Edges for Jul 6, 2026

Based on the reported May 11, 2026 House impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte and the scheduled Senate trial (July 6, 2026), the factual condition for a 'Yes' has already occurred under the event's plain wording; I assess a 99% independent probability that the event will resolve Yes.

I assess a high probability that Spider-Man: Brand New Day will open for less than $200M domestically on its opening weekend, with my best estimate at 85% chance of falling below that threshold based on franchise history, box office norms, and release-risk factors.

Independent assessment: overwhelmingly likely (already occurred); I assign a 99% probability that Trump has invoked the Insurrection Act during his presidency based on multiple corroborating facts and public statements.

I estimate an 85% probability that Claude will experience downtime on 0–2 days in July 2026, because historical patterns for mature AI SaaS and cloud-hosted services show few calendar days marked as incidents, and there is no public signal of a risky mass rollout or extended outage window for July.

I assess a low probability that the word "Goal" will be said 60 or more times during the live FOX broadcast of Portugal vs Spain, because even with enthusiastic commentary and replays it is very difficult to reach that volume of mentions in a single match window.

USAID was officially shuttered as an independent agency on July 1, 2025 and its foreign‑assistance functions were folded into the State Department; I assess a 99% probability that the correct answer to “Will USAID be eliminated?” is Yes.

I assess a low probability that the FOX English broadcast team will utter the standalone word "goal" 60 or more times between kickoff and the final whistle; reaching 60 mentions would require an extreme scoring and replay scenario that is very unlikely in a single match.

Given the June 30 Supreme Court ruling that the Executive Order contravenes federal statute, active litigation alleging excessive force, and other damaging disclosures, I assess a substantially greater-than-market chance that the described "bear case" for Trump will materialize in 2026.

I view Todd Blanche as a plausible caretaker but not the frontrunner; my independent estimate gives Blanche ~30% chance and Lee Zeldin the single best odds at ~45% given Trump's political incentives and Zeldin’s market traction elsewhere.

Independent assessment: very unlikely the Chicago pro football team will relocate to a new location in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 regular season — I estimate ~15% chance.

The market currently prices a very high chance of a US–China tariff agreement by year-end, but weighing political risks and a tight six-month timeline I assess the probability substantially lower; I estimate a 45% chance of a mutual, publicly announced tariff agreement by December 31, 2026.

Based on macro forecasts, the limited size of new fiscal programs, and the historical rarity of >5% quarterly real GDP outside unusual rebounds, I assess a low probability that any quarter from Q1 2025–Q4 2028 will record real GDP above 5%. My independent probability: 8%.

Assuming the market's binary is whether the 2025–2028 average annual measles cases will be ≥1,000, I assess a 72% chance that the average will meet or exceed 1,000 cases/year.

Independent assessment: I assign a 7% probability that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029. Legally possible (including pre-emptive pardons), but extremely unlikely given no known charges and strong political disincentives.

I assess a 30% chance that Justice Samuel Alito will resign during Donald Trump’s term (2025–2029). Age and partisan incentives make resignation plausible, but public denials and historical patterns of long tenures make it the less likely outcome.

Scottie Scheffler has a substantially better than coin‑flip chance to complete the career grand slam by the end of 2027; I estimate ~45% probability despite the market pricing it at ~5%.

Given realized 2025 windfalls plus strong 2026 equity performance, a partial ‘bull case’ outcome for Trump in 2026 is plausible but not probable — I assess a 35% chance that the positive financial/political momentum materializes and persists through 2026.

I assess a very low but non-zero chance that Trump will actually regain U.S. control of the Panama Canal during his term; I put the probability at 6% based on legal, diplomatic, and operational constraints versus the rhetorical and contingency-planning signals coming from the U.S. side.

I assess a 72% chance that Alibaba will top the Chatbot Arena Text leaderboard among primarily Chinese companies on July 31, 2026, reflecting Alibaba's strong resources and prior model competitiveness while accounting for meaningful upset risks from Baidu, Baichuan, Tencent and rapid open-source improvements.

I assess a roughly 30% probability that another pandemic will occur before GTA VI is released; this is below the market's near‑50/50 split because pandemics remain relatively rare over short-to-medium horizons despite rising zoonotic risks and surveillance blind spots.

Independent assessment: New York City is unlikely to register a small net population increase (0.01–0.99%) between July 2025 and July 2027; I estimate a ~18% chance absent a major, rapid reversal in migration or economic conditions.

I estimate a 32% chance that Ethereum will reach $3,000 at any point before December 31, 2026, reflecting a materially higher outlook than the market-implied 12.5% but still recognizing significant macro and regulatory downside risks.

Based on current facts and plausible midterm outcomes, I assess a ~44% chance that President Trump will be impeached by Jan 20, 2029 — significantly lower than the market's 64% yes price.

**Independent assessment:** I assign a 65% probability that Israel and Saudi Arabia will normalize relations before Jan 20, 2029 — more likely than not, driven by shared security interests, strong U.S. leverage and incentives, and Saudi economic and diplomatic pragmatism, though the Palestinian issue and possible regional shocks remain substantial obstacles.

I assess a roughly 30% chance that Google will hold the #1 spot on the Chatbot Arena LLM Leaderboard (style control on) at the July 31, 2026 check, meaning it's a plausible but not favored outcome given current public-access dynamics and competitor strength.

I assess a 28% chance that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls >= 60 on any date through July 31, 2026, reflecting a modestly higher probability than the market-implied ~16% due to the possibility of a rapid rebound but constrained by persistent regional security and logistical frictions.

Given heavy market conviction, favorable FDV math for many tokenomics designs, and Predict.fun's product traction, I assess a strong but not certain likelihood that the token's FDV will exceed $50M one day after launch.

I assess a very low chance (6%) that the United States will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029; diplomatic, legal, and alliance constraints make a formal transfer of sovereignty extremely unlikely.

**No acquisition is overwhelmingly likely.** Given Greenland and Denmark's firm rejection, NATO constraints, and the enormous political, legal, and practical barriers, I assess a very low chance that the U.S. will acquire Greenland during Trump’s term.

**Jay Clayton is the favorite but not a lock;** I assess a 72% independent probability that Jay Clayton becomes Trump’s next confirmed Director of National Intelligence before Jan 20, 2029, with the remainder split among other politically plausible nominees and the acting DNI (Bill Pulte) remaining in place or a different nominee emerging after delays.

I assess a low probability that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends — roughly 7% — because resignation is historically rare, institutional and political barriers are high, and there is no current evidence he intends to step down.

Market signal is strongly in favor of Bryce winning, but limited public data and show-structure volatility justify a modest discount; I assess a 70% probability Bryce Dettloff will be one of the winning men on Love Island USA Season 8.

Independent assessment: extremely unlikely that Donald Trump will successfully buy any part of Greenland during a presidential term; I estimate a 5% chance, with the dominant outcome being continued Danish/Greenlandic refusal and alternative forms of increased U.S. presence rather than outright purchase.

Very unlikely — I assess ~2% chance the United States will legally acquire any part of Canada before 2029. The legal, political, military and international barriers make formal acquisition effectively implausible, though tiny, remote tail scenarios keep the probability above zero.

I assess a low probability that Trump will secure a new comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) with China before Jan 20, 2029 — about 15% — because political, institutional, and strategic barriers make a large-scale FTA unlikely over the available time horizon.

I assign Google a roughly one-in-four chance (~25%) of occupying first place on the Chatbot Arena leaderboard on Dec 31, 2026, because Google has the technical resources to build a top model but faces strong competitors, evaluation-method and access risks, and productization/safety trade-offs that make outright leadership uncertain.

Given the market's strong conviction that The Odyssey will open at or above $75M but limited public information, I assess a materially higher-than-market chance that it will underperform; I assign an 18% probability that opening weekend will be less than $75M.

I assess a low probability that Google will occupy exactly the third slot on the Chatbot Arena Text Arena overall leaderboard on July 31, 2026, assigning a 20% chance based on platform participation uncertainty, strong competition, and short time to move positions.

I assess a 72% probability that the next Google Gemini Pro model added to the Arena leaderboard will debut with a score of at least 1480, reflecting strong historical performance and Google engineering momentum tempered by evaluation and release uncertainties.

Abiy Ahmed is the clear favorite to become Ethiopia's next Prime Minister after the 1 June 2026 general election due to incumbent advantages and party dominance, but non-negligible political and security risks keep the probability below certainty.

I assess a 12% probability that Ethereum will reach $2,500 at any time during July 2026; the market currently prices this outcome extremely low (~1.8%), but historical volatility and plausible catalysts make a sub-20% chance reasonable.

Independent assessment: extremely unlikely. I estimate a 7% chance that President Trump will be impeached by the House and subsequently convicted and removed by the Senate before his term ends.

High confidence that at least one of OpenAI or Anthropic will complete an IPO before 2040; long horizon, strong commercial incentives and precedent make a public listing(s) very likely despite regulatory and acquisition risks.

I assess a 30% probability that Mexico's year-over-year GDP growth for Q2 2026 will be below -0.5%, meaning a substantive contraction; the most likely outcome remains a modest positive or mildly negative growth print rather than a sharp decline.

Given Messi's elite finishing, set-piece and penalty role, and Argentina's squad strength, he has a non-negligible chance, but his age, likely reduced minutes, and very strong rivals make him an underdog to win the Golden Boot; I assess a 24% probability he is the top goalscorer.

I assess a 12% probability that China will commence a military offensive to seize any part of Taiwan by December 31, 2026, reflecting low but non-negligible risk driven by capability improvements and political triggers weighed against strong deterrence and the high cost of invasion.

With limited real-time information and a heavily traded market pricing Portugal at 22.5% to win, I assess Portugal has about a 32% chance to win this matchup, reflecting their knockout resilience and tactical upside while still favoring Spain as the slight pre-match favorite.

I estimate a modest but meaningful chance that Google will top the Chatbot Arena leaderboard on July 31, 2026, driven by its engineering resources and potential product updates, but facing strong competition from OpenAI, Anthropic, Mistral, and community-favored open models.

I assess a below-even chance that H.R.3633 (Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025) will be enacted by December 31, 2026, because legislative hurdles in the Senate, election-year politics, and uncertain White House alignment make passage and final signature challenging despite meaningful industry support and bipartisan interest.

Given limited real-time information, I assess Switzerland has a moderate underdog chance to win this match; I assign a 35% probability that Switzerland wins on July 7, 2026, modestly above the market-implied 27.5% to reflect Switzerland's historical solidity in knockout-style tournaments and the high variance of single-match outcomes.

Extremely unlikely — abolishing the Federal Reserve would require major Congressional action and sweeping legal change; given political, legal, and institutional barriers I assign a very low probability (~2%).

Independent assessment: Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is *plausibly* vulnerable but not the most likely next Cabinet departure; I estimate an 18% chance he will be the next person to leave Trump's Cabinet.

I assess a strong but not certain likelihood that Keith Sonderling becomes Trump's next Secretary of Labor; his acting incumbency and the White House nomination make him the clear favorite, but Senate confirmation and political risk reduce the probability below the market's 86%.

I assess a modest but non-negligible chance (~20%) that Elon Musk will personally visit Mars before 1 Aug 2099 — more likely via a later, lower‑risk trip if he survives into advanced age than as an early, high‑risk pioneer.

I assess a high probability that claude-opus-4-6-thinking will be the top-ranked model on the Chatbot Arena leaderboard at the July 11 check, but I discount some market overconfidence due to evaluation noise and last-minute performance shifts.

I assess a 20% probability that Core PCE YoY will be 3.3% or less for June 2026, below the market-implied 12.5% Yes price but still reflecting significant downside risk from base effects and goods disinflation offset by persistent services/shelter inflation and low market liquidity.

I assess Marine Le Pen has a modest but real chance of winning in 2027, driven by long-term gains for the National Rally and potential volatility in an open-field race, but structural barriers and likely anti-RN consolidations keep her probability low-to-moderate.

Given the short time window and persistent security and commercial disincentives affecting Strait of Hormuz transits, I assess a low but nonzero chance that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average >=60 by July 15, 2026.

I assess a 72% probability that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 on at least one date by December 31, 2026, driven by commercial incentives and likely stabilization of security and insurance conditions over the coming months.

I assign a low probability that Starbucks will report above 41,800 global stores in 2026 — the company sits at ~40,500 in June 2026 and would need an unusually large six‑month net expansion to exceed 41,800.