How many Fed rate cuts in 2026?
I estimate a 72% probability that the Fed will not cut rates at all in 2026, reflecting continued Fed reluctance to ease until there is clearer and sustained evidence of disinflation or a tangible weakening in labor markets, while acknowledging nontrivial tail risks that could force one or more cuts.
Analysis
Market prices currently assign roughly an 80% probability to no cuts in 2026, reflecting strong conviction that the Fed will keep policy restrictive through the year; the high event volume indicates broad participation and that market-implied probabilities incorporate both Fed communications and macro data through the first half of the year. I weigh that signal heavily but adjust downward because markets often underprice low-probability macro shocks and the Fed has historically responded to sudden growth or financial stress with policy easing when downside risks crystallize.
On the fundamentals side, inflation has been trending toward target but remains vulnerable to upside surprises from services inflation and wage pressures, and the labor market has generally stayed robust; these conditions reduce the near-term impulse to cut and argue for steady policy through 2026 absent a clear inflection. The Fed’s reaction function emphasizes sustained progress toward its 2% inflation objective rather than one-off data moves, so a sequence of weak data would be required to change policy from hold-to-cut within a single year.
Timing and technical considerations favor no cuts: the Fed has multiple scheduled meetings in 2026 and typically signals policy shifts in advance, which reduces the odds of surprise cuts, and the market already prices a high probability of no cuts so any new information would need to be materially different to move the needle. However, emergency cuts outside scheduled meetings are possible and count toward this market; financial instability, a sharply tightening of financial conditions, or a sudden growth collapse would increase the chance of such a move and therefore represent the main pathway to the 'No' outcome.
Balancing these factors, I place the probability of no cuts at 72% — lower than the current market price because of tail risks and the historical tendency for central banks to ease when downside risks crystallize, but still significantly above 50% because inflation and labor conditions to date favor a hold-dominated 2026 policy path.
Arguments
For
- Inflation progress has been gradual rather than abrupt, reducing urgency for cuts in 2026.
- A still-healthy labor market lessens the case for preemptive easing absent clear deterioration.
- Fed rhetoric has emphasized persistence in achieving inflation goals, implying reluctance to cut quickly.
- Markets and investors already expect no cuts, which reduces the likelihood of a self-fulfilling shift in sentiment toward easing.
- Tight financial conditions and elevated policy rates provide the Fed room to wait for stronger evidence before cutting.
Against
- A tangible economic downturn would likely push the Fed to cut at least once to stabilize growth.
- Faster-than-expected disinflation could prompt the Fed to ease to prevent an unnecessary economic slowdown.
- Unexpected systemic stress in the banking or shadow banking sector could force emergency cuts outside scheduled meetings.
- Major external shocks such as commodity price collapses or global recessions could shift the Fed’s calculus toward cuts.
Key drivers
- Trajectory of CPI and core services inflation over the next two to four quarters.
- Labor market strength as measured by payrolls, unemployment rate, and wage growth.
- Fed communications and dot-plot guidance that influence expectations for easing.
- Financial conditions including credit spreads, equity indices, and bank funding stress.
- Global growth and commodity price shocks that could alter U.S. inflation or growth prospects.
- Fiscal policy stance and its impact on demand and inflation dynamics.
Risk factors
- A sudden US growth slowdown or recession could force one or more cuts in 2026.
- A rapid and broad-based disinflation surprise could lead the Fed to cut to avoid over-tightening.
- Systemic financial stress or a banking crisis could prompt emergency easing outside scheduled meetings.
- Major geopolitical shocks that materially depress global demand and tighten financial conditions.
- Data revisions that retroactively show weaker growth or faster disinflation than initially reported.
Scenarios
Best case
No cuts occur in 2026: inflation remains sticky enough that the Fed holds rates through each FOMC meeting, labor market stays resilient, financial conditions remain stable, and the Fed communicates a patient, data-dependent stance that keeps markets aligned with a no-cut outcome.
Most likely
The Fed holds rates throughout 2026 and makes no cuts, but a single late-year cut remains a plausible tail outcome if incoming data show sustained weakness or a sudden financial shock, making no cuts the modal outcome but not a certainty.
Worst case
At least one cut occurs in 2026: a sharp growth slowdown, rapid disinflation, or financial crisis forces the Fed to implement one or more 25-basis-point cuts (including emergency or off-cycle cuts), producing the 'No' resolution for this market.
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