Edges for Jun 8, 2026

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Elon Musk becomes a trillionaire before 2027 — roughly 12% — because a narrow set of high-impact, near-term events could push his paper net worth above $1T, but those paths are unlikely and rely on speculative catalysts.

I assess a high probability (72%) that the 25th Amendment will be *used at least once* during Trump's 2025–2029 presidency — most likely via Section 3 (voluntary, temporary transfer); Section 4 (involuntary removal) remains very unlikely.

Given SpaceX's technical trajectory, Musk's high personal willingness to take risks, and the long (73-year) horizon to Aug 1, 2099, I assess a materially better-than-market chance that Elon Musk will visit Mars before that date — my independent probability is 45%.

I assess Scottie Scheffler has a substantially better-than-market chance to complete a career grand slam before 2028, driven by multiple remaining major opportunities and his status as a dominant, still-young world-class player — I place the probability at 42%.

Given very high measles counts already in 2025 and through mid‑2026, I assess a substantially greater-than-market chance that the 2025–2028 average will meet the market's 'Yes' condition; my independent probability is 65%.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance (25%) that the Chicago team will actually relocate to Indiana and play home games there by the first game of the 2028 regular season; an Indiana announcement is significantly more likely than on-field readiness by 2028.

I assess a very low chance that President Trump will literally ‘take back’ ownership and operation of the Panama Canal during his term; I assign a 5% probability that the canal will be returned to U.S. control by 2029.

I assess a better-than-even chance that the U.S. will fall below 7.60 on the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index during the 2025–2028 Trump administration, driven by cumulative hits to 'functioning of government' and 'civil liberties' even if catastrophic breakdown is unlikely.

I estimate a ~35% chance that a credible, broadly-recognized “bear case” for Trump will materialize in 2026 — higher than the market’s 10% — because ongoing legal friction, plausible economic or foreign-policy shocks, and political dynamics make at least one major reputational or governance setback more than a negligible risk.

I assess a 65% chance that MicroStrategy will announce purchases totaling more than 1,000 BTC during June 2–8, balancing the company’s historical accumulation behavior and available financing capacity against the narrow one-week window and recent uncertainty.

I assess a 70% independent probability that Elon Musk will be the world's first trillionaire before 2030, driven mainly by a high-probability SpaceX IPO at a multi-trillion-dollar valuation combined with Musk's large existing paper wealth; however, material downside risks (IPO timing/valuation, market swings, lockups) keep the outcome from being certain.

Given the market-implied probability around 47% and no specific new catalysts reported, I assess a slightly below-fifty percent chance that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 8 will be above $62,000, because the outcome hinges on short-term volatility and liquidity rather than long-term trends.

I assess a 30% chance that any quarterly real GDP (annualized q/q) will exceed 5% in Q1 2025–Q4 2028. The news shows supportive momentum and upside policy risk, but historical rarity of >5% real quarters and persistent inflation/tariff headwinds make a >5% quarter unlikely though not impossible.

I assess a roughly 27% probability that Bahrain will win; the market price (8%) is much lower than my independent estimate because friendlies and late squad decisions introduce variance, but Syria is still the clearer favorite on balance.

I assess a meaningful but not high chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by the end of 2026; I assign a 20% probability based on historical volatility and plausible bullish catalysts balanced against macro and regulatory risks.

I assess a low but non-trivial chance that the U.S. acquires any part of Greenland before 2029: strong rhetoric raises tail-risk, but legal, political, and practical barriers make actual transfer unlikely.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that USAID will be fully eliminated during a Trump term: about a 22% probability. Partial dismantling, budget cuts, or functional transfers are substantially more likely than a clean abolition.

I assess a strong but not certain probability that MicroStrategy will announce a BTC purchase between June 2–8, 2026, based on the company's long-standing buy-the-dip strategy and frequent purchase cadence; I assign a 78% chance of a Yes outcome.

I assess a low chance that Trump will complete a legal purchase (even of part) of Greenland during his term — my independent probability is 8%. The far more likely outcome is expanded U.S. security presence via leases or agreements rather than a sovereignty transfer.

I assess a ~22% independent probability that a clear “bull case” for Trump will materialize in 2026 — plausible but unlikely given policy execution risk, legal/political headwinds, and the high bar for a convincing, broad-based upside narrative.

I assign a 30% chance that Barron Trump will be granted a presidential pardon by Jan 21, 2029. The baseline is low because there is no known federal legal exposure, but nonzero because presidents can and sometimes do issue preemptive or politically motivated pardons — and this president has shown willingness to use clemency actively.

I assess a 78% probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $58,000 on the 1-minute candle at 12:00 ET on June 10, slightly below the market-implied ~85% to account for short-term volatility and macro risks.

Given Trump’s enduring organizational strength and base support but substantial legal, age, and party-organizational obstacles, I assess a modest but non-negligible 15% chance he wins and accepts the 2028 Republican presidential nomination.

The market-implied probability (96.5%) strongly favors 'Yes', but accounting for exchange microstructure risk, 1-minute candle volatility, and the possibility of localized Binance dislocation, I estimate an 85% chance Bitcoin will be above $50,000 at the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 13.

I assess a materially higher-than-market chance that Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act before 2027-01-01 — about a 30% probability — because of his repeated threats, playbook of executive escalation, and the plausible contingency of large, sustained unrest or a contested election environment that he would view as justifying military deployment.

A U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term is extremely unlikely; I assign a 92% chance that no formal transfer occurs, with a small residual chance split across the listed purchase-price bands.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (7%) that Trump will be both impeached and removed before his term ends — impeachment is materially more likely than removal, but Senate conviction (the removal step) remains highly improbable absent extraordinary, bipartisan-breaking events.

My independent assessment: Blake Lively is unlikely but not extremely unlikely to attend — I place a ~30% chance she attends Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce’s wedding on Dec 31, 2028.

I assess ~20% chance that U.S. government spending will register a net decrease of “250” (most plausibly $250 billion) before 2028; cuts of that magnitude are possible but materially unlikely given structural budget drivers and political constraints.

I assess a modestly lower-than-even chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's next Prime Minister after the 2026 election, with the main balancing forces being his strong core support and coalition skills versus legal exposures and the prospect of a united opposition or coalition breakdown.

James Ho is a credible and plausible nominee; I assign him a 24% independent chance of being the next Supreme Court Justice, higher than the market's 16% because his credentials, ideological fit, and clerkship ties make him a regularly shortlisted option if a conservative vacancy opens.

I assess a very low chance that the United States will acquire sovereignty over any part of Canada before Jan 21, 2029 — most plausibly a tiny, negotiated border adjustment; large-scale annexation is effectively impossible. My independent probability: 4%.

I assign a 63% probability that Karen Bass will win the 2026 Los Angeles mayoral election, reflecting the structural advantages of incumbency and market sentiment while accounting for significant local headwinds and uncertainty around turnout and a possible runoff.

Based on historical EO rates and institutional constraints, a 400–449 total across a four-year Trump second term is unlikely; I assess it at about 10%.

I assign a 22% probability that George Russell will win the 2026 F1 Drivers' Championship, reflecting a modest upside over the market-implied ~19.5% based on his talent and Mercedes' resources balanced against likely strong rivals and key technical uncertainties for 2026.

Marine Le Pen remains a plausible contender but faces entrenched structural barriers in France's two-round system; I assign a 12% chance she wins the 2027 presidency.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability (12%) that the United States will commence a military offensive to seize control of any portion of Iran before 2027, with occupation-style intervention remaining unlikely absent a major new trigger.

I assess a low probability that Ethereum will hit $10,000 by December 31, 2026; the market-implied probability is extremely low and my independent estimate is 8% based on supply/market-cap math, macro constraints, and required short-term upside.

I assess a 30% probability that Tyreek Hill will be playing for the Kansas City Chiefs by August 31, 2026, reflecting meaningful but not dominant chances driven by prior chemistry with Kansas City, offset by contract, cap, and roster realities at other teams.

I assess an 85% chance Conor McGregor fights again before 2028, with Max Holloway the clear favorite (my estimate 76%) given multiple media reports and strong promotional incentives, though lack of an official UFC announcement and typical McGregor volatility leave meaningful tail risk.

I assess an 18% chance the New York Yankees win the 2026 World Series, reflecting their organizational resources and historical competitiveness but counterbalanced by roster uncertainty, pitching variability, and strong league competition.

I assess McLaren's chances of winning the 2026 Constructors' Championship as low but non-negligible, around 8%, because structural advantages and driver strength give them upside while modern F1 dynamics and probable rival superiority make victory unlikely.

Given the very short three-day horizon and the market's strong pricing in favor of Yes, I assess a high probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $54,000 at 12:00 ET on June 11, but I discount the market's near-certainty to account for crypto volatility and exchange-specific risks.

I assess a low probability that President Trump will enact a meaningful expansion of high‑skill immigration during this term — I put the chance at 20%. Recent administrative steps and political incentives point toward continued restriction, with only narrow, targeted exceptions plausible.

Unlikely. I assign a 15% probability that China will overtake the U.S. in nominal GDP by 1 January 2030 — a low-probability tail outcome that requires a strong combination of above-consensus Chinese nominal growth and favorable exchange-rate moves.

Todd Blanche is the clear front‑runner but not a lock; I assess a 62% chance he becomes Trump's next Attorney General, with Lee Zeldin and Ron DeSantis as the strongest secondary possibilities.

I assess that OpenAI is more likely than Anthropic to IPO first — my independent probability is 72% that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic (by 2040). Timing uncertainty is substantial, but OpenAI’s product momentum, revenue signals, and visible intent outweigh the structural and governance risks that could slow it down.

I assess a modest but real chance (30%) that Trump will produce a formal new free-trade agreement (FTA) with China by Jan 20, 2029 — more likely we’ll see narrower tariff-framework deals rather than a comprehensive, Congress-ratified FTA.