Edges for Sep 6, 2026

I think the market is heavily overconfident in OpenAI going first. The latest reporting favors Anthropic being able to move through a public filing and listing window sooner, while OpenAI still looks more tentative and potentially pushed into 2027.

Starbucks looks materially more likely than the market implies to report above 41,800 global stores in 2026. The company was already at 41,304 stores in Q3 FY2026, so only modest additional net growth is needed to clear the threshold.

I think Yes is substantially more likely than the market implies, because multiple reports indicate USAID has already been dismantled in practice. The main uncertainty is whether the market resolves on formal legal abolition or on operational elimination, but the balance of evidence still favors Yes.

Boeing is making progress on restoring output, but clearing 620 commercial deliveries in 2026 still looks like a stretch. I would put the chance of a Yes outcome materially below the market, around 32%.

My independent estimate is that Barron Trump is unlikely to receive a presidential pardon by Jan. 21, 2029. A pardon would require either an actual prosecutorial risk or an extraordinary political/ family circumstance, both of which look uncommon for someone with no public indication of legal jeopardy.

I think the bear case for Trump has a meaningfully better than even chance of showing up in 2026 if it is defined as a sustained cluster of legal, political, and economic setbacks. The market’s 5% Yes price looks far too low for such a broad and already-developing narrative.

Onslaught looks more likely than not to finish below $2 million domestically for its opening weekend, but the margin is not huge because several outside forecasts point to a wider range that can spill above the threshold. I would slightly favor Yes, with the market already pricing most of that view in.

I put the chance of the United States acquiring any part of Greenland before 2029 at very low, around 4%. The political, legal, and diplomatic barriers are extreme, and there is little evidence that Denmark or Greenland would entertain a territorial transfer.

I make this a meaningful but far from likely possibility: Trump has enough avenues for visible wins, agenda-setting, and selective court or administrative successes that a “bull case” year is plausible. Still, the legal environment is hostile enough that a broad, durable triumph looks more like an exception than the base case.

I put the chance of a U.S. recession in 2027 at 41%. The market’s 26% looks too low given the age of the expansion risk, policy uncertainty, and the fact that recessions are still the default downside outcome over a two-year horizon.

A literal U.S. “take back” of the Panama Canal is very unlikely, with the most realistic path being heightened pressure, threats, or negotiations rather than a transfer of sovereignty. I would put the probability of a Yes outcome at 8%.

Keith Sonderling is still the clear favorite, but the market looks a bit too confident given the long runway and the possibility that Trump pivots to a more explicitly political or business-friendly choice. I put Sonderling meaningfully below the market and spread more probability across Bryan Slater and Andrew Puzder than the current pricing implies.

I put the probability of Trump invoking the Insurrection Act at 31%. The market looks somewhat too skeptical given his past willingness to test domestic-use-of-force limits, though the legal and political hurdles still make this a minority outcome.

I գնահատestimate a low single-digit chance that Trump resigns before his term ends, far below the market price. Resignation by a sitting president is historically rare, and Trump’s personal and political incentives strongly favor staying in office unless he is forced out by an extraordinary health or legal crisis.

Samuel Alito has a meaningful chance to step down before Trump’s term ends, but the market looks too confident. I would put the probability closer to the mid-50s than the high-60s.

New Hampshire is still the most likely first Democratic contest in 2028, but the market appears to be pricing it like an almost certain outcome. I think the state’s structural advantages are real, yet the combination of DNC rulemaking, calendar negotiation, and possible changes in state/party compliance leaves meaningful room for an alternative first contest.

Scottie Scheffler has a real but still modest chance to complete the career grand slam before 2028. His elite baseline skill makes the market’s 5% feel too low, but the task remains difficult because he still needs to capture at least two specific majors in a short window.

Robinhood has a plausible path to clearing 30.2 million funded customers in 2026, but it still needs another solid year of net additions. I գնահատ estimate the Yes outcome at 40%, meaning the market looks somewhat pessimistic but not wildly off.

Arsenal are a legitimate title contender, but the Premier League is usually too competitive for any single team to deserve nearly coin-flip odds this far from the finish. I make their chance of winning the 2026-27 title lower than the market price, around 38%.

The probability that the U.S. acquires any part of Canada by early 2029 is extremely low. Absent a catastrophic geopolitical rupture, this remains far more likely to resolve No than Yes.

I put the chance that Trump expands H-1B or otherwise meaningfully broadens high-skill immigration during this term at 33%. The market’s 22% looks a bit too pessimistic, but not wildly so, because a true expansion would likely require overcoming strong anti-immigration instincts and GOP resistance.

I think the chance that Trump buys Greenland, even partially, is very low. The market’s 19% Yes price looks materially too high given the diplomatic, legal, and practical barriers to any territorial purchase.

A U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term still looks extraordinarily unlikely, so the best estimate is a very high probability that no acquisition happens. The market’s 85% for no acquisition appears somewhat low, with most of the remaining probability concentrated in implausibly large purchase ranges.

Ethereum reaching $4,000 in September looks possible but still unlikely. The market is pricing it as a very low-probability event, and without a strong breakout catalyst in the remaining weeks, the most likely outcome is that ETH stays below that level.

My independent view is that 2035 US real GDP growth is most likely to land in the low-to-mid 2% range, with 2.1% to 2.5% the single most likely bucket. The market looks somewhat too pessimistic on a strong-but-not-recessionary long-run growth outcome.

Drake is always a plausible surprise-release candidate, but without any concrete rollout signals and with only about three and a half weeks left, the odds still lean toward no. I put the chance of a new album by September 30 at 18%.

Democrats can absolutely win both chambers in 2026, but a full D Senate and D House sweep is still a tougher outcome than the near-coin-flip market suggests. The structural advantage of the opposition in a midterm, plus the difficulty of taking and holding both chambers at once, makes No slightly more likely.

I estimate a modestly low but meaningful chance that Zelenskyy and Putin speak before the deadline, around 22%. A direct meeting is still unlikely, but the probability is higher than the market implies because wartime diplomacy can turn quickly if a ceasefire or negotiated channel emerges.

I think NYC is more likely to end up with a slight population decline than a slight increase over this window, with the most probable outcome being a move within roughly minus 1% to plus 1%. My independent probability for the 0.01% to 0.99% increase band is 34%, below the market’s 43%.

I think a Fed rate hike by December 2026 is somewhat more likely than not, but the market may be a bit too confident. My estimate is 64% Yes, reflecting a meaningful chance that inflation or growth re-acceleration forces one late-cycle hike, while also recognizing the Fed’s usual reluctance to tighten unless the data clearly demand it.

NVIDIA has a strong path to finishing 2026 as the world’s largest company, but the lead is not secure enough to justify near-certainty. I would price this somewhat below the market, with Yes still the more likely outcome.

A third impeachment attempt is meaningfully plausible, but the market looks too confident that it will happen. I estimate about a 58% chance that Trump is impeached before the end of the term, with the main uncertainty being House control and whether a sufficiently serious scandal or constitutional clash emerges.

My independent estimate is that the Fed is somewhat less likely than the market implies to leave rates unchanged at the December 2027 meeting, because the long horizon makes some policy move by then more likely than a clean hold. Still, a no-change decision remains the single most likely outcome at that meeting.

I think there is a low but not negligible chance that the DC Metro median home value ends up below $512,000 on September 30, with the market currently pricing the Yes side a bit too low. My estimate is higher than the market’s 8.15% implied probability, but still clearly favors No because the threshold sits below what has typically been a relatively expensive metro housing market.

The most important distinction here is that the market is not asking whether the U.S. has attacked Iran, but whether it will launch a military offensive intended to establish control over Iranian territory. Recent reporting supports ongoing strikes and escalation, but not a ground invasion or occupation, so I think the Yes outcome remains unlikely.

I think the market is somewhat overconfident, but a successful launch with an FDV above $800M is still more likely than not. My estimate is 62% Yes, reflecting strong upside if the token is well-promoted and tightly supplied, but meaningful risk that the launch is smaller or priced below the threshold.

I slightly lean toward a rate cut, but only modestly. The market is already pricing a meaningful chance of easing, and the Bank of Russia is the kind of central bank that will cut if disinflation and softer growth are clearly established, though it often waits for convincing confirmation.

I slightly favor the Yes side but still see it as a low-probability outcome. The market’s 18% implied probability looks reasonable, and my estimate is that Musk stays under 40 posts about one-fifth of the time in a 48-hour window.

I estimate a roughly one-in-three chance that at least one quarter from Q1 2025 through Q4 2028 prints above 5% annualized real GDP growth. The market looks a bit too pessimistic because a single outsized quarter can happen even when the underlying trend is only mediocre, especially with AI-driven capital spending and volatile inventory effects.

China overtaking the U.S. in nominal GDP by 2030 looks unlikely under current growth, inflation, and exchange-rate assumptions. I would price the Yes outcome at 11%, meaning the market appears somewhat too optimistic on the chance of a reversal.

The No side looks overwhelmingly likely. For the market to resolve Yes, New York City’s Parcl-based median home value would need to come in below $555,000, which appears far below the city’s typical level even allowing for volatility.

I գնահատestimate a low but non-trivial chance that Trump is both impeached and removed before his term ends, around 10%. Impeachment is politically plausible if control of the House shifts, but removal requires an extremely high Senate threshold that has almost never been met.

A foldable iPhone release by September 15 looks very unlikely. The market is pricing in a near-zero chance, and based on Apple’s typical product cadence and the remaining time window, I agree the odds are low, though not literally impossible.

The market is pricing in an extremely low chance that XRP touches $3 in September, and that seems directionally reasonable given the lack of bullish news and the short remaining window. Still, the probability is probably higher than 1.5% because a fast crypto rally can move XRP through a round-number threshold very quickly.

This is still a very low-probability event, because a CMI declaration would require a genuinely extraordinary mathematical breakthrough and an official institutional response within a short remaining window. I would put the chance of Yes slightly below the market price, at 16%.

Ethereum reaching $3,000 by year-end 2026 looks close to a coin flip, but I lean slightly toward No. The market price is already near 50-50, and absent a strong late-year crypto rally, $3,000 is a meaningful hurdle rather than a baseline.

Bitcoin has a non-trivial but still limited chance of touching $100,000 before the end of September. The market is pricing it as very unlikely, but given the long enough remaining window and Bitcoin’s tendency to produce sharp, volatile spikes, I think the true probability is somewhat higher than the current price implies.

Google has a plausible path to finishing first, but the market’s low price reflects how hard it is to hold the top spot in a fast-moving leaderboard. I think Google is somewhat more likely than 9% to lead at year-end, but still clearly an underdog against the field.

Infantino leaving FIFA presidency before the end of 2026 looks unlikely absent an unexpected scandal, health issue, or major political rupture. The market’s 17% Yes price seems somewhat elevated, and I would price a lower but still nonzero chance because leadership exits at this level can sometimes happen suddenly.

The market is pricing this as a fairly unlikely event, and that seems reasonable given the lack of confirmed, current reporting that the show is firmly locked in. I still assign a meaningful chance of Yes because the event description implies an announced October 2026 performance, which leaves room for the concert to go ahead if logistics and publicity hold.

South Korea’s December 2026 CPI inflation will most likely remain above 1.5%, though the threshold is not impossible if disinflation broadens quickly into the winter months. The market’s low Yes price looks broadly reasonable, but I see a somewhat higher chance of Yes than the current price implies.

China has been running with very weak inflation and occasional outright disinflation, so a CPI reading at or below 0.2% is plausible. Still, the threshold is strict, and even a modest rebound in food, energy, or services inflation would push the result above it, so I view Yes as a low-probability outcome.

The market is likely expecting the Bank of Israel to hold rates steady in October rather than cut, and that still looks like the most probable outcome. I assign a moderate chance of a decrease because a softer growth or inflation backdrop could justify easing, but the balance of evidence favors no change.

The Clarity Act still has a plausible path to becoming law in 2026, but the bar is high because it must clear both chambers and survive the remaining legislative calendar. I would slightly favor No, with Yes in the mid-teens rather than near the current low market-implied level.

Base has a plausible path to launching a token by mid-2027, but it is still far from a sure thing because the decision likely depends on product maturity, governance design, and regulatory comfort. I would slightly lean below the market at 34% Yes, reflecting meaningful optionality but substantial delay and non-launch risk.

Hyperliquid reaching $90 by the end of 2026 looks more likely than not, but not close to guaranteed. The market is already pricing a high chance, and I would keep the probability slightly below that level because crypto drawdowns and liquidity shocks can still derail a near-term breakout.

I think the market is a bit too low, but still broadly right that a recession by the end of 2026 is not the base case. The main path to Yes is a pair of weak GDP prints in the remaining quarters of 2026, while an NBER call by then is much less likely.

Spain is a live contender, but the market is still too conservative relative to its co-host advantage and long-run talent base. I put Spain’s outright win chance at 16%, above the current 12% market price but still far from a coin-flip.

The market appears somewhat underpricing the chance of a 5.0% unemployment print in 2026, but the threshold is still relatively high and would usually require a clear labor-market deterioration. I would put the probability modestly above market-implied levels at 12%.

I would put the chance of a 14-day effective ceasefire completing by September 4 at slightly below the market price, because the bar is not just a pause in rhetoric but a full two-week window with no qualifying U.S. strike on Iranian territory. With no evidence of a recent strike and a relatively short time horizon, Yes is plausible, but the event still depends on there having been no qualifying action in the prior two weeks all the way through the deadline.