Edges for Jul 3, 2026

I assess an 85% probability that Miami's median home value (Parcl price-per-sqft × 2100) will be less than $1,017,000 on September 30, 2026, because a $1M+ citywide median would require an outsized, broad-based surge above typical per-square-foot medians and would be inconsistent with likely citywide housing composition and macro constraints.

Independent assessment assigns a material but not overwhelming chance that the UK Prime Minister will be the first G7 leader to leave office — I estimate a 40% probability, meaning substantial risk but far from certain.

I assess a better-than-even chance that the 'bear case' for Trump will materialize in 2026 — legal battles, damaging disclosures, and agency hollowing cumulate into political and institutional setbacks that produce a clearly negative year for the presidency.

I assess a 65% probability that Elon Musk will post fewer than 40 main-feed/quote/repost items between July 4 12:00 PM ET and July 6 12:00 PM ET, because 40 posts in a 48-hour window is a relatively high bar given his historical typical volume and the holiday context, though spikes remain possible.

I assess an 18% probability that Jannik Sinner will win Wimbledon 2026 — he is a top contender with improving grass credentials but faces strong competition, surface variance, and typical Grand Slam upset risk that keep his outright chances below 20%.

Independent assessment: very unlikely — I assign a 10% chance that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029, because there is no legal trigger, heavy political downside, and no historical precedent of presidents pardoning an uncharged child purely as a family favor.

I assess an 18% chance that U.S. quarterly real GDP (annualized) will exceed 5% in at least one quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028. This is materially below the current market price (Yes: 50%).

I assess a 35% probability that the June 2026 year‑over‑year CPI will be 3.6% or lower, reflecting a meaningful chance that disinflation continues but giving greater weight to persistent services and shelter inflation that leave downside limited.

I assess a ~1% chance that President Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his term. The event is effectively impossible under normal legal, diplomatic, and political constraints and would require a major, low-probability systemic shock (war, Panama collapse, or explicit Panamanian invitation).

This event is already settled in history: Donald Trump completed his 2017–2021 term without the 25th Amendment being invoked. My independent probability that the 25th Amendment was used during that presidency is 0%.

Scottie Scheffler has a realistic path to complete the career grand slam by the 2028 cutoff (only the U.S. Open remains); I assess his independent probability at 32% — materially higher than the market's 5%.

I assess a 70% chance Taylor Swift will be married in Manhattan by the market's resolution standard, balancing her strong Manhattan ties and celebrity privacy preferences against plausible alternatives and the lack of confirmed reporting.

I assess a materially above-market chance that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030: about 40% — a plausible but still-disputed outcome driven by growth and exchange-rate paths, with large uncertainty from demographics, debt and geopolitics.

I assess a 30% chance that Ethereum will reach $3,000 at any point before December 31, 2026, reflecting meaningful upside potential from on-chain and institutional catalysts but substantial macro, regulatory, and supply risks that favor the market's lower-implied probability.

I estimate a low but non-negligible chance that USAID will be fully eliminated during Trump's term — institutional and legislative hurdles make outright abolition unlikely, though political alignment and reorganization pressures create a meaningful tail risk.

I assess a 60% probability that the Fed will not cut rates at any point in 2026, reflecting a modest downgrade versus the market-implied ~78% that accounts for sustained Fed hawkishness but underweights downside risks to growth and financial stress.

I assess a low probability (12%) that President Trump will complete a new comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) with China before Jan 20, 2029 — restrictive, sectoral purchase deals and containment measures are far more likely than a broad U.S.–China FTA in this time window.

I assess a very low probability that the U.S. will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029 — around 4% — because of overwhelming legal, political, and diplomatic obstacles and the unlikelihood of Greenlandic or Danish consent.

I assess a very low but nonzero chance that a President Trump will successfully buy any portion of Greenland's sovereignty during a term — most plausible outcomes are limited leases or property deals, not a transfer of territory sovereignty.

I assess a 48% independent probability that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 — plausible given ongoing investigations and the 2026 midterms, but not the most likely outcome because political costs, Senate dynamics, and uncertain House control make impeachment far from certain.

Given Trump's high frequency of public attacks on media figures, the unsettled and sometimes critical posture of Tucker Carlson since leaving mainstream cable, and a busy political calendar, I assess a modestly better-than-even chance that Trump will publicly insult Tucker Carlson by July 31, 2026.

I assess a very low independent probability (5%) that Trump will be impeached and removed from office before his term ends — impeachment is plausible; removal via a 67‑vote Senate conviction is extremely unlikely without an extraordinary, bipartisan political shock.

United Russia is the most likely single party to gain the largest net number of Duma seats in the September 2026 election due to incumbency, control of electoral levers, and the Kremlin's ability to shape outcomes, though economic and wartime pressures and tactical redistribution of seats to allied parties create meaningful downside risk.

I assess Todd Blanche as the frontrunner but not a lock — my independent probability that Trump will pick Todd Blanche is 64%. The field has meaningful tail risk from political picks (Zeldin) or other surprise nominees.

I assess a very high probability that there will be no formal U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term — the legal, political, and logistical barriers make a sovereignty transfer extremely unlikely.

I assess a 33% chance that Minions & Monsters will open below $68M for the 5-day July 1–5 weekend, with the balance favoring a solid holiday opening above that threshold driven by franchise strength and the July 4 boost.

I assess a low probability that the Department of Education will be legally abolished before Jan 20, 2029 — abolition requires Congressional statute and faces major political, legal, and practical barriers. My independent probability is 12%.

I assess an 18% probability that Marine Le Pen will win the 2027 French presidential election, reflecting improved structural opportunities for the far right but persistent institutional and coalition barriers in a two-round system.

I assess a modest but well-above-market probability that China will commence a military offensive against Taiwan by the end of 2026, reflecting growing PLA capabilities and political incentives balanced against high deterrence and catastrophic costs for Beijing.

I assess the United States has a modest but meaningful chance to beat Belgium on July 6, 2026, at about 44%, with home-field advantages and squad depth narrowing the gap against Belgium's higher individual quality and experience.

I assess a 10% chance that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends. Resignation remains a low-probability tail outcome given historical precedent and current incentives to remain in office, though legal and health shocks could raise the risk.

I assess a 38% probability that the Bank of Russia will cut the key rate at the September 11, 2026 meeting; the central bank faces competing pressures from easing inflation and growth weakness on one side and fiscal, FX, and geopolitical risks on the other, and I judge the balance favors a hold.

I assess a low probability that the Fed will cut the upper bound of the federal funds rate by 50+ bps at the September 2026 FOMC meeting; my estimate is 10%, reflecting the Fed's historical preference for gradualism absent a sharp and unexpected deterioration in inflation or growth.

Brazil is the moderate favorite to win against Norway on July 5, 2026, with an estimated probability of 62% based on historical strength, squad depth, and market sentiment counterbalanced by Norway's high-end attacking threat and knockout-game variance.

Independent estimate: extremely unlikely. I assess about a 2% chance the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029; the current dispute is trade-focused, and there is no plausible legal, political, or military pathway for territorial acquisition in this timeframe.

I assess there is a high probability the Bank of Israel will cut rates at the July 6, 2026 meeting, with my best estimate at 88% due to easing inflationary pressure, domestic demand softness, and global easing momentum, though nontrivial risks could force the Bank to hold.

Very unlikely — I assess a ~2% chance the U.S. will acquire any foreign sovereign territory by Jan 1, 2027, given the absence of negotiations, legal/political constraints, and the short timeline.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that the DOJ will file a federal criminal charge against Michael Saylor by December 31, 2026, because criminal cases require stronger, often non-public evidence and the observable public record so far points more to civil enforcement than to clear criminal conduct.

I assess about a 9% chance that NVIDIA will be the third-largest company by market cap as of market close on July 31, 2026; Nvidia remains a top-five contender but the specific third slot is unlikely given the incumbents and volatility in valuations.

I assess a 40% chance Lionel Messi finishes as the 2026 World Cup top goalscorer, slightly below the market-implied probability, reflecting his elite finishing and likely penalty duties offset by age, rotation risk, and strong competition from younger pure strikers.

I assess a modestly less-than-even chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel’s next Prime Minister after the October 27, 2026 election, reflecting his enduring advantages but substantial legal, political, and coalition risks.

I assess a 42% probability that the Fed raises the upper bound of the federal funds target at least once during 2026, with the balance of risks favoring no hike absent a sustained upside inflation surprise or materially tighter labor markets.

Given the June 22 Switzerland round produced a roadmap and ongoing technical talks, I assess a low but non-negligible 15% chance that no qualifying senior-level US–Iran meeting will occur by September 30, 2026, with the balance favoring at least one formal round before the deadline.

I assess an independent ~78% probability that Jay Clayton will be confirmed as Donald Trump’s next Director of National Intelligence before Jan 20, 2029, given the scheduled nomination and strong administration signals, with a modest haircut for confirmation and withdrawal risk.

I assess a 60% chance the Chicago pro football team will announce relocation to a new Illinois site by the first game of the 2028 regular season — staying in-state is the most likely outcome, but the race is competitive given active Indiana alternatives and political/transactional uncertainty.

Independent assessment: a meeting before 1 Jan 2027 is possible but unlikely — I put the probability at 25%. Public signals make a meeting feasible in theory, but political and operational barriers make it a long shot within six months.

Given Trump's persistent communication style and frequent public attacks, I assess a high probability that he publicly insulted someone on July 1, 2026, though the market-implied probability is slightly higher than my independent estimate.

I assess a roughly 30% probability that IMF Portwatch will show a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 on at least one date by July 31, 2026, reflecting limited time for sustained recovery but non-negligible upside from rapid de-escalation or demand spikes.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability (12%) that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls >= 60 on or before July 15, 2026, driven mainly by the short timeframe and requirement for sustained high daily counts but modestly elevated by the chance of data revisions or a rapid de-escalation.

I assess a 78% probability that IMF Portwatch will record a 7-day moving average of transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz equal to or above 60 on at least one day by December 31, 2026, reflecting a strong expectation of resumed or sustained traffic albeit with measurable tail risks from security or economic shocks.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Trump will formally invoke the Insurrection Act during his presidency; I put the independent probability at 12% based on legal, institutional, and political frictions vs. plausible high‑violence scenarios that could push him to it.

Given the market-implied probability (~2%) and the absence of visible July catalysts, I assess a low but nonzero chance that Ethereum will hit $2,500 in July, assigning a 7% probability driven by tail-risk volatility and macro upside scenarios.

I assign a very low probability (1%) that President Trump will succeed in ending the Federal Reserve before Jan 20, 2029 — the legal, institutional, and political barriers make abolition extremely unlikely within this time window.

I assess a 10% chance that the Supreme Court will fully overturn marriage equality (i.e., reverse Obergefell v. Hodges) before 2029. This reflects a small but non-negligible risk driven by the Court’s conservative majority and Dobbs precedent, tempered by strong social entrenchment and stare decisis pressures.

There is a very low probability that any new state will be admitted before 2029; I estimate a 4% chance that Trump will preside over the addition of a 51st state before his term ends.

I assess a 23% probability that Canada wins the match on July 4, 2026; Canada benefits from home advantage and attacking talent but Morocco's defensive quality and tournament experience make an outright Canadian victory unlikely.

I assess a very low probability (~1%) that any part of Cuba will become the 51st U.S. state by Jan 20, 2029. Legal, diplomatic, and political barriers make annexation or statehood for Cuban territory highly implausible in a U.S. presidential term.

Independent assessment: Anthropic is substantially more likely to IPO before OpenAI; I estimate a 78% probability that Anthropic will list first (i.e., Anthropic IPOs before OpenAI) before 2040.

I assess a near-even but slightly-favored chance (48%) that NYC’s population will register a modest increase of 0.01–0.99% between July 2025 and July 2027 — a rebound from the 2024–25 dip but not a large surge.

I assess a 20% probability that UK annual real GDP in 2026 will be below 0%, reflecting a material but not dominant risk of a weak or double-dip contraction driven by tighter monetary/fiscal conditions or an external shock.