Edges for Sep 7, 2026

Spider-Man: Brand New Day is overwhelmingly likely to be under 940 million domestically by September 30. That threshold is so high that it would require an all-time, record-shattering run well beyond what even the biggest superhero releases typically achieve in that time frame.

I think the market is substantially overpricing the chance that AfD wins Sachsen-Anhalt by at least 25 points. AfD may well finish first, but a 25-point margin over the runner-up would require an unusually lopsided result that looks much less likely than the current price implies.

USAID looks very likely to count as eliminated during Trump’s term. The reporting provided strongly suggests the agency was dismantled early, and the market price appears far too low unless the contract definition requires a formal statutory repeal that has not occurred.

Starbucks looks materially more likely than the market implies to report above 41,800 global stores in 2026. The company was already at 41,304 stores in Q3 FY2026, so only modest additional net growth is needed to clear the threshold.

Barron Trump receiving a presidential pardon before 2029 looks very unlikely absent an unforeseen legal problem. My independent estimate is 7%, far below the 50% market price.

Ulrich Siegmund has a plausible path if the AfD translates a strong election result into governing control, but the institutional and coalition barriers are still substantial. I think the market is too optimistic on Yes, and the more likely outcome is that another candidate is sworn in or the process leads elsewhere.

Robinhood has been growing its customer base steadily, and reaching more than 30.2 million funded customers in 2026 looks more likely than not. The threshold is high but not out of reach if the company keeps converting younger users and sustains strong retail engagement.

Arsenal are a credible title contender, but the market price looks too optimistic for a league as volatile as the Premier League. I would put their chance of winning the 2026-27 title at about 24%.

My independent estimate is that Trump has a meaningful but far-from-likely chance of being impeached again before Jan. 20, 2029, with the biggest driver being whether Democrats win the House in 2026. I put the probability at 38%, well below the market’s 66%.

2026 looks capable of finishing as one of the hottest years on record, but the evidence provided is much stronger for regional heat than for a true global number-one finish. I think the market is overstating the chance that 2026 will end up as the single hottest year worldwide.

I see this as a very low-probability event. The United States has strategic interest in Greenland, but actually acquiring any part of it before 2029 would require an extraordinary political and legal break with Denmark and Greenland’s own autonomy.

OpenAI is more likely than Anthropic to be the first of the two to complete an IPO, but the outcome is not close to certain. My independent estimate is meaningfully below the market because both companies have strong reasons to stay private for a long time.

Scottie Scheffler is good enough to make a career grand slam plausible, but the market looks too pessimistic if the question is simply whether he can complete the four-major set by the start of 2028. I price it well above the current market because his baseline major-winning odds over the next two seasons are still strong.

I think the market is underestimating the odds that 2026 becomes a materially bad year for Trump. My independent estimate is well above the current price, though still not a majority because the outcome likely requires a cluster of adverse political, legal, or economic developments rather than just routine volatility.

I put the chance that Trump “takes back” the Panama Canal during his term at about 9%. The idea is politically loud but legally, diplomatically, and operationally extremely hard to convert into actual U.S. control.

Keith Sonderling is still the clear favorite, but the market looks a bit too confident given the long runway and the possibility that Trump pivots to a more explicitly political or business-friendly choice. I put Sonderling meaningfully below the market and spread more probability across Bryan Slater and Andrew Puzder than the current pricing implies.

United Russia remains the clear favorite to gain the most seats in the next Russian parliamentary election. The combination of incumbency, administrative advantages, fragmented opposition, and a mixed electoral system makes a No outcome possible but still meaningfully less likely than Yes.

A presidential resignation before the end of the term is possible but still very unlikely. I put it far below the market, because the historical and political barriers to a voluntary Trump resignation are enormous.

My independent estimate is that the Fed is somewhat less likely than the market implies to leave rates unchanged at the December 2027 meeting, because the long horizon makes some policy move by then more likely than a clean hold. Still, a no-change decision remains the single most likely outcome at that meeting.

New Hampshire is still the most likely first Democratic contest in 2028, but the market appears to be pricing it like an almost certain outcome. I think the state’s structural advantages are real, yet the combination of DNC rulemaking, calendar negotiation, and possible changes in state/party compliance leaves meaningful room for an alternative first contest.

I put the chance that Elon Musk personally visits Mars before Aug. 1, 2099 at 24%. The market’s 12% looks somewhat low, mainly because the time horizon is long enough for Starship and crewed Mars transport to mature, though the personal nature of the question keeps the odds far from even.

I think the chance that USD ends September below 2.2 million Iranian rials is low, but not negligible. The current market price looks broadly reasonable, and I would put Yes at around 22%.

Democrats can absolutely win both chambers in 2026, but a full D Senate and D House sweep is still a tougher outcome than the near-coin-flip market suggests. The structural advantage of the opposition in a midterm, plus the difficulty of taking and holding both chambers at once, makes No slightly more likely.

I think the odds are very low that Trump will buy any part of Greenland during this term. The idea has recurring political attention, but a real acquisition would require multiple layers of consent and an extraordinary diplomatic breakthrough that currently looks unlikely.

I put the chance that Trump expands H-1B or otherwise meaningfully broadens high-skill immigration during this term at 33%. The market’s 22% looks a bit too pessimistic, but not wildly so, because a true expansion would likely require overcoming strong anti-immigration instincts and GOP resistance.

Base still looks more likely than not to avoid launching a native token by June 30, 2027. The ecosystem is growing quickly, but the absence of any confirmed token roadmap keeps the Yes case speculative rather than evidence-based.

Ethereum reaching $4,000 in September looks possible but still unlikely. The market is pricing it as a very low-probability event, and without a strong breakout catalyst in the remaining weeks, the most likely outcome is that ETH stays below that level.

A foldable iPhone release by September 15 looks very unlikely. The market is pricing in a near-zero chance, and based on Apple’s typical product cadence and the remaining time window, I agree the odds are low, though not literally impossible.

I put a modest chance on OpenAI making an official AGI claim before the end of 2026, but the market’s No side still looks more likely. The main reason is that OpenAI has strong incentives to be careful with the term AGI, and an announcement would require both a real technical leap and a willingness to make a very high-stakes public declaration.

My independent view is that 2035 US real GDP growth is most likely to land in the low-to-mid 2% range, with 2.1% to 2.5% the single most likely bucket. The market looks somewhat too pessimistic on a strong-but-not-recessionary long-run growth outcome.

Trump has a meaningful chance to repeat “Democrat” or its variants at a very high frequency, but 25 or more mentions is still an aggressive threshold. I think the market is somewhat underpricing the possibility, though the most likely outcome remains just under the bar.

A U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term still looks overwhelmingly unlikely. I put the probability of no acquisition at 94%, with only a small tail risk of any negotiated transaction or extraordinary geopolitical event producing a sale or transfer.

The market is pricing a strong chance that Predict.fun’s token clears a 50M FDV within a day of launch, and that looks directionally reasonable given the speculative nature of new governance tokens. Still, the threshold is not trivial, and an underwhelming launch, thin liquidity, or weak initial demand could leave the FDV below target.

Anthropic looks favored to finish September with the top-ranked model on the Arena leaderboard, but the edge is not ironclad because a single strong release or leaderboard shuffle from OpenAI, Google, or another rival could still overtake it. I would price Yes at 78%, a bit below the market but still strongly favored.

I think a relocation to a new Illinois site by the 2028 opener is plausible but less likely than the market implies. The most likely path is still some kind of Illinois move, but the financing, approvals, and construction timeline are tight enough that I would price it below the current 57%.

I think the chance that Trump’s 2026 becomes a genuinely strong “bull case” year is low, but not as low as the market implies. My independent estimate is 15%, reflecting a plausible path to a favorable policy, economic, or political narrative even though the bar is high.

Ethereum reaching $3,000 by year-end 2026 looks close to a coin flip, but I lean slightly toward No. The market price is already near 50-50, and absent a strong late-year crypto rally, $3,000 is a meaningful hurdle rather than a baseline.

I think the market is pricing in a fairly strong chance that Variational launches with a high-profile token, but 800M FDV one day after launch is still a demanding threshold. My estimate is slightly below the current market price because early-token valuations often fade after the first print and because there is meaningful execution risk around whether and when the token launches at all.

I think the probability is higher than the market implies, but still not the majority outcome. Trump has both the incentive and the willingness to test emergency domestic powers, yet legal, political, and operational constraints make invocation far from likely absent a major crisis.

I estimate about a one-in-three chance of a recession in 2027. The baseline remains continued expansion in the U.S., Europe, and the global economy, but late-cycle fragility, policy error risk, and geopolitical shocks leave a meaningful recession tail.

The market is pricing this as a fairly unlikely event, and that seems reasonable given the lack of confirmed, current reporting that the show is firmly locked in. I still assign a meaningful chance of Yes because the event description implies an announced October 2026 performance, which leaves room for the concert to go ahead if logistics and publicity hold.

A direct Zelenskyy-Putin meeting before Jan. 1, 2027 is still unlikely, but not quite as dead as the market implies. I estimate a low single-digit-to-low-teens chance, with the main upside coming from an externally forced peace-process breakthrough rather than voluntary bilateral diplomacy.

Gavin Newsom is a credible but far from dominant contender for the 2028 Democratic nomination. I would put his chances modestly above the market price because of his national profile and fundraising potential, but still well below one in four given the depth of the party field and the likelihood of a competitive open race.

Ulf Kristersson has a plausible path to continue as prime minister, but the market is right to price him as the underdog because his outcome depends on the right bloc holding together and winning enough support after the election. I would put the chance of Yes at 24%.

Google has a plausible path to finishing first, but the market’s low price reflects how hard it is to hold the top spot in a fast-moving leaderboard. I think Google is somewhat more likely than 9% to lead at year-end, but still clearly an underdog against the field.

The chance that Trump is both impeached and removed from office before the end of his term looks meaningfully below the market price. Impeachment is plausible in a crisis, but actual removal requires an exceptionally high and historically rare level of bipartisan Senate support.

A Level 4 advisory for Taiwan before Jan. 1, 2027 is possible but still unlikely absent a major cross-strait crisis. I estimate the chance at 12%, modestly above the market’s 7% price because the tail risk is more substantial than a routine peacetime advisory implies.

I assign a modest chance that the Bank of Russia cuts the key rate at the September meeting, but not a high one. The market’s implied probability looks reasonable, and I would place Yes slightly above one-third because easing is plausible if disinflation has continued, though the central bank is still likely to be cautious.

My view is that the most likely 2033 growth print is in the 1.1% to 1.5% range, with a meaningful chance of a somewhat stronger 1.6% to 2.0% outcome and a non-trivial tail of sub-1% growth. Overall, I lean modestly positive versus the market on the mid-range outcomes and think the distribution is a bit too concentrated on the single top bin.

I make this a very low-probability event. Trump is clearly willing to pressure and attack the Fed, but there is no evidence of an actual pathway to abolish it before January 2029.

I think the chance of a $250 billion reduction in total government spending before 2028 is low, but not negligible. The existing evidence points to meaningful program-specific cuts, especially in Medicaid, without showing a confirmed across-the-board decline of that magnitude.

Marine Le Pen remains a credible contender for 2027, but winning a two-round French presidential election is still difficult given the broad coalition typically formed against the far right. My estimate is modestly below the market price because the runoff structure, candidate uncertainty, and legal/political headwinds keep her path narrow.

Benjamin Netanyahu remains a live but not favored candidate to return as prime minister after the next election. His base, name recognition, and coalition-building experience keep him in the mix, but the likelihood of another leader taking over still looks higher.

NVIDIA has a strong lead today and the recent earnings backdrop supports continued strength, so Yes is still the most likely outcome. However, the gap is not so large that a sharp AI-sector rotation or a broad market correction could not change the ranking before year-end.

Hyperliquid reaching $90 by the end of 2026 looks more likely than not, but not close to guaranteed. The market is already pricing a high chance, and I would keep the probability slightly below that level because crypto drawdowns and liquidity shocks can still derail a near-term breakout.

I think the market is a bit too low, but still broadly right that a recession by the end of 2026 is not the base case. The main path to Yes is a pair of weak GDP prints in the remaining quarters of 2026, while an NBER call by then is much less likely.

Hyperliquid has a meaningful chance of doing some form of airdrop before the end of 2027, but the uncertainty is high because the project may prefer alternative incentive designs or may consider prior distributions sufficient. I would put the probability of Yes slightly above the market-implied level at 42%.

The Supreme Court overturning marriage equality by 2029 is possible but still unlikely. My estimate is meaningfully above the market because the Court’s current conservative majority and recent skepticism toward substantive due process keep the issue alive, even though the bar for overturning Obergefell remains very high.

Al Hilal should still be a clear favorite at home, but the lack of recent team news adds some uncertainty. I would put their win probability slightly below the market, but still very high.

Trump publicly praising Netanyahu in September looks more likely than not, because he has a long history of openly complimenting Netanyahu and tends to use him as a prominent foreign-policy reference point. The market is already near 60%, and I would lean somewhat higher given the recurring opportunity for praise in speeches, interviews, or social posts.