Edges for Jul 2, 2026

Starbucks is very likely to report more than 41,800 total global stores in 2026 — the company already exceeds ~41,000 in mid‑2026 and its announced expansion trajectory makes surpassing 41,800 by year‑end highly probable.

Based on the July 2026 filings and the June Supreme Court decision, two of the three pillars of the described 'bull case' have already materialized; I assess a strong likelihood that the overall bull case will be judged to have occurred in 2026.

Because multiple Cabinet impeachment articles have already been introduced and a partisan House majority can pass articles by simple majority, I assess a substantially better-than-even chance that at least one Cabinet member will be impeached by the House before Jan 1, 2027.

I assess a low probability (~6%) that the Chicago pro football team will relocate to a new site in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 regular season; the most likely outcome is relocation to Hammond, Indiana (the team has already announced plans).

Based on authoritative reports that the Trump administration ordered and executed USAID's closure in early 2025, the independent probability that USAID was eliminated during Trump's term is extremely high.

Independent assessment assigns a material but not overwhelming chance that the UK Prime Minister will be the first G7 leader to leave office — I estimate a 40% probability, meaning substantial risk but far from certain.

Independent assessment: I estimate a ~25% chance Samuel Alito resigns sometime during Trump’s 2025–2029 term. Age raises the baseline risk, but his ideological alignment and current activity argue against a likely voluntary resignation.

Assuming “Yes” means the 2025–2028 average annual U.S. measles case count is at least 1,000 (i.e., an average "in the thousands"), I assess a **72%** probability that the average will be ≥1,000 cases/year.

I estimate a ~45% chance that at least one company will *announce* it has achieved AGI before 2027-01-01 — announcements are materially easier than true verification, and powerful incentives plus high-profile CEO statements make a near-term claim plausible even if scientific consensus lags.

There is a small but non‑zero chance Barron Trump is pardoned by Donald Trump before Jan 21, 2029; legally possible but politically and factually improbable. My independent probability is 12%.

Given the high $35M threshold, limited public information, and current market price, I assess the probability of the Laso Finance public sale reaching over $35M at 30% by the July 31, 2026 deadline.

I assess a ~38% chance that the described 'bear case' for Trump — a combination of meaningful market volatility driven by geopolitical/inflationary pressures plus a sharp, politically salient decline in Trump-linked crypto assets — will occur in 2026.

I assess a very low probability that Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his term — the Torrijos–Carter treaties, Panamanian sovereignty, international law, and overwhelming political and practical costs make a forcible or legal reclamation extremely unlikely.

I assign a 44% independent probability that Todd Blanche will be Trump’s next U.S. Attorney General; the market (Blanche 71%) appears to be overweighting acting-incumbent momentum and may be mispricing political risk and alternative high-profile picks.

This event is already settled in history: Donald Trump completed his 2017–2021 term without the 25th Amendment being invoked. My independent probability that the 25th Amendment was used during that presidency is 0%.

I assess a substantially sub-50% chance that any U.S. quarterly GDP will exceed 5% annualized between Q1 2025–Q4 2028; my independent estimate is 30% driven mostly by low probability of a large one‑off rebound or an unexpectedly large fiscal shock.

I assess a materially above-market chance that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030: about 40% — a plausible but still-disputed outcome driven by growth and exchange-rate paths, with large uncertainty from demographics, debt and geopolitics.

I assess a roughly 45% chance that President Trump will be formally impeached (articles passed by the House) before Jan 20, 2029. The single dominant hinge is control of the House after the 2026 midterms plus any major new legal or political revelations between now and 2029.

Independent assessment: **~5%** chance the United States acquires any part of Greenland before 2029. Strong legal, political, and diplomatic barriers make a transfer of sovereignty highly unlikely within the available timeline.

I assess a low probability that Zelenskyy and Putin will meet face-to-face before 1 Jan 2027 — roughly 18% — because public posture, escalation dynamics, legal/travel barriers, and the absence of a credible mediating framework make a bilateral summit unlikely in the remaining six months.

I assess a low but not negligible chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026; I estimate an 18% probability based on historical volatility, macro drivers, and the market's strong current skepticism.

Independent assessment: I assign a very low probability (2%) that Trump will succeed in buying any part of Greenland during his term; massive legal, political, diplomatic and fiscal barriers make an actual purchase extremely unlikely, though minor edge-case paths (leases, concessions, or coerced deals) keep the probability non-zero.

I assess there is a meaningful but not dominant chance that Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act before Jan 20, 2029—my independent probability is 35% driven by repeated threats, policy imperatives, and multiple possible trigger events, tempered by strong legal, institutional, and political restraints.

I assess a low probability (12%) that President Trump will complete a new comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) with China before Jan 20, 2029 — restrictive, sectoral purchase deals and containment measures are far more likely than a broad U.S.–China FTA in this time window.

Given the market-implied probability (Yes 0.835) and the short five-day horizon, I assess a high likelihood that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on July 6 will be above $56,000, but tail risks and the single-minute resolution keep the probability below certainty.

Based on current evidence and historical patterns, it is very unlikely President Trump will resign before his term ends; I assess an ~8% chance of resignation prior to 2029-01-21.

I assess that Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the single most likely next Cabinet departure, but not a certainty — I place a 42% independent chance he leaves next given the legal/ethical exposure, absenteeism, and media amplification.

I assess a 30% probability that Lionel Messi will finish as the top goalscorer at the 2026 FIFA World Cup, below the market-implied ~44% but reflecting strong uncertainty driven by his age, role, and very strong competing scorers.

I assess Jay Clayton has a strong but not certain path to confirmation as DNI; my independent probability that Clayton becomes Trump's next Director of National Intelligence before Jan 20, 2029 is 70%.

I assess a modest but non-negligible chance (25%) that the 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls will reach or exceed 60 by July 15, 2026, with the principal constraint being the short time window and need for a sustained uplift in daily calls.

Given the long time horizon to year-end and the fact that the market only needs a single date with a 7-day moving average >=60, I assess a substantially better-than-even chance that Strait of Hormuz transit calls will meet the threshold by December 31, 2026, but persistent geopolitical or structural routing changes keep nontrivial downside risk.

Independent estimate: extremely unlikely. I assess about a 2% chance the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029; the current dispute is trade-focused, and there is no plausible legal, political, or military pathway for territorial acquisition in this timeframe.

I assess a very high probability that there will be no formal U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term — the political, legal, and diplomatic obstacles make a treaty or purchase extremely unlikely; I place the independent probability at 92%.

Independent assessment: I assign a 15% probability that Scottie Scheffler completes the career Grand Slam before 2028 (i.e., wins the 2027 U.S. Open), meaning I view the current market (6% Yes) as materially underpricing his chances.

Brazil is the favorite but not a heavy one; I assess a 62% chance Brazil wins the match on July 5, 2026 based on superior squad depth, historical knockout performance, and tactical flexibility offset by Norway's elite striker threat and single-game variance.

I assess a near-even but slightly-favored chance (48%) that NYC’s population will register a modest increase of 0.01–0.99% between July 2025 and July 2027 — a rebound from the 2024–25 dip but not a large surge.

Given the short window since the June 22 Switzerland talks, the formal senior-level round beginning by July 3 is unlikely but not impossible; I estimate a low probability that parties will convene and publicly acknowledge a new senior-level meeting within the next 72 hours.

I assess a 30% probability that George Russell wins the 2026 F1 Drivers' Championship, reflecting a meaningful but not leading chance driven by Mercedes' resources and the unknown impact of the 2026 technical regulations versus strong competition from Red Bull and other top teams.

I assess a 20% probability that Vladimir Putin will cease to be President of Russia at any time before December 31, 2026, reflecting a low-but-real tail risk from health, assassination, or an elite break, weighed against strong institutional control and repression that favor status quo.

I assess an 8% probability that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting a low but plausible tail outcome driven by a major crypto bull market or exceptional institutional inflows.

I assess a 30% chance that Hyperliquid will reach $100 by December 31, 2026, slightly below the market-implied probability, reflecting a combination of meaningful upside if crypto markets rally and limited runway plus uncertainty around token fundamentals and supply dynamics.

Anthropic is the clear favorite to IPO before OpenAI. Based on filings, timing signals, and corporate incentives, I assign a high (but not certain) probability that Anthropic will debut first.

I assess a slightly better-than-even chance that Ethereum will reach $1,800 in July 2026, estimating a 52% probability based on market-implied odds, typical ETH volatility, and a balance of bullish catalysts and short-term risks.

I assess a modestly higher-than-market chance that Elena Rybakina wins Wimbledon 2026, assigning a 16% probability based on her proven grass-court game and Wimbledon pedigree balanced against field strength, draw and injury risk.

Given persistent uncertainty about the pace of de-escalation and only one month left in the window, I assess a modest but not negligible chance that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day average ≥60 by July 31, 2026, and place the probability at 32%. This reflects a balance between plausible operational recovery drivers and significant political, insurance, and routing impediments that make a full return to 'normal' within 30 days unlikely but possible.