Edges for Jul 7, 2026

Very unlikely that FOX's official English announcers will utter the standalone word "Goal" 60 or more times during regulation play, extra time, or penalties; I assess this at roughly a 3% chance given typical match commentary patterns and plausible high-goal scenarios.

I assess that the probability of a WHO-level or widely recognized global pandemic being declared before the market cutoff (2026-07-31) is very low; I estimate about a 1% chance given the short time window and improved post‑COVID surveillance and response capacity.

**Assumption:** 'Yes' = OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic. Independent assessment: I assign a 35% probability that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic (i.e., Anthropic is more likely to be the first of the two to list).

I assess a low probability (~15%) that the Fed will cut by more than 25 bps at the December 8, 2027 meeting; a modest cut of 25 bps or no change are substantially more likely given current trajectories and Fed behavior.

Independent assessment: Barron Trump is very unlikely to be pardoned before Jan 21, 2029 — I estimate about a 5% chance, driven mainly by lack of any federal charges and the enormous political cost of pardoning one’s own child.

Assuming the market's binary is whether the 2025–2028 average annual measles cases will be ≥1,000, I assess a 72% chance that the average will meet or exceed 1,000 cases/year.

I assess a 30% chance that Justice Samuel Alito will resign during Donald Trump’s term (2025–2029). Age and partisan incentives make resignation plausible, but public denials and historical patterns of long tenures make it the less likely outcome.

I assign a low probability (15%) that Donald Trump will publicly praise Zohran Mamdani by July 31, 2026, because Mamdani is a relatively low‑profile progressive figure with no obvious alignment to Trump’s priorities, making praise unlikely absent a surprise event or strategic reason.

I assess a very low probability (2%) that FOX announcers will say the exact word "Goal" 60 or more times during the Argentina vs Egypt match broadcast, because reach of 60 uses would require sustained, repeated usage far beyond normal soccer commentary patterns.

Given multiple independently verifiable setbacks (Supreme Court ruling, large-scale environmental rollbacks that provoke backlash, and documented election-subversion plans already generating litigation), I assess a substantial chance the bear-case narrative will materialize in 2026 — but Trump's structural political resilience limits certainty.

I assess a low probability (18%) that U.S. real quarterly GDP will exceed 5% in any quarter from Q1 2025–Q4 2028; consensus forecasts and structural constraints make such a spike unlikely absent a large fiscal or one-off statistical shock.

**Independent assessment:** I assign a 65% probability that Israel and Saudi Arabia will normalize relations before Jan 20, 2029 — more likely than not, driven by shared security interests, strong U.S. leverage and incentives, and Saudi economic and diplomatic pragmatism, though the Palestinian issue and possible regional shocks remain substantial obstacles.

I assess a 65% probability that Elon Musk will post fewer than 40 main-feed/quote/repost items between July 9 12:00 PM ET and July 11 12:00 PM ET, given typical recent activity and the lack of publicly known major triggers for an extended tweetstorm.

I assess a 35% chance that Donald Trump will be visibly in the official winning-team photo after the 2026 World Cup Final, based on low historical incidence of outside VIPs in team photos combined with Trump's high incentive to appear and the unique host-country dynamics of 2026.

I assess a 50% independent probability that Todd Blanche will be confirmed as Trump’s next Attorney General; Lee Zeldin is the most plausible alternative at ~30% with DeSantis, Bailey, and Paxton trailing as lower-probability outcomes.

I assess a very low probability that Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal by physically seizing or legally reasserting US sovereign control during his term — this is overwhelmingly unlikely given legal, diplomatic, operational, and geopolitical constraints.

I estimate a ~32% chance Scottie Scheffler wins the U.S. Open before 2028 and thereby completes the career Grand Slam, driven by elite form and two remaining realistic attempts (2026 and 2027).

I assess a 72% chance that Alibaba will top the Chatbot Arena Text leaderboard among primarily Chinese companies on July 31, 2026, reflecting Alibaba's strong resources and prior model competitiveness while accounting for meaningful upset risks from Baidu, Baichuan, Tencent and rapid open-source improvements.

Independent assessment: New York City is unlikely to register a small net population increase (0.01–0.99%) between July 2025 and July 2027; I estimate a ~18% chance absent a major, rapid reversal in migration or economic conditions.

Independent assessment: Jay Clayton is the most likely permanent DNI but not a lock — I assign him a ~65% chance of being confirmed before Jan 20, 2029, with several plausible alternate outcomes (including an eventual Pulte push or another Trump loyalist) accounting for the rest.

I assess a 45% chance that OpenSea's token will have a Fully Diluted Valuation above $500M one day after launch, reflecting meaningful upside from brand and demand but substantial uncertainty from tokenomics, timing, and macro/regulatory risks.

I assess a 22% chance Cristiano Ronaldo will visibly shed tears on-field or on the bench during a 2026 World Cup match for Portugal, reflecting a modest but meaningful possibility driven by his advanced career stage, high emotional stakes, and frequent camera exposure balanced against low base rates for visible crying during matches and selection/playing-time uncertainty.

I assess a 35% probability that Elon Musk will post fewer than 40 qualifying X posts between July 6 12:00 PM ET and July 8 12:00 PM ET, implying a 65% chance he posts 40 or more given typical activity and tracker rules.

I assess a low probability (12%) that USAID will be legally eliminated during Trump's current term; a far more likely outcome is deep defunding, functional transfer or rebranding rather than statutory abolition.

Independent assessment: Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is *plausibly* vulnerable but not the most likely next Cabinet departure; I estimate an 18% chance he will be the next person to leave Trump's Cabinet.

I assess a 30% probability that Ethereum will reach $3,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting a plausible but not likely upside scenario that requires a sustained risk-on macro environment and significant crypto-specific catalysts.

I assess a modestly better-than-even chance (~52%) that the Chicago pro football team will announce relocation to a new stadium site in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 regular season — the outcome hinges on whether Illinois lawmakers can clinch a financing deal before the club finalizes a move to Indiana.

I assess a 52% probability that Jannik Sinner wins Wimbledon 2026, viewing him as a clear favorite based on talent and trajectory but accounting for strong competition on grass and situational uncertainties.

I assess a very low probability (3%) that Trump will successfully buy any part of Greenland during his term. Legal sovereignty, Greenlandic/Danish political opposition, and huge fiscal and diplomatic costs make a purchase essentially implausible; the market (Yes 18%) appears to overstate the chance.

**No acquisition is overwhelmingly likely.** Given Greenland and Denmark's firm rejection, NATO constraints, and the enormous political, legal, and practical barriers, I assess a very low chance that the U.S. will acquire Greenland during Trump’s term.

I assess a low probability that Trump will secure a new comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) with China before Jan 20, 2029 — about 15% — because political, institutional, and strategic barriers make a large-scale FTA unlikely over the available time horizon.

Given market pricing and typical RBNZ data-dependence, I assess a modestly higher-than-even chance of an OCR increase at the July 7, 2026 decision, but uncertainty from missing current-data inputs keeps confidence limited.

I assess an 85% probability that Abiy Ahmed will officially assume the office of Prime Minister of Ethiopia following the June 1, 2026 general election, with the largest remaining risks coming from security escalation, internal elite splits, or a chaotic post-election transition.

Given the balance of macro conditions and the market's near-50/50 pricing, I assess a modestly lower-than-even chance that the Fed will raise the upper bound of the federal funds rate at any point in 2026; my estimated probability is 35%. This reflects the combination of already-restrictive policy, an apparent tilt toward easing in many forecasting models, and the possibility of shocks or persistent inflation that could still force a hike.

I assess a low independent probability—about **7%**—that the United States will acquire any sovereign part of Greenland before 2029; the logistical, legal, and political barriers make transfer of sovereignty far more likely to fail than succeed.

I assess a 65% probability that NVIDIA will be the largest company by market cap on July 31, 2026, reflecting strong AI-driven revenue momentum and market sentiment balanced against valuation and macro risks.

I assess a 65% probability that the Bank of Russia will lower the key rate at its July 24, 2026 meeting, based on easing inflationary pressure, a history of cautious easing, and market pricing that already leans toward a cut but leaves room for downside surprises.

I assess a 30% probability that Core PCE YoY will be 3.3% or less in June 2026, reflecting meaningful but incomplete disinflation pressure offset by persistent services/shelter inflation and upside risks from labor and demand.

Given explicit statements of willingness, active internal planning, and recent favorable legal signals for executive insulation, I assign a meaningful but not dominant chance that Trump will formally invoke the Insurrection Act during his presidency: **30%**.

I assign Google a roughly one-in-four chance (~25%) of occupying first place on the Chatbot Arena leaderboard on Dec 31, 2026, because Google has the technical resources to build a top model but faces strong competitors, evaluation-method and access risks, and productization/safety trade-offs that make outright leadership uncertain.

Given the aggravated murder charge, a realistic balance of procedural momentum and evidentiary uncertainty puts the chance of a homicide conviction by July 31, 2027 slightly above even at 57%. The remaining risk is driven by plea dynamics, potential suppressions or delays, and the narrow 13-month calendar window to final judgment.

I assess that United Russia has a better-than-even (around 65%) chance of gaining the most seats in the September 2026 State Duma election, driven by incumbency advantages, administrative resources and the Kremlin's incentives to consolidate parliamentary support, though significant political, military or economic shocks could undermine that outcome.

I assess a 12% probability that June 2026 annual CPI will be 3.6% or lower; most indicators point to headline inflation remaining above 3.6% but there is a non-negligible chance that continued disinflation and helpful base effects push the 12-month reading beneath that threshold.

I assess a low but material chance that the full 2026 'Trump bull case' materializes — primarily because a dovish Fed or a sustained AI mega-cap rally could produce a concentrated upside, but current macro, crypto, and valuation headwinds make that outcome unlikely.

Given the strong market pricing and typical mid-July release dynamics, I assess a relatively low probability that The Odyssey will open for less than $75M, but uncertainty around marketing, reviews, and competition keeps that chance materially above the market-implied 7.7%. My best estimate: 18% that the opening weekend will be under $75M domestically.

Argentina is the clear favorite given squad quality and tournament pedigree, but knockout volatility and a world-class forward on Egypt's side keep a nontrivial upset possibility; I estimate an 82% chance Argentina wins on July 7, 2026.

I assess a modest but small chance (15%) that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls ≥60 on at least one date by July 31, 2026, because a short, sustained lull in regional incidents or a temporary spike in scheduled transits could push the seven-day average over the threshold, but ongoing security and economic factors make a sustained rebound unlikely in the next three weeks.

I estimate a modest but meaningful chance that Google will top the Chatbot Arena leaderboard on July 31, 2026, driven by its engineering resources and potential product updates, but facing strong competition from OpenAI, Anthropic, Mistral, and community-favored open models.

Given prevailing macro trends and the market's extremely low price for a 5.0% upper bound, I assess a modest but non-negligible chance that the Fed's upper bound will reach 5.0%+ by year-end 2026, assigning a 12% probability based on balance of risks.

I assess Alexis Mac Allister has about a one-in-three chance (33%) to score at least one goal in Argentina vs Egypt, based on his attacking role but limited shot volume and several tactical uncertainties.

I assess a low but non‑negligible independent probability (9%) that Donald Trump will be impeached and removed from office before Jan 20, 2029. Structural barriers — most importantly the need for a 2/3 Senate conviction — make removal unlikely, though dramatic, bipartisan-triggering events could produce a small tail chance.

Very unlikely — I assess ~2% chance the United States will legally acquire any part of Canada before 2029. The legal, political, military and international barriers make formal acquisition effectively implausible, though tiny, remote tail scenarios keep the probability above zero.

I assess a modest but non-negligible chance (~20%) that Elon Musk will personally visit Mars before 1 Aug 2099 — more likely via a later, lower‑risk trip if he survives into advanced age than as an early, high‑risk pioneer.

I assess a roughly 30% chance that Google will hold the top spot on the Chatbot Arena Math leaderboard on July 31, 2026, reflecting Google's strong math capabilities but substantial competition and leaderboard-specific volatility.

I assess a strong but not certain likelihood that Keith Sonderling becomes Trump's next Secretary of Labor; his acting incumbency and the White House nomination make him the clear favorite, but Senate confirmation and political risk reduce the probability below the market's 86%.

I assess a 12% probability that Core CPI YoY for June 2026 will be 2.4% or less, reflecting a small but non-negligible chance driven by faster-than-expected disinflation and base effects, while the dominant structural stickiness of services and shelter keeps the outcome more likely above 2.4%. Market prices currently imply an extremely low chance of Yes, but I allow a higher tail probability for a downside surprise.

I assess a low probability that Zelenskyy and Putin will meet before 1 Jan 2027 — about a 20% chance — because Putin has publicly refused and there is no confirmed plan, though active third‑party mediation keeps a nontrivial tail risk of a surprise meeting.

I assess a 33% chance the 25th Amendment will be used at least once during President Trump’s term — most likely via a voluntary Section 3 temporary transfer for a medical procedure; involuntary Section 4 removal is possible but unlikely.

Very likely — Conor McGregor is officially booked to fight Max Holloway on July 11, 2026; I assess a 98% probability that McGregor's next fight will occur as scheduled (i.e., he will fight next, and it will be the Holloway bout).

I assign a low probability that Starbucks will report above 41,800 global stores in 2026 — the company sits at ~40,500 in June 2026 and would need an unusually large six‑month net expansion to exceed 41,800.