Edges for Jun 27, 2026

I assess a low probability (12%) that active US military personnel will physically enter Venezuelan land territory by June 30, 2026; the very short remaining window and high political/operational barriers make such an operation unlikely absent an urgent, unforeseen trigger.

I assess a moderately better-than-market chance that South Korea advances to the Round of 32, reflecting their historical strength and the favorable 2-of-3 group structure but tempered by uncertainty about their specific group draw, recent form, and match circumstances.

Extremely unlikely — I assess a low single-digit chance (~3%) that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029; pardons are legally possible absent conviction, but there is no factual or political path that makes this plausible at scale.

I assess an 8% chance that U.S. real quarterly GDP (annualized) will exceed 5% in any quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — a low-probability tail event driven only by extreme fiscal/monetary shocks, big inventory swings, or large data revisions.

Based on the facts, USAID has already been functionally dismantled and is very likely to remain eliminated as an independent agency by Jan 20, 2029 — even if a narrow, formal statutory repeal does not occur.

I assess a 25% chance the Chicago pro football team will have relocated to a new Illinois location by the first game of the 2028 regular season — more likely they will remain at Soldier Field or have no finalized relocation by then.

**Assumption:** 'Yes' = the 4-year average annual measles cases in the U.S. during 2025–2028 is >= 1,000. Based on current outbreak size, vaccination trends, and public-health capacity, I assess a **65%** probability that the 4-year average will meet or exceed 1,000 cases/year.

Independent assessment: vanishingly small chance that Trump will 'take back' legal ownership or permanent control of the Panama Canal during his term — I estimate a 2% probability of any outcome that could plausibly be described as 'take back.'

I assess a materially higher-than-market chance that a coherent 'bear case' for Trump will crystallize in 2026 — roughly 38% — driven by a plausible combination of economic retracement, legal setbacks, and damaging election-interference narratives that could meaningfully weaken his standing.

I assess a 34% chance that a durable, broad 'Trump bull case' materializes across 2026 — plausible given pockets of strength (Bitcoin, AI infrastructure) but unlikely because legal, macro, and market-structure risks make a full, sustained bull outcome more than a coin-flip failure.

I judge a new, comprehensive US–China free trade agreement signed and implemented before Jan 20, 2029 as unlikely — my independent probability is low due to political, institutional, and geopolitical obstacles.

Based on mounting internal pressure, bipartisan backlash, and multiple insider reports, I assess Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the most likely next Cabinet departure — more likely than current markets price.

I assess a low probability that Lionel Messi will finish as the 2026 World Cup top goalscorer (18%), primarily because of his advanced age, reduced scoring role, and strong competition from younger elite strikers despite Argentina's high team quality.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that Justice Clarence Thomas will resign during Trump’s term; my independent probability is 20% driven mainly by age and health tail risks but weighed down by his recent high level of activity and lack of any stated intent.

I assess ~40% chance Saudi Arabia will formally normalize relations with Israel before Jan 20, 2029 — plausible under a heavy U.S.-brokered package but more likely to be blocked by Saudi public red lines and the Gaza/Iran regional backdrop.

I assess ~30% independent probability that Elon Musk will personally visit Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — significantly higher than the market price (13%), because over a 73-year horizon human Mars travel is very likely and Musk has both motive and access, while survival and willingness constraints keep the probability well below 50%.

I assess Todd Blanche as the most likely nominee/confirmed Attorney General but not a slam — my independent probability for Blanche is 58%, with significant remaining chance for a Trump-aligned political pick (Zeldin/Harmeet) or a delayed/surprise selection.

I assess a very low but non-zero chance that the U.S. will acquire sovereign control of any part of Greenland before January 2029 — this would require extraordinary political and legal events to align within a short timeline.

I assess a 72% probability that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 for at least one date by December 31, 2026, driven by the route's centrality to global oil and goods flows but tempered by persistent geopolitical and security risks.

I assess an 80% probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 30 will be above $56,000, reflecting strong short-term upside momentum and end-of-month flows but tempered by minute-level volatility and manipulation risk.

Given active House proceedings with a floor vote expected today and sustained political momentum, I assess a high likelihood that the House will impeach President Trump at some point before Jan 20, 2029.

I assess a 45% probability that the IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average for Strait of Hormuz transit calls reaches or exceeds 60 on at least one date by July 15, 2026, because a short sustained rebound could push the average over the threshold but substantial geopolitical and commercial headwinds make that recovery uncertain.

I assess there is a very high probability that the U.S. will not acquire Greenland during Trump’s term — the legal, political, financial, and diplomatic barriers make acquisition effectively implausible.

Independent assessment: low probability (10%) that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends — resignation is historically rare and inconsistent with his recent behavior, though nonzero tail risks (health, catastrophic scandal) justify a small probability.

Keir Starmer is very likely to be the first G7 leader to leave office because he has publicly resigned and the timing now depends on Labour's leadership process; I assess an 85% chance the UK PM is the first to go.

Very unlikely. I assess a 6% independent probability that Trump will successfully buy any part of Greenland during his term (by 2029), because sovereign sale requires willing sellers and major legal/diplomatic hurdles that currently make a purchase implausible.

Given multiple credible reports saying Blake Lively was not invited and absent from pre-wedding events, I assess a low probability she will attend; I assign an 8% chance of attendance and see the market (20%) as likely overstating the upside.

I assess a very low chance (6%) that the Department of Education will be legally abolished before Jan 20, 2029 — operational dismantling is plausible, but statutory elimination requires Congress and is unlikely in this window.

I assess an 18% chance the 25th Amendment will be used during Trump's presidency — most likely as a temporary, voluntary Section 3 transfer for a medical procedure rather than an involuntary Cabinet-led Section 4 removal.

I assess a modestly favorable chance (60%) that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of arrivals for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 at least once by July 31, 2026, because transient spikes or short-lived normalization are sufficient and geopolitical pressure has shown frequent short de-escalations; however, persistent security risks and rerouting incentives keep this outcome far from certain.

I assess a low probability (8%) that President Trump will be impeached and successfully removed from office before his term ends; removal requires an unusual, bipartisan break by many Republican senators or an extraordinary constitutional emergency.

Given the June 22 Switzerland round produced reported progress but only limited time remains to organize a formal senior-level follow-up, I assess a relatively low but non-negligible probability that a next senior-level U.S.–Iran round will begin by July 3, 2026.

I assess ~15% chance Scottie Scheffler completes the Career Grand Slam before 2028 (i.e., wins the 2027 US Open at Pebble Beach). This is materially higher than the market's ~4% price.

Extremely unlikely — I assess about a 2% independent probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029.

Independent assessment: modest chance that NYC posts a tiny population increase (0.01–0.99%) from July 2025 to July 2027 — I estimate ~28% probability, with a higher likelihood of small declines or stagnation driven by slow growth, housing constraints, and policy headwinds.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican nomination, primarily because of his residual base strength and brand recognition balanced against serious structural, legal, and personal obstacles.

I assess Croatia has a modest but clear edge to win this match; I estimate a 62% probability that Croatia beats Ghana based on relative team quality, tournament experience, and market pricing adjusted for upset risk.

I assess a 72% probability that the Fed will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at the July 2026 meeting, reflecting strong market consensus tempered by nontrivial upside risk from inflation or labor surprises.

Incumbent Governor Phil Weiser is likely to win the Colorado Democratic primary on June 30, 2026, with a strong advantage from incumbency, fundraising, and party infrastructure, but a low-probability upset remains possible from a late scandal or an unusually strong intra-party challenger.

Assuming the question is whether Anthropic will IPO before OpenAI, I assess Anthropic has a clear near-term lead and assign it a 75% chance of being the first to list.

I assess a low probability that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 — roughly a 12% chance — because current nominal growth, exchange-rate constraints, and structural limits make a crossover before 2030 unlikely absent a large shift in trajectories.

I assess a modest but non-negligible chance that Starbucks finishes 2026 above 41,800 stores — roughly 22% — because the gap is small relative to potential incremental upside from China/India expansion and one-off accounting/opening timing, though the company's guidance points to a below-threshold outcome as the most likely.

I assess Algeria has about a 30% chance to win this World Cup match against Austria, somewhat higher than the market-implied 22.5% but still the underdog given Austria's overall consistency and squad depth.

I assess a modest but non-negligible chance that Marine Le Pen wins the 2027 French presidential election, with structural obstacles making victory unlikely but political fragmentation and shifting voter behavior providing upside tail risks.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by December 31, 2026, putting the probability at 8% driven by a small set of bullish macro and adoption scenarios against larger headwinds of market scale and regulatory risk.

I assess a 72% chance that Elon Musk will post 40–64 main-feed posts (including reposts and quote posts) between June 25 12:00 PM ET and June 27 12:00 PM ET, because his baseline activity and history of bursts of high-volume posting make the band likely, though uncertainty from reply exclusion and unknown schedule reduces confidence below the market-implied price.

I assess an 8% probability that the United States will commence a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of Iran by December 31, 2026, because the political, operational, and strategic barriers to a ground invasion are large and immediate triggers for full-scale invasion are unlikely in the remaining time window.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that China will launch a military offensive to take control of any inhabited part of Taiwan by the end of 2026, driven by high risks and costs that make full-scale invasion unlikely in this timeframe.

I assess a 16% probability that Elena Rybakina wins Wimbledon 2026, modestly above the market-implied 12.5% because her game and past success on grass give her real upside, but uncertainty about current form and a very deep field keep her an outsider.

I assess a 45% chance that Mike Maignan will record 3 or more saves, slightly below the market-implied probability because France's defensive control reduces the expected number of shots on target despite Norway's dangerous attackers.

I assess a low probability that the Laso Finance MetaDAO public sale will hit over $35M in committed funds by the July 31, 2026 deadline, primarily because the target is large for a single public sale on MetaDAO and there is no recent news indicating major institutional demand, but the low probability is non-zero due to the resolution rule that a brief spike in the displayed committed figure would count as success.

I assess Spain has a modest but real chance to win the 2026 World Cup, with a probability modestly above the market-implied price due to squad quality and youth depth tempered by tournament variance and strong rivals.

I assess a 38% probability that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's next Prime Minister after the 2026 election, reflecting his persistent coalition-building strengths tempered by legal exposure, opposition potential, and coalition fragility.

I assess a modest but meaningful chance that Vladimir Putin ceases to be President by December 31, 2026, assigning an 18% probability driven mainly by tail-risk events (death, incapacitation, targeted removal or an elite-driven exit) and elevated political stress from the Ukraine war, while the baseline status quo and strong security control make continued incumbency the most likely outcome.

I assess Mexico has a better-than-even chance to reach the Round of 16 at the 2026 World Cup, primarily because they are a host nation with strong historical knockout experience and a competitive squad, but knockout volatility and draw luck keep the probability well below certainty.

Given the narrow $2,000 window and the market's very low implied probability, I assess a small but non-negligible chance that BTC/USDT will be between $62,000 and $64,000 at the Binance 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 27, 2026.