Who will be the next Prime Minister of Israel after the next election?
I assess a modestly less-than-even chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel’s next Prime Minister after the October 27, 2026 election, reflecting his enduring advantages but substantial legal, political, and coalition risks.
Analysis
Market-implied probability (Yes 40%) reflects a marketplace view that Netanyahu remains a viable contender but faces meaningful headwinds; trading volume is large enough to show sustained interest, and the market currently prices in a significant chance that he will not be sworn in. I put the probability slightly above the market at 45% to reflect Netanyahu’s durable electoral base and historical resilience while still acknowledging the substantial structural obstacles he faces.
Historically, Netanyahu and Likud have repeatedly recovered from political setbacks and retained the ability to lead or dominate right-leaning blocs, which matters greatly in Israel’s fragmented proportional system where coalition arithmetic matters more than absolute vote share. However, past performance does not guarantee future coalition-building success: small religious and ultra-Orthodox parties remain kingmakers, and those partners’ willingness to enter a coalition with Netanyahu depends on both pre-election bargaining and post-election incentives.
Legal and reputational dynamics are central to this race: ongoing indictments or court developments (if they persist) create political uncertainty that can depress potential coalition partners’ willingness to sit with Netanyahu, energize opponents, or lead to legal outcomes that complicate his ability to be sworn in. External shocks, especially national-security events between now and the election, could swing undecided voters strongly toward a leader perceived as experienced on security (which tends to favor Netanyahu) or equally could punish the incumbent for perceived mishandling, producing rapid swings in turnout and coalition mathematics.
Operationally, the decisive factor will be post-election coalition negotiations rather than raw vote share, and there are realistic paths both to Netanyahu’s return (Likud plurality plus cooperative right/religious bloc) and to his exclusion (opposition coalesces or key small parties refuse to join him); the calendar also matters because failure to form a government by constitutional or political deadlines could lead to caretaker scenarios or unusual resolutions, though the market’s December 31, 2027 cutoff makes that a relatively low-probability but non-negligible tail risk.
Arguments
For
- Netanyahu has a resilient personal political machine and a disciplined Likud base that tends to deliver reliable votes in national elections.
- In Israel’s proportional system, being the leader of the largest right-wing party gives Netanyahu the strongest initial claim to form a government.
- Security-focused voters often favor experienced leaders during volatile periods, and Netanyahu is widely perceived as strong on security and diplomacy by that bloc.
- He has historically demonstrated skill at post-election bargaining and extracting concessions from smaller parties to assemble coalitions.
- Name recognition and fundraising capacity give him advantages in campaigning and in influencing coalition negotiations after the vote.
Against
- Ongoing legal proceedings create both practical and reputational obstacles that can deter potential coalition partners from joining a Netanyahu-led government.
- Voter fatigue after many years of competitive leadership can mobilize anti-Netanyahu coalitions and reduce turnout among his swing supporters.
- Fragmentation on the right could reduce Likud’s seat share even if the overall right bloc remains sizable, complicating arithmetic for a Netanyahu-led coalition.
- A united or better-coordinated centrist-left bloc could combine with Arab parties or defectors to form an alternative coalition without Netanyahu.
- International diplomatic pressures and fallout from contentious policies could make some coalition partners wary of committing to Netanyahu for stability reasons.
Key drivers
- Likud’s raw vote share and whether it emerges as the largest single party in the Knesset.
- Willingness of small religious, ultra-Orthodox, and right-wing parties to enter a coalition with Netanyahu post-election.
- Status and trajectory of Netanyahu’s legal proceedings, including any convictions, appeals, or plea deals.
- National-security events or crises in the months before the election that could shift voter preferences toward or away from an experienced incumbent.
- Opposition unity and the ability of centrist and left-leaning parties to coordinate a viable anti-Netanyahu bloc or a kingmaker coalition.
- Voter turnout patterns among secular, centrist, Arab, and young voters that can materially change proportional seat distribution.
Risk factors
- A conviction or major adverse legal ruling that either legally prevents or politically handicaps Netanyahu’s ability to be sworn in.
- An unexpectedly effective opposition near-election coalition that captures enough seats to block Netanyahu from forming a majority coalition.
- A significant split within Likud or defections to new parties that dilute his raw seat total.
- Major security incidents that either damage Netanyahu’s standing or, conversely, produce a rally effect that disproportionately benefits him and makes current odds obsolete.
- Coalition bargaining costs that force potential partners to demand concessions Netanyahu cannot accept, preventing formation of a government.
- Electoral reforms, last-minute party mergers, or disqualifications that materially alter the seat math in ways not reflected in current market pricing.
Scenarios
Best case
Netanyahu leads Likud to a clear plurality, negotiates an effective deal with religious and right-wing partners, overcomes legal and reputational obstacles through legal maneuvers or political assurances, and is officially sworn in as Prime Minister after the election.
Most likely
Likud performs strongly but not overwhelmingly; Netanyahu remains the central figure in coalition talks but faces stiff bargaining and possible defections, leaving his ability to be sworn in plausible but far from certain, with post-election negotiations determining the final result.
Worst case
Netanyahu’s legal situation produces a disqualifying or politically crippling outcome, crucial kingmaker parties refuse to join him, opposition forces cobble together a majority or force unsustainable bargaining, and either another leader is sworn in or protracted deadlock leads to an outcome other than Netanyahu.
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