Edges for Jun 26, 2026

Keith Sonderling is overwhelmingly likely to be the correct answer — he assumed the office on April 20, 2026 and is effectively the Department of Labor Secretary; I assign ~96% probability that he is Trump's next Secretary of Labor as defined by this market.

I assess a 25% chance the Chicago pro football team will have relocated to a new Illinois location by the first game of the 2028 regular season — more likely they will remain at Soldier Field or have no finalized relocation by then.

Independent assessment: very unlikely — I estimate an 8% chance Barron Trump receives a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029, because there is no present legal basis and the political cost of pardoning a child is extremely high, though not impossible if circumstances change.

I assess an independent probability of 1% that Trump will "take back the Panama Canal" during his term — rhetorically possible but practically and legally vanishingly unlikely.

Independent assessment: ~0% — the question, as written (average measles cases during a 'Trump Administration' from 2025–2028), is unresolvable because Donald Trump is not serving a 2025–2028 administration; a Yes outcome is effectively impossible under ordinary resolution rules.

I assess a 34% chance that a durable, broad 'Trump bull case' materializes across 2026 — plausible given pockets of strength (Bitcoin, AI infrastructure) but unlikely because legal, macro, and market-structure risks make a full, sustained bull outcome more than a coin-flip failure.

I assess a materially higher-than-market chance that a coherent 'bear case' for Trump will crystallize in 2026 — roughly 38% — driven by a plausible combination of economic retracement, legal setbacks, and damaging election-interference narratives that could meaningfully weaken his standing.

Independent estimate: Scottie Scheffler has a meaningful (roughly 30%) chance to complete the Career Grand Slam before 2028, driven by two remaining U.S. Open opportunities (June 2026 in progress and June 2027 at Pebble Beach) and his elite, sustained form.

I assess a low probability that USAID will be fully eliminated during Trump's term; I put the independent chance at 15% based on statutory, political, and institutional constraints even while recognizing paths that could severely weaken or absorb the agency.

I assess a very small but non‑zero chance (~2%) that Zelenskyy and Putin meet in person before July 1, 2026 — highly unlikely given public rejections and lack of preparation, but not strictly impossible because of last‑minute backchannels or sudden battlefield/political shifts.

I assess a 28% chance that U.S. quarterly real GDP will exceed 5% in at least one quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — possible but still unlikely given historical rarity and the scale of shock required.

Saudi Arabia is the favorite but not overwhelming; I assess a 58% chance Saudi Arabia wins, reflecting their deeper squad and World Cup experience balanced against Cabo Verde's defensive organization and underdog upside.

I assess a moderately better-than-market chance that South Korea advances to the Round of 32, reflecting their historical strength and the favorable 2-of-3 group structure but tempered by uncertainty about their specific group draw, recent form, and match circumstances.

I assess a very low chance (6%) that the Department of Education will be legally abolished before Jan 20, 2029 — operational dismantling is plausible, but statutory elimination requires Congress and is unlikely in this window.

Independent assessment: Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is *unlikely* to be the next Cabinet member to leave; I assign a 15% chance he is the next to go, with other more volatile, higher-visibility aides more likely to depart next.

I assess a low probability that Lionel Messi will finish as the 2026 World Cup top goalscorer (18%), primarily because of his advanced age, reduced scoring role, and strong competition from younger elite strikers despite Argentina's high team quality.

I assess a 72% probability that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 for at least one date by December 31, 2026, driven by the route's centrality to global oil and goods flows but tempered by persistent geopolitical and security risks.

Independent assessment: Andrew Oldham is extremely unlikely to be the next Supreme Court justice; I assign a 2% chance based on his lack of appellate pedigree, public consideration, and historical nomination patterns.

Independent assessment: ~5% chance that Trump will buy at least part of Greenland during his term. Legal, political, and practical barriers make a purchase overwhelmingly unlikely; the market price of 20% appears to overstate the realistic tail risk.

Independent assessment: virtually certain (99%) that there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term; any market odds implying material chance of a purchase are mispricing confusion or edge-case scenarios.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that Justice Clarence Thomas will voluntarily resign during Trump's 2025–2029 term: my independent estimate is 22% (Yes).

I assess a low probability that Trump will finalize a comprehensive new U.S.–China free trade agreement during his term — the political, security, and legislative obstacles are large and time-consuming, making a true FTA unlikely before Jan 20, 2029.

I assess a very low independent probability (7%) that the United States will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029; the most likely outcome is continued U.S. strategic engagement without any transfer of territorial sovereignty.

Given active House proceedings with a floor vote expected today and sustained political momentum, I assess a high likelihood that the House will impeach President Trump at some point before Jan 20, 2029.

I assess a modest but meaningful chance that Cap's token will sport an FDV above $500M one day after launch, driven by tokenomics choices and exchange listing decisions but constrained by regulatory and liquidity risks.

Independent assessment: low probability (10%) that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends — resignation is historically rare and inconsistent with his recent behavior, though nonzero tail risks (health, catastrophic scandal) justify a small probability.

I assess ~40% chance Saudi Arabia will formally normalize relations with Israel before Jan 20, 2029 — plausible under a heavy U.S.-brokered package but more likely to be blocked by Saudi public red lines and the Gaza/Iran regional backdrop.

Incumbent Governor Phil Weiser is likely to win the Colorado Democratic primary on June 30, 2026, with a strong advantage from incumbency, fundraising, and party infrastructure, but a low-probability upset remains possible from a late scandal or an unusually strong intra-party challenger.

Given multiple credible reports saying Blake Lively was not invited and absent from pre-wedding events, I assess a low probability she will attend; I assign an 8% chance of attendance and see the market (20%) as likely overstating the upside.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Starbucks reports above 41,800 global stores in 2026 — my independent probability is 22% based on recent growth rates, China/India upside, and downside from maturity and economic headwinds.

I assess Marine Le Pen has a meaningful but still minority chance of winning the 2027 French presidency; I assign an 18% probability based on structural barriers to a far-right victory offset by plausible scenarios of fragmentation, poor turnout, and economic or security shocks that could boost her support.

I assess a low probability (8%) that President Trump will be impeached and successfully removed from office before his term ends; removal requires an unusual, bipartisan break by many Republican senators or an extraordinary constitutional emergency.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican nomination; the market-implied probability is extremely small (≈2%), but structural advantages and uncertainty around rivals and legal outcomes keep the realistic probability higher.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that President Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act before 2027-01-01 — my independent probability is 12%. Invocation is legally possible and politically thinkable, but historically rare and carries very large political, legal and institutional frictions.

I assess an 80% probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 30 will be above $56,000, reflecting strong short-term upside momentum and end-of-month flows but tempered by minute-level volatility and manipulation risk.

Extremely unlikely — I assess about a 2% independent probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029.

I assess an 18% chance the 25th Amendment will be used during Trump's presidency — most likely as a temporary, voluntary Section 3 transfer for a medical procedure rather than an involuntary Cabinet-led Section 4 removal.

Given Netanyahu's entrenched position in Israeli politics and coalition-building experience, I assign him a meaningful chance to return as Prime Minister after the October 2026 election, but legal exposure, coalition fragility, and dynamic security/economic conditions make that outcome less likely than not.

Market prices imply near-certainty, but accounting for short-term volatility, exchange-specific risks, and a six-day horizon I assess a high but not absolute probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on July 1 will be above $52,000.

I assess a modestly favorable chance (60%) that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of arrivals for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 at least once by July 31, 2026, because transient spikes or short-lived normalization are sufficient and geopolitical pressure has shown frequent short de-escalations; however, persistent security risks and rerouting incentives keep this outcome far from certain.

I assess a modest but meaningful chance that Vladimir Putin ceases to be President by December 31, 2026, assigning an 18% probability driven mainly by tail-risk events (death, incapacitation, targeted removal or an elite-driven exit) and elevated political stress from the Ukraine war, while the baseline status quo and strong security control make continued incumbency the most likely outcome.

I assess a low probability that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 — roughly a 12% chance — because current nominal growth, exchange-rate constraints, and structural limits make a crossover before 2030 unlikely absent a large shift in trajectories.

Given current market pricing and typical FOMC behavior during periods of easing inflationary pressure, I assess a high probability that the Fed will leave the target federal funds rate unchanged at the July 28–29, 2026 meeting.

Assuming the question is whether Anthropic will IPO before OpenAI, I assess Anthropic has a clear near-term lead and assign it a 75% chance of being the first to list.

I assess a 92% probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 29, 2026 will be above $54,000, reflecting strong market confidence tempered by short-term tail risks and exchange-specific failure modes.

Given heavy market conviction (Yes trading at ~87.5%) and typical Binance liquidity, I assess a high probability that the XRP/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 26 will be above $1.00, but short-term volatility and exchange-specific tail risks lower confidence somewhat below the market-implied level.

I assess Mexico has a better-than-even chance to reach the Round of 16 at the 2026 World Cup, primarily because they are a host nation with strong historical knockout experience and a competitive squad, but knockout volatility and draw luck keep the probability well below certainty.

I assess a low probability that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026, assigning roughly a 6% chance, because the market-implied probability is very low and the remaining time horizon is short relative to the size of the rally required, although low-probability tail events could push price that high.

I assess a 45% probability that the IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average for Strait of Hormuz transit calls reaches or exceeds 60 on at least one date by July 15, 2026, because a short sustained rebound could push the average over the threshold but substantial geopolitical and commercial headwinds make that recovery uncertain.