Edges for Jul 4, 2026

I assess a very high probability that Elon Musk’s Bloomberg-reported net worth will be less than $0.70T on July 31, 2026; I estimate this at about 97% based on typical asset composition and realistic upside scenarios over the next month.

Starbucks is very likely to report above 41,800 total global stores in 2026 — the company is already >41,000 and the incremental number required (~800+) is small relative to the planned pace of expansion.

I assess a 33% chance that Minions & Monsters will open below $68M for the 5-day July 1–5 weekend, with the balance favoring a solid holiday opening above that threshold driven by franchise strength and the July 4 boost.

Independent assessment: very unlikely that Justice Samuel Alito will resign during President Trump's term — I estimate roughly an 18% chance he leaves before 20 Jan 2029.

I assess a better-than-even chance that the 'bear case' for Trump will materialize in 2026 — legal battles, damaging disclosures, and agency hollowing cumulate into political and institutional setbacks that produce a clearly negative year for the presidency.

I assess a **72%** chance that the 2025–2028 average annual measles case count will meet the 'Yes' condition (assumed here as average ≥ 2,200 cases/year). The recent 2025 peak and the very strong 2026 trajectory make an above‑2,200 four‑year average the more likely outcome absent major, sustained vaccination gains.

Independent assessment: very unlikely — I assign a 10% chance that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029, because there is no legal trigger, heavy political downside, and no historical precedent of presidents pardoning an uncharged child purely as a family favor.

I assess a 35% probability that the June 2026 year‑over‑year CPI will be 3.6% or lower, reflecting a meaningful chance that disinflation continues but giving greater weight to persistent services and shelter inflation that leave downside limited.

I assess a moderate-favored probability that Alibaba will top the Chatbot Arena LLM leaderboard on July 31, 2026, reflecting Alibaba's strong models and ecosystem but significant competition and leaderboard volatility.

I assess an 18% chance that U.S. quarterly real GDP (annualized) will exceed 5% in at least one quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028. This is materially below the current market price (Yes: 50%).

I assess a ~1% chance that President Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his term. The event is effectively impossible under normal legal, diplomatic, and political constraints and would require a major, low-probability systemic shock (war, Panama collapse, or explicit Panamanian invitation).

I assess a materially higher probability than the market-implied 10.5%, concluding there is a meaningful chance ETH will trade at or above $3,000 before 2027 due to on-chain supply dynamics and potential macro-driven crypto rallies, but significant regulatory and macroeconomic risks keep the probability well below even odds.

Scottie Scheffler has a realistic path to complete the career grand slam by the 2028 cutoff (only the U.S. Open remains); I assess his independent probability at 32% — materially higher than the market's 5%.

I assess a 72% probability that Abiy Ahmed will be appointed and sworn in as Prime Minister following the 1 June 2026 elections, reflecting strong incumbency advantages tempered by meaningful security and political risks.

Very unlikely — I assign a low probability (~5%) that Trump will conclude a bona fide new U.S.–China free trade agreement that is put in place before Jan 20, 2029.

I assess a low chance that NYC will register a small positive net population change of 0.01–0.99% over 2025–2027 — the city is more likely to remain stagnant or decline modestly given recent data and weak working‑age population growth.

I assess a very low probability that the U.S. will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029 — around 4% — because of overwhelming legal, political, and diplomatic obstacles and the unlikelihood of Greenlandic or Danish consent.

Shohei Ohtani remains the clear frontrunner due to his unique two-way value and team context, but injury risk and voter tendencies reduce the market-implied certainty; I assess a 72% chance he wins the 2026 NL MVP.

I estimate a low but non-negligible chance that USAID will be fully eliminated during Trump's term — institutional and legislative hurdles make outright abolition unlikely, though political alignment and reorganization pressures create a meaningful tail risk.

I assess about a 10% chance that the match ends 0-0 at the end of regulation, slightly above the current market-implied 8.5% because defensive tendencies and tournament stakes raise the baseline but Canada’s attacking talent lowers it.

I assess a 35% chance that a WHO-level or widely recognized new pandemic will occur before Grand Theft Auto VI is released, reflecting moderate long-term uncertainty but lower near-term likelihood given improvements in surveillance and countermeasures.

I assess a 48% independent probability that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 — plausible given ongoing investigations and the 2026 midterms, but not the most likely outcome because political costs, Senate dynamics, and uncertain House control make impeachment far from certain.

I assess a 60% chance the Chicago pro football team will announce relocation to a new Illinois site by the first game of the 2028 regular season — staying in-state is the most likely outcome, but the race is competitive given active Indiana alternatives and political/transactional uncertainty.

I assess a 30% independent probability that Israel and Saudi Arabia will announce full normalization before Jan 20, 2029 — plausible under a negotiated, US-driven package, but overall disfavored by the Gaza war, Saudi domestic constraints, and Israeli political risk.

I assess a very low but nonzero chance that a President Trump will successfully buy any portion of Greenland's sovereignty during a term — most plausible outcomes are limited leases or property deals, not a transfer of territory sovereignty.

I assess a very high probability that there will be no formal U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term — the legal, political, and logistical barriers make a sovereignty transfer extremely unlikely.

Corbin Carroll is a strong favorite to lead MLB in triples in 2026 because of elite sprint speed, regular leadoff role, and a batted‑ball profile that produces many hits to the gaps, but injuries, park effects, and the innate randomness of triples keep the probability below overwhelming certainty.

**Independent assessment:** I assign a 70% probability that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic by 2040 — OpenAI's scale, revenue pathways and investor incentives make it the more likely of the two to pursue and complete an IPO first, though meaningful governance, regulatory and strategic-partner frictions keep the chance below certainty.

China overtaking U.S. in nominal GDP by 2030 is plausible but not the most likely outcome — I assign a 32% probability that China will be larger in nominal terms by 1 January 2030.

Independent assessment: Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is unlikely to be the next Cabinet member to leave; I assign him a 20% chance of being the next departure and view other contenders (particularly Susie Wiles and Pete Hegseth) as more likely next exits.

United Russia is the most likely party to gain the largest number of seats in the September 2026 State Duma election due to entrenched incumbency advantages and Kremlin incentives to preserve or expand its margin, though economic pressures and war-related fatigue create meaningful downside risk.

I assess Todd Blanche as the frontrunner but not a lock — my independent probability that Trump will pick Todd Blanche is 64%. The field has meaningful tail risk from political picks (Zeldin) or other surprise nominees.

I assess a very low independent probability (5%) that Trump will be impeached and removed from office before his term ends — impeachment is plausible; removal via a 67‑vote Senate conviction is extremely unlikely without an extraordinary, bipartisan political shock.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Ethereum will reach $2,500 sometime in July 2026, assigning a probability of 12% based on short time remaining, market pricing, and the balance between high crypto volatility and the absence of confirmed catalysts.

I assess an 18% probability that Marine Le Pen will win the 2027 French presidential election, reflecting her strong durable base and upside scenarios but accounting for persistent structural barriers posed by France's two-round runoff system and likely anti-RN consolidation.

Although Lionel Messi remains a top-class scorer and finished as one of the leading scorers at the 2022 World Cup, his advanced age, likely managed minutes, and strong competition make him an underdog for the 2026 Golden Boot; I assess a 28% chance he finishes as the tournament's top goalscorer.

I assess a roughly 20% chance that Rockstar/Take-Two will announce another postponement or fail to release GTA VI in the US by November 19, 2026, reflecting moderate tail risk from late-stage technical, certification, or operational issues despite strong incentives to ship on time.

I assess a 10% chance that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends. Resignation remains a low-probability tail outcome given historical precedent and current incentives to remain in office, though legal and health shocks could raise the risk.

I assess a 65% probability that Elon Musk will post fewer than 40 main-feed/quote/repost items between July 4 12:00 PM ET and July 6 12:00 PM ET, because 40 posts in a 48-hour window is a relatively high bar given his historical typical volume and the holiday context, though spikes remain possible.

I assess an 18% chance that Google will occupy the top spot on the Chatbot Arena LLM Leaderboard at the July 31, 2026 check, because Google has the technical resources to produce a leading model but faces significant participation and evaluation risks on this specific leaderboard.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability (12%) that the Fed's upper bound will reach 5.0% or higher by the end of 2026, driven mainly by upside inflation or a policy surprise, while the more likely path is continued easing or stable policy below that threshold.

I assess an 18% chance the 25th Amendment will be used at least once during Trump's presidency — low but material, driven mainly by age/health risks and the nonzero chance of a voluntary or emergency transfer, and tempered by strong political barriers to involuntary removal.

Independent assessment: extremely unlikely — ~2% chance that the U.S. will acquire any part of Canada before 2029. Trade disputes and rhetoric do not translate into territorial transfer within this time window.

Independent assessment: vanishingly small chance that President Trump will actually end the Federal Reserve before Jan 20, 2029 — I assess ~2% for 'Yes'.

I assess a low-to-moderate probability that FOX announcers will say the word "Goal" 60 or more times during the live Canada vs Morocco broadcast; reaching 60+ mentions requires an unusually high number of goal events or persistent repetition by commentators and/or an exceptionally long penalty shootout.

I assess a 36% probability that the US federal government will take a formal action in 2026 that results in the general removal of public access within the US to at least one major AI model, with the most plausible pathway being targeted actions against foreign-owned models or platform-specific restrictions rather than a broad takedown of US flagship models.

I assess a 28% probability that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 on at least one date by July 31, 2026; the remaining chance is dominated by persistent security and commercial frictions that have kept traffic below pre-crisis norms.

I assess an independent ~78% probability that Jay Clayton will be confirmed as Donald Trump’s next Director of National Intelligence before Jan 20, 2029, given the scheduled nomination and strong administration signals, with a modest haircut for confirmation and withdrawal risk.

I assess an 18% chance that the U.S. monthly unemployment rate (U-3) will reach at least 5.0% at some point during 2026, reflecting a baseline expectation of continued labor-market strength but material tail risk from a mild-to-moderate recession or large negative shocks.

I assess a strong likelihood that claude-opus-4-6-thinking will top the Chatbot Arena Text Arena overall leaderboard on July 11, 2026, with my best estimate at 80% probability based on current market pricing, leaderboard mechanics, and model stability considerations.

I assess a 72% probability that the Fed will make no 25-basis-point cuts in 2026, a bit lower than the current market-implied ~77.6% but still reflecting a strong tilt toward policy remaining on hold absent a sharp downturn or disinflation surprise.

I assess Canada has about a 30% chance to win this match; the market-implied probability (~23.5%) is reasonable but I tilt slightly higher because home advantage and attacking talent give Canada a viable upset path against a tactically strong Morocco side.

I assess a 75% probability that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 on at least one date by December 31, 2026, driven by shipping incentives to resume normal routings and the relatively modest threshold required for resolution, but subject to meaningful geopolitical and demand-side risks.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that the Department of Education will be legally abolished before Jan 20, 2029 — the administration can hollow it out significantly, but full statutory elimination within the timeframe is unlikely.

I assess a very low probability that the United States will add a new state before 2029-01-20 — virtually zero for foreign annexation and extremely unlikely for domestic territorial admission; my independent estimate is 3%.

I assess a low but non-negligible 12% probability that Argentina will have begun formal dollarization (either a USD legal-tender adoption or a government-implemented peg) by December 31, 2026, reflecting strong political intent but major practical and institutional barriers to rapid implementation.

I assess about a 9% chance that NVIDIA will be the third-largest company by market cap as of market close on July 31, 2026; Nvidia remains a top-five contender but the specific third slot is unlikely given the incumbents and volatility in valuations.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (8%) that Argentina's INDEC 12-month CPI for December 2026 will be reported under 20%, reflecting the difficulty of rapid disinflation from a high-inflation baseline absent sustained fiscal and monetary commitment.

Given the very strong market signal and meaningful trading volume, I assess a high probability that Amora Robinson will be eliminated this week, though a small chance remains for twists, immunities, or reporting/format technicalities to prevent resolution as 'Yes'.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Trump will formally invoke the Insurrection Act during his presidency; I put the independent probability at 12% based on legal, institutional, and political frictions vs. plausible high‑violence scenarios that could push him to it.