Edges for Aug 10, 2026

Starbucks looks very likely to clear 41,800 global stores in 2026. The latest reported base and management’s own net-new store guidance point to a year-end total comfortably above the threshold.

Ethereum looks overwhelmingly likely to hit $3,000 by December 31, 2026, and the provided context even suggests it may already have done so this year. The main uncertainty is not market direction but whether the event will resolve cleanly on a recognized price print.

USAID appears to have already been dissolved as an independent agency, so I make the Yes outcome very likely. The main uncertainty is whether the market’s settlement standard requires formal legal abolition rather than operational dismantling.

Barron Trump getting a presidential pardon before January 2029 looks very unlikely absent a major and currently unobserved legal development. My independent estimate is 4%, driven by the fact that pardons require a federal offense or at least some plausible legal exposure, and there is no sign of either today.

The odds favor a formal action that blocks Yabloko from contesting the 2026 parliamentary election, but the case is still pending and the outcome depends on how aggressively the authorities want to move. I estimate a moderately high chance of Yes, somewhat above even but below near-certainty.

My base case is that 2035 U.S. real GDP growth lands in the 1.6% to 2.5% range, with 1.6% to 2.0% the single most likely bucket. The market looks a bit too pessimistic on outright zero-or-negative growth.

Robinhood looks meaningfully more likely than not to finish 2026 above 30.2 million funded customers. The Q2 2026 print already puts the company close enough that a continuation of recent momentum should get it over the line.

Alito’s age makes retirement plausible, but his recent public denial of near-term plans materially lowers the odds. I still see a meaningful chance of leaving before Trump’s term ends, just not a majority one.

Scheffler remains a legitimate candidate to finish the career grand slam within the window, but the short clock and the need to win one specific major keep this far from certain. I put the chance materially above the market at 24%.

I make impeachment less likely than the market does, with a rough 45% chance that Trump is impeached before Jan. 20, 2029. The main reason is that impeachment still depends heavily on Democrats winning the House and then deciding to spend political capital on a vote, and neither step is close to guaranteed.

I think Trump has a meaningful chance of ending 2026 in a genuinely negative narrative, driven by repeated legal and administrative setbacks rather than one single knockout blow. The current market looks too pessimistic on Yes unless the contract requires an unusually severe definition of a “bad year.”

I put the most likely 2032 outcome in the 2.1% to 2.5% range, with a roughly one-in-three chance. The market looks too pessimistic on that bin and too anchored to sub-2% growth.

United Russia still looks like the strongest and most institutionally protected force in the race, so I lean Yes. The main caveat is that the market wording about seat gains is a little ambiguous, which keeps this short of a near-lock.

I put the chance of the United States acquiring any part of Greenland before 2029 at 9%. Trump’s rhetoric keeps the event alive, but the legal, political, and diplomatic barriers are extraordinary and there is no visible path to an actual transfer.

I put the chance at a very low single-digit to high single-digit probability, around 7%, because the reporting supports aggressive rhetoric and pressure tactics but not an actual transfer of sovereignty or forced retaking of the Canal. The market looks too bullish on a literal takeover outcome and appears to be pricing the headline more than the operational reality.

Sirius looks like the likelier winner, supported by stronger recent results and a favorable head-to-head record, but the market may be pricing them a bit aggressively for a matchup that still has meaningful draw risk. I would put their win chance slightly below the current market-implied level.

The SPR is only about 4.8 million barrels above the 300 million threshold, and the latest weekly report already showed a draw of roughly 2.8 to 2.9 million barrels. That makes a Yes outcome fairly likely, though not close to guaranteed because weekly SPR changes can be irregular.

I think a Trump-favorable 2026 is materially more plausible than the market implies, but still more likely not to happen than to happen. The most likely outcome is a mixed year with a few wins and some setbacks, rather than a true dream scenario.

I assign a meaningfully higher-than-market chance that Trump formally invokes the Insurrection Act before the end of his presidency. The combination of public signaling, recurring domestic unrest around immigration enforcement, and a demonstrated willingness to test legal boundaries makes a use of the statute plausible, though still far from the default outcome.

The threshold of 5.1% for U.S. final-demand PPI is high enough that a Yes outcome looks very likely barring an unexpected inflation shock. The supplied news is about China’s PPI and does not match the BLS-based U.S. market, so I place much more weight on the structural tendency for U.S. producer inflation to stay well below that level.

I put the chance of Trump actually buying at least part of Greenland during this term at 8%. The strategic interest is real, but an actual transfer of sovereignty remains extraordinarily unlikely given the firm opposition from Denmark and Greenland and the need for a formal, politically durable deal.

NVIDIA looks like the favorite to finish August as the world’s largest company because it already holds the top spot and appears to have a meaningful lead. The main downside is not NVIDIA collapsing, but a rival catching it in a volatile market before month-end.

Trump is much more likely to face impeachment proceedings than to be impeached and then removed from office. I put the combined yes probability at 9%, with the Senate conviction step doing most of the work in keeping this outcome rare.

The most likely outcome is still a moderate-growth print around the high-1s to low-2s, with 1.6% to 2.0% the single most probable band. I see somewhat more weight on the 2.1% to 2.5% range than the market does, while extreme boom-or-bust outcomes remain relatively unlikely.

OpenAI looks meaningfully more likely to IPO before Anthropic because it is already further along in the formal process. Still, the lead is not ironclad given OpenAI’s reported willingness to delay and Anthropic’s ability to move quickly if it chooses.

I think Section 4 of the 25th Amendment is possible but still unlikely during Trump’s term. My independent estimate is lower than the market because the legal and political hurdles are enormous, and even a serious health or incapacity episode would more likely lead to a voluntary Section 3 transfer or some other resolution than a successful Section 4 invocation.

A U.S. invasion of Iran before the end of 2026 looks unlikely, with the most important evidence pointing toward continued coercive pressure, airstrikes, and diplomacy rather than a land campaign. I would put the chance of Yes at 9%, well below a coin flip and somewhat below the current market price.

My assessment is that no Fed rate cuts in 2026 is the more likely outcome, but not by the extreme margin implied by the market. The balance of evidence points to a high chance of the Fed staying on hold through year-end, though a single cut remains a meaningful late-year risk.

I think Trump is more likely to restrict H-1B and other high-skill immigration than to expand it, with only a small chance of a meaningful pro-expansion shift before the end of his term. The most plausible path is continued tightening, fee increases, or at most narrow carve-outs rather than a true expansion.

I assign a below-even chance that Strait of Hormuz traffic reaches the 60-vessel 7-day average threshold by year-end. The main reason is that current traffic is still far below normal, and a full recovery has to happen quickly and persistently for the market to resolve Yes.

I think exactly one confirmation is slightly less likely than the market implies, but still the single most plausible positive outcome. The absence of any current vacancy keeps the probability from getting too high, and that leaves zero or two confirmations as meaningful alternatives.

The most likely outcome is a small positive June GDP print, so a sub-zero monthly change looks unlikely. I estimate the chance of Canada posting less than 0.0% MoM GDP growth in June 2026 at 13%.

I put the chance of no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term at 88%. Formal acquisition is overwhelmingly constrained by Greenlandic and Danish opposition, making the purchase scenario a long shot even if Washington keeps pressing the issue.

I think the chance that U.S. CPI inflation exceeds 4.5% at least once in 2026 is low, because the latest forecast set is clustered well below that level and would need a sharp late-year shock to change course. The market’s 20.5% Yes price looks a bit high to me, so I would price Yes at 15%.

Gianni Infantino is still in office and the current political crisis appears to be a fight over his future rather than evidence of an imminent departure. I think the odds of him ceasing to be FIFA president before year-end are meaningfully below the current market price, though not negligible because a sudden resignation or forced exit is still possible.

Västerås SK still look like a slight underdog on pure team quality, but the reported first-half lead makes a Yes outcome more plausible than the pre-match numbers suggested. I lean modestly toward Yes, but only by a narrow margin because the matchup profile still favors Djurgårdens IF over a full ninety minutes.

I make the Fed no-change outcome in December 2027 slightly more likely than the market does, because a single meeting two years out is more likely to land on a pause than on a fresh move. The balance of evidence points to a modestly bullish case for a 0 bps decision, but not by a wide margin.

I put the chance of a company explicitly announcing AGI before Oct. 1, 2027 at 28%. Rapid capability gains make it plausible, but the need for a public, unambiguous corporate declaration keeps the odds materially below a simple “models get very good” forecast.

Aaron Taylor-Johnson is still a plausible contender, but the evidence remains rumor-heavy rather than confirmatory. I think the chance he is officially announced by the end of 2026 is meaningfully higher than the market price, but still not high in absolute terms.

Iran’s regime is under exceptional stress, but the balance of evidence still favors survival through the end of 2026. The most plausible outcome is continued rule by the existing coercive and clerical-security apparatus, even if succession conflict and unrest intensify.

Oldham is a real contender, but the event is still mostly about whether a Supreme Court opening materializes at all before 2029. I put his chance a bit below the market because the shortlist is crowded and the vacancy risk is still the main bottleneck.

I put the chance at 2%: there is no confirmed U.S. sovereignty-transfer deal in motion, and the remaining time window is too short for a new territorial acquisition to close. A surprise Greenland-style transaction is the main upside path, but it still looks highly unlikely.

I estimate only a modest chance that Trump resigns before his term ends, about 12%. The current market looks somewhat too high because there is no concrete resignation signal and Trump has strong incentives to stay in office.

I put a single-year 2033 contraction at about 7%, meaning the market is a bit too high on the zero/negative-growth tail. The modal outcome is still a modestly positive year, centered in the 2.1% to 2.5% range.

I think a tiny population gain is possible but not the most likely outcome. My best estimate is 41% for a 0.01% to 0.99% increase, with a slightly higher chance that NYC stays flat-to-down rather than posts a small gain.

NVIDIA remains the clear frontrunner and is currently valued as the world’s largest company, but the contract depends on who finishes first on a single date, so the risk of a late-year flip is meaningful. I would still assign NVIDIA a strong but not dominant chance, slightly below the market price because the gap is vulnerable to a sharp rerating or a strong rally in Apple or Alphabet.

The Strait of Hormuz would need a very large and sustained rebound in ship arrivals to clear the 60-plus threshold, and current traffic still looks far too depressed for that to be the base case. A sudden diplomatic or security breakthrough could change the picture, but the probability of that happening and translating into PortWatch data by September 30 looks low.

Hyperliquid has a credible upside path to $90, but the balance of forecast evidence and the current market price both point to it being a minority outcome. I estimate about a 24% chance that it touches $90 at some point before the end of 2026.

Spain is a legitimate contender and I rate them slightly above the market, but not by a wide margin. Their host status and likely post-2026 momentum make them one of the strongest bets, yet World Cup volatility still keeps the true win chance well below 25%.

Alphabet has a real path to the top spot, but it needs a narrow and time-sensitive combination of strong relative performance and weakness from one or more rival mega-caps. I think the market is right to treat this as unlikely, though not impossible, and I estimate an 11% chance of Yes.

I think there is a very strong chance that DTF St. Louis finishes with 0 or 1 Primetime Emmy wins, though the path to a second win is not negligible. My estimate is lower than the market price because the show still has multiple ways to collect just one award and only a few realistic paths to exceed that threshold.

Core CPI at or below 2.2% looks unlikely because the latest pre-release signals are clustered closer to 2.4% to 2.5%. I would price the Yes outcome at 6%, with the most likely result still above the cutoff.

Elon Musk could certainly clear 40 posts in a 48-hour window if he stays anywhere near his recent pace, but his activity is volatile enough that a quieter stretch still has a meaningful chance of landing below the cutoff. I put the probability of fewer than 40 posts at 31%, a bit above the market but still a minority outcome.