Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by July 31?

Direct recent IMF Portwatch data was unavailable to fetch for this assessment, so I rely on broad observable patterns: the market price (Yes 16.5%) implies the crowd assigns low odds of a return to a 7-day average >=60 in the remaining ~4 weeks, signaling that traders believe either recent daily counts are well below historical peaks or that current volatility/security conditions will persist. Given the short time window left to reach a 7-day moving average threshold, the odds of a qualifying run are very sensitive to any sudden, sustained uptick in daily transits over the coming days that is both large and persistent enough to lift the 7-day average above 60. One or two isolated high-count days are unlikely to suffice; the needed recovery must be sustained for at least a week and coincide with the last reporting days to qualify within the market window.

Historically, the Strait of Hormuz is a high-traffic chokepoint whose baseline daily transit counts fluctuate with seasonal commercial shipping patterns, oil production/export schedules, and regional geopolitical conditions; absent acute disruptions its multi-day averages often sit in a range where crossing a 60 threshold is plausible but not guaranteed. The critical historical context is that security-driven downturns (attacks on tankers, mine incidents, or escalatory naval activity) can depress transits for weeks-to-months, and conversely, de-escalation and commercial pressure rapidly restore flows because rerouting around other passages is costly and time-consuming for regular tanker trade.

On the geopolitical and commercial side, incentives favor normalization: exporters and charterers prefer the shortest, cheapest routes, and insurance and naval escort arrangements can restore confidence quickly if incidents abate or if multinational maritime security responses deter attackers; this supports a non-negligible chance of a rebound within weeks. Against that, persistent or intensifying security incidents, higher war-risk premiums, or deliberate sanctions/operational restrictions would suppress calls, and such negative shocks can be protracted, making recovery before July 31 less likely.

Balancing these elements and the short calendar, I assign a probability materially above the market-implied 16.5% because structured, resolvable events (e.g., ceasefire, visible decline in attacks, or information showing resumed export schedules) could produce the required sustained uptick quickly; however, the remaining timeframe and the requirement of a 7-day average make this still an underdog outcome, prompting my 28% estimate rather than parity or a near-certainty.