Edges for Jun 28, 2026

I assess a 25% chance that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic. Anthropic's earlier confidential filing and high probability of a late‑2026 announcement make it the clear favorite to go public first.

Extremely unlikely — I assess a low single-digit chance (~3%) that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029; pardons are legally possible absent conviction, but there is no factual or political path that makes this plausible at scale.

I assess an 8% chance that U.S. real quarterly GDP (annualized) will exceed 5% in any quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — a low-probability tail event driven only by extreme fiscal/monetary shocks, big inventory swings, or large data revisions.

Based on the facts, USAID has already been functionally dismantled and is very likely to remain eliminated as an independent agency by Jan 20, 2029 — even if a narrow, formal statutory repeal does not occur.

**Assumption:** 'Yes' = the 4-year average annual measles cases in the U.S. during 2025–2028 is >= 1,000. Based on current outbreak size, vaccination trends, and public-health capacity, I assess a **65%** probability that the 4-year average will meet or exceed 1,000 cases/year.

Independent assessment: vanishingly small chance that Trump will 'take back' legal ownership or permanent control of the Panama Canal during his term — I estimate a 2% probability of any outcome that could plausibly be described as 'take back.'

Based on mounting internal pressure, bipartisan backlash, and multiple insider reports, I assess Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the most likely next Cabinet departure — more likely than current markets price.

I assign a 40% probability that the 'bear case' for Trump will occur in 2026 — legal and policy setbacks create a credible pathway to broad political damage, but strong macroeconomic performance and political resilience make a full-fledged bear year more uncertain.

I assess Todd Blanche as the single most likely pick but substantially less certain than markets imply — I put a 50% chance Blanche is Trump's next Attorney General, with Lee Zeldin as the clearest alternative at ~30%.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that Justice Clarence Thomas will resign during Trump’s term; my independent probability is 20% driven mainly by age and health tail risks but weighed down by his recent high level of activity and lack of any stated intent.

I judge a new, comprehensive US–China free trade agreement signed and implemented before Jan 20, 2029 as unlikely — my independent probability is low due to political, institutional, and geopolitical obstacles.

I assess an 8% chance the 25th Amendment will be used during Trump's presidency — highly unlikely absent a sudden serious medical incapacity or an unprecedented political revolt within the executive branch.

I assess a materially higher chance than the market that a recognizable 'Trump bull case' materializes in 2026 — not the slam‑dunk narrative of unbroken gains, but a clear, market‑driven surge tied to economic/earnings tailwinds and reduced political risk.

I assess about an 18% chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026, higher than the market-implied ~1.6% but still a long-shot outcome driven by a narrow set of favorable macro and crypto-specific conditions.

I assess a very low but non-zero chance that the U.S. will acquire sovereign control of any part of Greenland before January 2029 — this would require extraordinary political and legal events to align within a short timeline.

I assess a low (5%) independent probability that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 1 Jan 2030 — closing a roughly $10–12T gap in five years requires extremely unlikely combinations of sustained double‑digit nominal China growth, large RMB appreciation, and/or a major U.S. collapse.

I assess a 48% probability that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 on or before July 31, 2026, reflecting a roughly even chance with a slight tilt toward stagnation given ongoing regional risks and the moving-average requirement.

Very unlikely. I assess a 6% independent probability that Trump will successfully buy any part of Greenland during his term (by 2029), because sovereign sale requires willing sellers and major legal/diplomatic hurdles that currently make a purchase implausible.

I assess there is a very high probability that the U.S. will not acquire Greenland during Trump’s term — the legal, political, financial, and diplomatic barriers make acquisition effectively implausible.

I assess a low probability that President Trump will resign before his term ends — roughly a 12% chance — because resignation is historically rare, he has strong incentives to fight, and the current facts show no credible plan or public signals pointing toward resignation.

I assess a 72% probability that Mexico reaches the Round of 16 at the 2026 World Cup, reflecting strong home-advantage and historical knockout consistency balanced against single-game knockout volatility and draw risks.

Based on mixed but fragile data — youth rebounds vs. older-student stagnation and very weak 12th-grade results — I assess a modestly below-even chance that U.S. math scores will show a significant decline in 2026.

Given the short time window, lack of recent public data in this brief, and persistent geopolitical risks, I assess a below-even chance that IMF Portwatch will show a 7-day moving average of at least 60 transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz by July 15; I put the probability at 25%.

Brazil is the clear favorite but not overwhelmingly so; I assess a 68% chance Brazil wins on June 29, 2026, reflecting Brazil's superior talent and depth tempered by Japan's tactical discipline and upset potential.

I assess ~15% chance Scottie Scheffler completes the Career Grand Slam before 2028 (i.e., wins the 2027 US Open at Pebble Beach). This is materially higher than the market's ~4% price.

I assess a very low independent probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada by 2029 — roughly 2% — because there is no credible pathway for lawful transfer, Canada is strengthening defense and sovereignty, and outright conquest or forced annexation is politically and legally prohibitive.

I estimate a 28% chance that NYC's July 2025→July 2027 population change will fall in the narrow band −0.99% to 0% (a small decline up to ~0%). I judge larger declines (≥1%) as more likely than the market currently prices.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican nomination, primarily because of his residual base strength and brand recognition balanced against serious structural, legal, and personal obstacles.

I assess a 72% probability that the Fed will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at the July 2026 meeting, reflecting strong market consensus tempered by nontrivial upside risk from inflation or labor surprises.

I assess a ~30% independent chance that President Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act before Jan 20, 2029 — a meaningful but minority probability driven by the administration's rhetoric and adviser pressure balanced against steep legal, political, and operational barriers.

Based on the active floor debate and a high likelihood the Democratic-led House will secure enough votes, I assess a strong probability that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029.

I assess a low but meaningfully higher-than-market chance that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of arrivals in the Strait of Hormuz of at least 60 on some date by July 7, 2026, driven by the short time window and operational constraints; my probability is 15%.

After a blind assessment of the evidence I place the probability of a meaningful 2026 decline in U.S. reading scores at about 40%; the most likely single outcome is a negligible net change rather than a large drop, and markets at ~47% are somewhat tilted toward expecting a pronounced decline.

I assess a modest but non-negligible chance that Starbucks finishes 2026 above 41,800 stores — roughly 22% — because the gap is small relative to potential incremental upside from China/India expansion and one-off accounting/opening timing, though the company's guidance points to a below-threshold outcome as the most likely.

I assess roughly a 20% chance Vladimir Putin will cease to be President of Russia by December 31, 2026, driven mainly by low historical turnover and strong control of state institutions but offset by notable tail risks (health, elite infighting, or a war-driven removal).

I assess a modest but non-negligible chance that Marine Le Pen wins the 2027 French presidential election, with structural obstacles making victory unlikely but political fragmentation and shifting voter behavior providing upside tail risks.

I assess a 46% chance Lionel Messi wins the 2026 World Cup Golden Boot, slightly below the market-implied ~52%; his elite finishing and Argentina’s quality keep him competitive, but age, likely reduced minutes, and strong younger forwards make him less probable to be the top scorer.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by December 31, 2026, putting the probability at 8% driven by a small set of bullish macro and adoption scenarios against larger headwinds of market scale and regulatory risk.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Trump will be impeached and then *removed* from office before his term ends — my independent probability is 12%. House impeachment is likely; Senate conviction remains unlikely absent extraordinary developments.

I assess a low probability that the DOJ will achieve a full court 'win' (a judicial judgment against Apple) by Jan 1, 2030 — most paths lead to a settlement or protracted litigation rather than a definitive trial victory.

I assess a 65% independent probability that the Chicago pro football team will announce relocation to a new site in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 regular season — an outcome I view as modestly more likely than current markets imply.

I assess a high probability that GRVT's FDV will be above $100M one day after launch, driven by strong market pricing, typical tokenomics that target high headline FDVs, and the likelihood of initial exchange listings and speculative demand.

I assess Shohei Ohtani has a strong but not certain chance to win the 2026 NL MVP, with the primary risks being injury, role limitations, or an unexpected breakout by another NL star.

I assess a low probability that the Laso Finance MetaDAO public sale will hit over $35M in committed funds by the July 31, 2026 deadline, primarily because the target is large for a single public sale on MetaDAO and there is no recent news indicating major institutional demand, but the low probability is non-zero due to the resolution rule that a brief spike in the displayed committed figure would count as success.

The market currently prices a very high chance that BTC/USDT will close above $56,000 at the Binance 1-minute candle at 12:00 ET on June 30; after weighing market-implied odds, liquidity and short-term volatility risk, I assess a 90% probability of Yes.

Independent assessment: very likely the US national debt will hit $40 trillion during the Trump Administration — I assign a 93% probability, because the gap is small relative to recent quarterly additions and structural drivers point to continued nominal increases.

I assess a 22% chance that George Russell wins the 2026 F1 Drivers' Championship, slightly above the market-implied 17.5% because his proven talent and Mercedes' development capacity give him a realistic upside, but substantial obstacles from likely Red Bull dominance, teammate dynamics, and technical/regulatory uncertainty keep the probability low.

I assess a 38% probability that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's next Prime Minister after the 2026 election, reflecting his persistent coalition-building strengths tempered by legal exposure, opposition potential, and coalition fragility.

France is the clear favorite to beat Sweden on 2026-06-30, but single-game variance, possible rotation, and Sweden's defensive organization reduce the certainty; I assess a 72% probability that France wins in regulation time.

I assess a roughly 30% chance that Côte d'Ivoire wins this match, somewhat higher than the market-implied 25.5% because of Africa-side volatility and single-game upset potential, but Norway remains the clear favorite given squad depth and likely superior finishing.

I assess a strong but not certain likelihood that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on July 3 will be above $56,000, reflecting high current market confidence tempered by the high noise of a single-minute settlement and holiday liquidity risks.