Who will be the next Prime Minister of Israel after the next election?
I assess a 38% probability that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's next Prime Minister after the 2026 election, reflecting his persistent coalition-building strengths tempered by legal exposure, opposition potential, and coalition fragility.
Analysis
The market currently prices Benjamin Netanyahu’s chance at roughly 33.5% yes and 66.5% no, indicating bettors see his reappointment as an underdog; the high event volume shows strong attention and that small shifts in coalition signals or legal developments could move prices materially. The scheduled election (October 27, 2026) leaves a defined timeline but substantial time for campaigns, realignments, and potential early-election shocks that can change dynamics quickly.
Netanyahu’s core strengths are structural: long-term name recognition, a disciplined Likud base, and historical ability to stitch together diverse right-wing and religious coalitions; these traits give him a credible path to a majority if the right-leaning bloc consolidates and turnout favors his voters. Israeli politics is also highly fragmented, so small changes in seat distributions or a couple of party moves can flip the post-election arithmetic; the presidency’s role in tasking a coalition-builder means the leader best positioned to form a stable majority matters as much as raw vote share.
Countervailing pressures are material and persistent: Netanyahu’s legal troubles and the public controversies around them reduce his bargaining leverage with potential coalition partners who fear reputational and governance costs, and they create durable motivation for opposition parties to form cross-spectrum alliances specifically to exclude him. Additionally, coalition partners on the far right or ultra-Orthodox side can be unpredictable, and international diplomatic pressure or economic fallout from contentious policy can change partner calculations or public sentiment between now and the vote.
Given these forces, the realistic range of outcomes is wide: a consolidated right bloc plus disciplined turnout gives Netanyahu a straightforward route into the premiership, while effective opposition unity or defections from hardline partners could deny him a majority; absent decisive new events (major legal rulings, large-scale realignments, or surprising polling swings), a mid-30s to low-40s percentage captures the balance between his structural advantages and the significant headwinds he faces.
Arguments
For
- Netanyahu has a long-established personal vote and party machine that reliably mobilizes core supporters.
- He has historic experience assembling broad right-religious coalitions and negotiating complex bargains to reach a majority.
- If right-wing and religious parties consolidate behind Likud, the arithmetic to appoint him becomes straightforward.
- Political inertia and familiarity often advantage well-known leaders in fragmented parliaments where coalition formation is about deals as much as raw votes.
Against
- Ongoing or new legal rulings against Netanyahu could erode partner willingness to form or remain in a government with him.
- Opposition parties have a clear incentive to unite to prevent his return and may accept unstable but anti-Netanyahu coalitions to do so.
- Some potential coalition partners may prefer to sit in opposition rather than tie themselves to a leader under heavy legal and reputational pressure.
- International diplomatic costs and economic uncertainty tied to a Netanyahu-led government could push some pragmatists away from supporting him.
Key drivers
- Seat distribution among Likud, allied right-wing, and religious parties after the election will directly determine whether a Netanyahu-led majority is feasible.
- Legal developments in Netanyahu’s corruption trials or appeals could materially alter his political standing and coalition partners’ willingness to join him.
- Turnout patterns among right-wing and centrist voters will amplify or blunt Netanyahu’s core base advantage.
- The ability of centrist, left, and Arab parties to coordinate a coalition specifically engineered to exclude Netanyahu is a decisive counterweight.
- Presidential decisions about who to task with forming a government after the election can favor the most likely coalition-maker rather than the single largest party leader.
- International diplomatic and economic reactions to candidate rhetoric or policy proposals could influence risky coalition partners’ calculations.
Risk factors
- A conviction (if it occurs and is not stayed) could create legal and political barriers that reduce Netanyahu’s viability.
- An unexpected unification of opposition parties (including durable cooperation with Arab parties) could produce a working majority opposed to him.
- Coalition partner defections or demands could make a Netanyahu-led bloc numerically insufficient or operationally unstable.
- Major security events or economic shocks close to the election could shift public sentiment rapidly either for or against incumbents.
- A last-minute party split, merger, or electoral threshold shifts could unexpectedly change seat allocation and bargaining leverage.
- Presidential discretion in appointing the candidate to form a government could favor a non-Netanyahu coalition-builder even if Likud is the single largest party.
Scenarios
Best case
A consolidated right-wing and religious bloc performs strongly on October 27, 2026, turnout favors Likud’s base, and no disqualifying legal development occurs, allowing Netanyahu to quickly assemble a majority coalition and be appointed and sworn in as Prime Minister.
Most likely
The election yields a fragmented Knesset where Netanyahu’s Likud is among the largest parties but not guaranteed a majority; post-election horse-trading decides the outcome, with a significant chance that his coalition-building succeeds if right-wing partners remain cohesive, but also a large chance that opposition aggregation or partner defections prevent his appointment.
Worst case
Opposition parties (including centrist, left, and Arab factions) manage disciplined coordination and form a narrow majority, or a damaging legal conviction or decisive judicial ruling removes Netanyahu from viable contention, resulting in a non-Netanyahu government.
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