Edges for Sep 8, 2026

USAID looks very likely to count as eliminated during Trump’s term. The reporting provided strongly suggests the agency was dismantled early, and the market price appears far too low unless the contract definition requires a formal statutory repeal that has not occurred.

Starbucks is very likely to clear 41,800 global stores sometime in 2026. The market appears to be pricing in a much slower store-opening cadence than Starbucks has historically maintained.

Resident Evil is more likely than not to open below 50 million domestically. That threshold is high enough that only a genuinely breakout event release would clear it, and the franchise’s historical domestic openings have usually been well under that level.

Barron Trump receiving a presidential pardon before 2029 looks very unlikely absent an unforeseen legal problem. My independent estimate is 7%, far below the 50% market price.

2026 can still finish extremely warm, but becoming the single hottest year on NASA’s record looks harder than the market price implies. I would put Yes at about 38%, with No slightly favored because 2026 would need to beat a very high bar set by recent record years and the remaining months may not be enough to close that gap.

Robinhood has been growing its customer base steadily, and reaching more than 30.2 million funded customers in 2026 looks more likely than not. The threshold is high but not out of reach if the company keeps converting younger users and sustains strong retail engagement.

Beef is very likely to finish with 0 or 1 Primetime Emmy wins, and the strongest read is that it has no realistic path to multiple wins. The eligibility window alone makes a low-count outcome the default unless there is an unusual late-cycle nomination or a special eligibility wrinkle.

My independent estimate is that Trump has a meaningful but far-from-likely chance of being impeached again before Jan. 20, 2029, with the biggest driver being whether Democrats win the House in 2026. I put the probability at 38%, well below the market’s 66%.

Ulrich Siegmund has a plausible path if the AfD translates a strong election result into governing control, but the institutional and coalition barriers are still substantial. I think the market is too optimistic on Yes, and the more likely outcome is that another candidate is sworn in or the process leads elsewhere.

I lean slightly toward No, but this is a fairly balanced market. Without evidence of a qualifying U.S. strike on Iran close to the deadline, the main question is whether a clean 14-day window had already started and finished by September 4.

Tyler Robinson is more likely than not to be convicted of some homicide offense before the deadline, but the path is still uncertain because the case is only at the pretrial stage and a conviction is not guaranteed. I estimate a moderate chance of Yes, above the current market price but still short of a lock.

United Russia is still the overwhelming favorite to finish with the largest seat gain in the 2026 State Duma election, mainly because it starts from the dominant position and the Russian system strongly favors continuity. The biggest uncertainty is not whether it remains the largest party, but whether some other party can post a larger net seat increase from a low baseline.

Scottie Scheffler is good enough to make a career grand slam plausible, but the market looks too pessimistic if the question is simply whether he can complete the four-major set by the start of 2028. I price it well above the current market because his baseline major-winning odds over the next two seasons are still strong.

I think there is a modest chance Elon Musk stays under 40 counted posts in the two-day window, but the default expectation is still that he clears it. The market’s pricing near 26.5% for Yes looks reasonable, though I would lean slightly higher because the threshold is high enough that a relatively quiet stretch could still land under it.

I see this as a very low-probability event. The United States has strategic interest in Greenland, but actually acquiring any part of it before 2029 would require an extraordinary political and legal break with Denmark and Greenland’s own autonomy.

Anthropic is still a strong favorite to lead this specific text-arena leaderboard at the end of September, but the current price looks somewhat aggressive given how quickly top models can shuffle. I would price Yes below the market, though still as the most likely outcome.

I put the chance that Trump “takes back” the Panama Canal during his term at about 9%. The idea is politically loud but legally, diplomatically, and operationally extremely hard to convert into actual U.S. control.

I think the market is underestimating the odds that 2026 becomes a materially bad year for Trump. My independent estimate is well above the current price, though still not a majority because the outcome likely requires a cluster of adverse political, legal, or economic developments rather than just routine volatility.

A presidential resignation before the end of the term is possible but still very unlikely. I put it far below the market, because the historical and political barriers to a voluntary Trump resignation are enormous.

I think 2035 US real GDP growth is most likely to land in the 1.6% to 2.5% range, with a meaningful chance of slightly stronger growth. The market looks too pessimistic on the middle-of-the-road outcomes and gives too much weight to sub-1% or negative growth.

I think the odds are very low that Trump will buy any part of Greenland during this term. The idea has recurring political attention, but a real acquisition would require multiple layers of consent and an extraordinary diplomatic breakthrough that currently looks unlikely.

Valve is still capable of an open release, but its long history of slow, opaque launches makes a 2026 release only modestly likely. I would price Yes below the market at around 41%.

A Democratic sweep of both chambers is plausible but still not the base case. The House looks slightly favorable for Democrats, while the Senate remains the main hurdle and keeps this outcome below a coin flip despite a serious path.

I think the chance of a $250 billion government-spending decline before 2028 is meaningfully higher than the market implies, but still far from likely. My independent estimate is 18%, driven by the possibility of abrupt rescissions, shutdown-related compression, or a statistical year-over-year drop from a high baseline rather than durable policy restraint.

Base still looks more likely than not to avoid launching a native token by June 30, 2027. The ecosystem is growing quickly, but the absence of any confirmed token roadmap keeps the Yes case speculative rather than evidence-based.

A U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term still looks overwhelmingly unlikely. I put the probability of no acquisition at 94%, with only a small tail risk of any negotiated transaction or extraordinary geopolitical event producing a sale or transfer.

I think the chance that Trump’s 2026 becomes a genuinely strong “bull case” year is low, but not as low as the market implies. My independent estimate is 15%, reflecting a plausible path to a favorable policy, economic, or political narrative even though the bar is high.

New Hampshire is still the most likely state to go first, but the market looks a bit too confident given ongoing Democratic calendar flexibility and the possibility of a South Carolina-led opening sequence. I make Yes about 78%, not 88%.

A new state before Trump’s term ends looks very unlikely. The current news is almost entirely rhetorical and symbolic, while actual statehood would require a narrow and politically difficult legislative process that is not underway.

I think the market is somewhat optimistic on the chance of the 5-year Treasury yield touching 4.58% during September. The threshold is plausible in a volatile rates environment, but the absence of supportive news and the need for only a temporary intramonth spike make the probability meaningful rather than overwhelming.

I think a relocation to a new Illinois site by the 2028 opener is plausible but less likely than the market implies. The most likely path is still some kind of Illinois move, but the financing, approvals, and construction timeline are tight enough that I would price it below the current 57%.

I lean slightly toward the Fed leaving rates unchanged in December 2027, but not as strongly as the market does. With that much time horizon, the most likely setup is a policy regime that has settled into either modest easing or a late-cycle adjustment, which makes a no-change outcome plausible but far from dominant.

The market is pricing in an extremely high chance that LAPTOP launches on Base, and that seems plausible if the project has already signaled Base as its intended venue. Still, with no fresh news or on-chain confirmation in hand, I would leave a small but meaningful chance that the eventual launch happens elsewhere or does not occur at all.

I think the market’s No price is directionally right, and the chance of the 5-year Treasury yield dipping below 4.00% before year-end looks modest. The most likely path is that rates stay near current levels unless there is a clear growth or labor-market shock that forces a sharp repricing lower.

Variational has enough market attention and optionality to support a high launch valuation, but an $800M FDV one day after launch is still a demanding threshold for a token with no confirmed launch timing or distribution details. I think the market is a bit too optimistic, so I lean Yes but below the current implied price.

I estimate about a one-in-three chance of a recession in 2027. The baseline remains continued expansion in the U.S., Europe, and the global economy, but late-cycle fragility, policy error risk, and geopolitical shocks leave a meaningful recession tail.

Boeing can clear 640 deliveries if 737 MAX production and 787 output both stay healthy through the year, but the bar is still high. I think the true probability is modestly below the market and closer to the high-50s than the mid-60s.

My independent view is that Elon Musk visiting Mars personally before Aug. 1, 2099 is very unlikely, with the main drag being simple biology: he would need to remain alive and capable into an age far beyond normal human lifespan. The mission architecture also remains unresolved, and current Mars plans are about uncrewed or cargo flights, not a confirmed human trip for Musk himself.

Ethereum has a slightly better-than-even chance of touching $3,000 before the end of 2026, but the market is still pricing a fairly balanced outcome for good reason. I would lean Yes because the remaining time window is long enough for a broad crypto rebound to carry ETH above that level, though the path is still sensitive to risk appetite and market momentum.

Ulf Kristersson has a real path to remaining prime minister if the center-right bloc can hold together, but the market is right to price this as an underdog outcome. The most likely result is that the next government comes from a different coalition, though prolonged negotiations could still leave Kristersson in place if the right bloc narrowly survives.

I think the market is probably underestimating the chance a bit, but the odds of Kanye West actually performing in Russia by October 31 still look meaningfully below 50%. The combination of a reported schedule and his history of last-minute changes keeps Yes alive, yet logistical, legal, and reputational hurdles make No the likelier outcome.

I think the chance that the 30-year Treasury yield touches 5.40% before the end of 2026 is meaningful but somewhat lower than the market price suggests. A rise that high is plausible if inflation re-accelerates or fiscal and term-premium pressure intensifies, but it still requires a fairly adverse rate move from already elevated levels.

Marine Le Pen looks highly likely to reach the runoff, but the presidency is still harder to win because France’s two-round system usually consolidates anti-far-right voters against her. I make her chance of winning the 2027 election modestly below 50%, but somewhat higher than the current market implies.

Benjamin Netanyahu remains a live but not favored candidate to return as prime minister after the next election. His base, name recognition, and coalition-building experience keep him in the mix, but the likelihood of another leader taking over still looks higher.

NVIDIA looks like the most likely company to finish 2026 as the world’s largest by market cap, but the lead is not so large that the outcome is close to guaranteed. A yes outcome is favored unless NVIDIA underperforms sharply or another mega-cap stages a strong late-year rally.

Anna Kelly looks like a credible front-runner in a Trump-style loyalty-and-comms-driven appointment process, but not an overwhelming one. I put her chances modestly above the market because the role often goes to a trusted insider who can manage message discipline and survive the job.

Hyperliquid has a strong chance of touching $90 before the end of 2026, but the current market price looks somewhat aggressive given how much of the move may already be priced in. I would still lean Yes, but with meaningful downside risk from crypto volatility and the possibility that momentum stalls before the final push.

Solana has a meaningful but not dominant chance to reach $140 by the end of 2026. The market’s 36.5% Yes price looks reasonable, and I would put the probability slightly above that level because the target is not especially high for a major crypto asset if the broader market stays constructive.

The chance that Trump is both impeached and removed from office before the end of his term looks meaningfully below the market price. Impeachment is plausible in a crisis, but actual removal requires an exceptionally high and historically rare level of bipartisan Senate support.

The chance that the United States acquires any part of Canada before 2029 is extremely low. Even with heightened geopolitical noise, this would require a dramatic and highly unlikely break in allied relations, constitutional process, and international order.

It is overwhelmingly unlikely that Trump will actually end the Federal Reserve before January 20, 2029. He could pressure, weaken, or restructure parts of it, but outright abolition would require extraordinary political and legal alignment that is not realistic under normal conditions.

Trump is still more likely than not to keep H-1B policy restrictive, but a limited expansion is plausible if business groups and labor-market shortages create enough pressure. I put the chance of some meaningful expansion at 28%, modestly above the market.

I make a modest population increase the single most likely outcome, but only narrowly. The most plausible result is that NYC ends up roughly flat to slightly up, with enough immigration and natural growth to offset continued domestic outmigration.

Gavin Newsom is a credible but far from dominant contender for the 2028 Democratic nomination. I would put his chances modestly above the market price because of his national profile and fundraising potential, but still well below one in four given the depth of the party field and the likelihood of a competitive open race.

The market is pricing a very high chance that the Fed makes zero cuts in 2026, and that looks broadly plausible given the absence of any confirmed easing cycle in the provided context. I would still leave some room for at least one cut if growth weakens or inflation cools more than expected, but the most likely outcome remains no cuts.

Democrats are the clear favorite to win House control, but the margin is not overwhelming because the chamber is still decided by a relatively small number of competitive districts. The market price looks a bit higher than my own estimate, so I would put Democratic odds in the low-to-mid 80s rather than near certainty.

I think the probability is higher than the market implies, but still not the majority outcome. Trump has both the incentive and the willingness to test emergency domestic powers, yet legal, political, and operational constraints make invocation far from likely absent a major crisis.

A Level 4 advisory for Taiwan before Jan. 1, 2027 is possible but still unlikely absent a major cross-strait crisis. I estimate the chance at 12%, modestly above the market’s 7% price because the tail risk is more substantial than a routine peacetime advisory implies.

The Liberals are still a live contender to clear Sweden’s 4% threshold and win seats, but the margin is thin and their recent polling profile has generally looked fragile. I would put the chance of at least one seat slightly above even, but below the market price.

This is an extremely low-probability event because it would require a highly unusual formal federal action to rename an existing U.S. state, not just a symbolic statement. The market price looks far above my estimate, and I think Yes is closer to a long-shot than a meaningful possibility.