scenarios
Best case
For 'Yes' (drop below 7.60): A coordinated cascade occurs — sustained attacks on independent agencies and election officials, selective prosecutions and legal restrictions on protest and press, and several states implement exclusionary administrative measures. The combined negative movements across 'functioning of government' and 'civil liberties,' reinforced by deteriorating political culture, drive the EIU score below 7.60 by the 2026 or 2027 annual assessment.
Most likely
A measurable democratic erosion unfolds but is uneven: selective declines in 'functioning of government' and 'political culture' combined with smaller hits to 'civil liberties' nudge the overall score downward. There is a realistic chance the cumulative decline exceeds 0.4 points by 2027–2028, producing a score below 7.60 — but the process is contested and reversible, producing periodic partial recoveries rather than a single rapid collapse.
Worst case
For 'No' (score stays >=7.60): Institutional checks hold. Courts block the most extreme executive measures, state-level officials and the private sector resist pressure on election administration and press freedoms, and political costs (political backlash, electoral losses in 2026) deter further aggressive steps. The EIU records only modest declines or stable scores, keeping the U.S. at or above 7.60 through 2028.
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