Edges for Jun 29, 2026

I assess a 25% chance that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic. Anthropic's earlier confidential filing and high probability of a late‑2026 announcement make it the clear favorite to go public first.

I assess a low but non-zero chance (~10%) that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029 — legally possible (preemptive pardons exist) but politically unlikely given no current charges or investigations.

Interpreting the market question as whether the 2025–2028 average will exceed 1,500 measles cases/year, I assess a 65% chance that the four-year average will be >1,500 cases/year based on the already large 2026 total and persistent drivers lowering population immunity.

I assess a low probability that any U.S. quarterly GDP (annualized) exceeds 5% between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — my independent estimate is 20% — because baseline forecasts, fiscal constraints, and recent quarterly momentum make a >5% annualized quarter an unlikely one-off event.

Near-zero probability. I assess a ~3% independent chance that Trump will “take back” the Panama Canal during his term — the weight of treaty, legal, logistical, regional, and diplomatic barriers makes outright seizure or legal reclamation extremely unlikely; only extraordinary, low-probability contingencies (major regional collapse, a willing Panamanian government, or extreme reinterpretation of treaty emergency clauses) could change that.

I assign a 40% probability that the 'bear case' for Trump will occur in 2026 — legal and policy setbacks create a credible pathway to broad political damage, but strong macroeconomic performance and political resilience make a full-fledged bear year more uncertain.

I assess a materially better-than-market chance that Starbucks will report above 41,800 global stores in 2026 — approximately a 38% probability based on projected gross openings, regional rollouts, and likely net additions once closures stabilize.

I assess a low probability (12%) that Trump will negotiate and secure a new, comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) with China during a term ending Jan 20, 2029.

I assess Todd Blanche as the single most likely pick but substantially less certain than markets imply — I put a 50% chance Blanche is Trump's next Attorney General, with Lee Zeldin as the clearest alternative at ~30%.

I assess a 62% probability that USAID will be formally eliminated (statutorily shuttered or subsumed such that it ceases to exist as a congressionally created independent agency) during Trump's term by 2029-01-20. The administration's clear intent and de facto dismantling make formal elimination more likely than not, but congressional and political constraints leave substantial uncertainty.

I estimate a low but non‑zero chance (~4%) that the United States will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029. Legal, diplomatic, and political barriers make acquisition highly unlikely, though aggressive diplomacy, Greenlandic independence, or a rushed lease/purchase of a small area create tail risk.

I assess a 40% probability that Elon Musk will post fewer than 40 main-feed posts from June 27 12:00 PM ET to June 29 12:00 PM ET, roughly in line with the market but slightly more conservative about low-volume outcomes.

I assess an 8% chance the 25th Amendment will be used during Trump's presidency — highly unlikely absent a sudden serious medical incapacity or an unprecedented political revolt within the executive branch.

I assess a substantially better-than-market chance that Donald Trump will win the 2028 Republican nomination, but still consider it unlikely due to age, legal exposure, and likely intra-party competition; my probability is 20%.

I estimate a 22% chance that Justice Clarence Thomas will resign during President Trump’s term — unlikely but not negligible given age and exposure to health or scandal shocks.

I assess about an 18% chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026, higher than the market-implied ~1.6% but still a long-shot outcome driven by a narrow set of favorable macro and crypto-specific conditions.

Independent assessment: I assign a 40% chance the DOJ ultimately 'wins' its antitrust case against Apple before 2030 — meaning the government secures a judicially approved remedy (trial judgment or binding consent decree) that is materially favorable to the DOJ.

I assess a materially higher chance than the market that a recognizable 'Trump bull case' materializes in 2026 — not the slam‑dunk narrative of unbroken gains, but a clear, market‑driven surge tied to economic/earnings tailwinds and reduced political risk.

I assess a low (5%) independent probability that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 1 Jan 2030 — closing a roughly $10–12T gap in five years requires extremely unlikely combinations of sustained double‑digit nominal China growth, large RMB appreciation, and/or a major U.S. collapse.

I assess a 38% chance that Israel and Saudi Arabia will normalize relations by Jan 20, 2029 — plausible if the U.S. delivers large, credible security/economic guarantees and Saudi calculates the domestic costs as manageable, but the unresolved Palestinian/Gaza issue and domestic/regional risks make formal normalization unlikely in the near term.

I assign a low probability (6%) that the U.S. will acquire sovereign control of any part of Greenland during Trump’s current term; sustained rhetoric and limited confidential talks make non‑sovereign arrangements plausible, but legal, political, and international barriers make an actual purchase extremely unlikely.

Given overwhelming Greenlandic/Danish opposition, extreme cost, legal/constitutional barriers, and Trump's public shift away from forced annexation, I assess a very high probability that the U.S. will not acquire Greenland during Trump's term.

Based on the active floor debate and a high likelihood the Democratic-led House will secure enough votes, I assess a strong probability that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029.

I assess a low probability that President Trump will resign before his term ends — roughly a 12% chance — because resignation is historically rare, he has strong incentives to fight, and the current facts show no credible plan or public signals pointing toward resignation.

Brazil is the clear favorite but not overwhelmingly so; I assess a 68% chance Brazil wins on June 29, 2026, reflecting Brazil's superior talent and depth tempered by Japan's tactical discipline and upset potential.

I assess a very low independent probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada by 2029 — roughly 2% — because there is no credible pathway for lawful transfer, Canada is strengthening defense and sovereignty, and outright conquest or forced annexation is politically and legally prohibitive.

I estimate a 28% chance that NYC's July 2025→July 2027 population change will fall in the narrow band −0.99% to 0% (a small decline up to ~0%). I judge larger declines (≥1%) as more likely than the market currently prices.

I assess a 72% probability that the Fed will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at the July 28–29, 2026 FOMC meeting, with the balance of risk tilted toward a surprise 25 bps move if key incoming data or financial conditions shift materially between now and the meeting.

I assess a 72% probability that Mexico reaches the Round of 16 at the 2026 World Cup, reflecting strong home-advantage and historical knockout consistency balanced against single-game knockout volatility and draw risks.

I assess that Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the single most likely next Cabinet departure, but not a lock — I place his independent probability at 40% based on sustained insider friction, public controversies, and historical turnover patterns in this administration.

I assess an 18% probability that Marine Le Pen wins the 2027 French presidential election, reflecting her entrenched voter base and party organization balanced against the strong structural disadvantages posed by France's two-round system and likely broad opposition coalitions.

I assess a 65% independent probability that the Chicago pro football team will announce relocation to a new site in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 regular season — an outcome I view as modestly more likely than current markets imply.

Hosting three strong CONCACAF sides raises the region's chances above historical norms, but Europe and South America still dominate; I assess a 12% probability that a CONCACAF country wins the 2026 World Cup.

Given persistent mistrust, high costs of enforcement, and the historically fragile nature of ceasefires in this conflict, I assess a modest probability that Russia and Ukraine will announce a mutually agreed, general ceasefire by December 31, 2026; my best estimate is lower than the market-implied 43%. There is a realistic pathway for a deal if battlefield dynamics and external mediation align, but significant obstacles make this an uphill outcome within six months.

Scottie Scheffler has a meaningful single-tournament chance to complete the Career Grand Slam at the 2027 US Open (Pebble Beach); I estimate his odds at about 14% to win that tournament and thus complete the slam before 2028.

I assess roughly a 20% chance Vladimir Putin will cease to be President of Russia by December 31, 2026, driven mainly by low historical turnover and strong control of state institutions but offset by notable tail risks (health, elite infighting, or a war-driven removal).

The market currently prices a very high chance that BTC/USDT will close above $56,000 at the Binance 1-minute candle at 12:00 ET on June 30; after weighing market-implied odds, liquidity and short-term volatility risk, I assess a 90% probability of Yes.

I assess a 46% chance Lionel Messi wins the 2026 World Cup Golden Boot, slightly below the market-implied ~52%; his elite finishing and Argentina’s quality keep him competitive, but age, likely reduced minutes, and strong younger forwards make him less probable to be the top scorer.

I assess an 8% probability that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by December 31, 2026, higher than the market-implied ~1.8% but still low given the magnitude of the required rally and known macro/regulatory headwinds.

I estimate Jay Clayton has a strong but not certain chance to be Trump's permanent DNI — about 72% — with the remainder split among a handful of Trump loyalists (Aaron Lukas, Bill Pulte) and allied figures (Devin Nunes, John Ratcliffe).

France is the clear favorite to beat Sweden on 2026-06-30, but single-game variance, possible rotation, and Sweden's defensive organization reduce the certainty; I assess a 72% probability that France wins in regulation time.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Trump will be impeached and then *removed* from office before his term ends — my independent probability is 12%. House impeachment is likely; Senate conviction remains unlikely absent extraordinary developments.

I assess a strong but not certain likelihood that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on July 3 will be above $56,000, reflecting high current market confidence tempered by the high noise of a single-minute settlement and holiday liquidity risks.

Given the very short time horizon and the market's strong expectation that BTC will be above $50,000 at the Binance 1-minute close on July 5 at 12:00 ET, I assign a high probability but discount a bit for single-minute volatility and liquidity/manipulation risk.

Given the short time window, lack of recent public data in this brief, and persistent geopolitical risks, I assess a below-even chance that IMF Portwatch will show a 7-day moving average of at least 60 transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz by July 15; I put the probability at 25%.

I assess a roughly 30% chance that Côte d'Ivoire wins this match, somewhat higher than the market-implied 25.5% because of Africa-side volatility and single-game upset potential, but Norway remains the clear favorite given squad depth and likely superior finishing.

Given reported progress from the June 22 talks but the very short window and logistical/political hurdles, I assess a modest probability that a new senior-level US–Iran in-person round will begin by July 3, 2026.

I assess an 8% probability that MicroStrategy will announce a Bitcoin purchase during June 23–29; the market-implied probability is extremely low (~3%), but historical patterns and Saylor’s stated preferences leave a modest tail possibility.

I assess a low probability (12%) that the Department of Education will be formally abolished by Jan 20, 2029 — administrative dismantling is likely to continue, but full legal elimination is a high bar requiring congressional action unlikely to occur in this timeframe.

Independent assessment: *Very unlikely* that Trump will meaningfully expand high-skill immigration (H-1B or equivalent) during his term through 2029; I assign a 12% probability to a genuine expansion while assigning much higher probability to continued restriction or status-quo-with-higher-bar reforms.

I assess Shohei Ohtani has a modest but real chance to lead MLB in runs in 2026, with factors like elite on-base and power supporting him but structural limits (lineup spot, possible two-way usage, injury risk) making it unlikely he is the favorite winner.

Argentina are strong favorites to beat Cabo Verde on July 3, 2026, but there is a non-negligible upset risk from rotation, red cards, or an exceptional performance from Cabo Verde; I assess an 82% chance Argentina wins.