Edges for Jul 1, 2026

Starbucks is very likely to report more than 41,800 total global stores in 2026 — the company already exceeds ~41,000 in mid‑2026 and its announced expansion trajectory makes surpassing 41,800 by year‑end highly probable.

Based on authoritative reports that the Trump administration ordered and executed USAID's closure in early 2025, the independent probability that USAID was eliminated during Trump's term is extremely high.

Independent assessment: I estimate a ~25% chance Samuel Alito resigns sometime during Trump’s 2025–2029 term. Age raises the baseline risk, but his ideological alignment and current activity argue against a likely voluntary resignation.

Assuming “Yes” means the 2025–2028 average annual U.S. measles case count is at least 1,000 (i.e., an average "in the thousands"), I assess a **72%** probability that the average will be ≥1,000 cases/year.

I assess a moderately high chance that the UK Prime Minister (Keir Starmer) will be the first of the current G7 leaders to leave office, but not as extreme as the market; I assign 60% to the UK being first, with the remainder split among plausible early exits from France, the US, Italy and Germany.

I estimate a ~45% chance that at least one company will *announce* it has achieved AGI before 2027-01-01 — announcements are materially easier than true verification, and powerful incentives plus high-profile CEO statements make a near-term claim plausible even if scientific consensus lags.

There is a small but non‑zero chance Barron Trump is pardoned by Donald Trump before Jan 21, 2029; legally possible but politically and factually improbable. My independent probability is 12%.

Given the Supreme Court’s major expansion of removal power and the still-healthy underlying economy, there is a meaningful chance the 'Trump bull case' materializes in 2026 — but significant legal setbacks, central-bank constraints, and tech volatility make it far from certain. My independent estimate: 38%.

I assess a very low probability that Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his term — the Torrijos–Carter treaties, Panamanian sovereignty, international law, and overwhelming political and practical costs make a forcible or legal reclamation extremely unlikely.

Based on borough-level trends (notably Brooklyn’s sharp decline) and citywide fiscal pressures, a small net population increase of 0.01–0.99% between July 2025 and July 2027 is unlikely; I assign a 15% probability to that outcome.

I assess a substantially sub-50% chance that any U.S. quarterly GDP will exceed 5% annualized between Q1 2025–Q4 2028; my independent estimate is 30% driven mostly by low probability of a large one‑off rebound or an unexpectedly large fiscal shock.

While current markets place almost zero odds on Donald Trump securing the 2028 Republican nomination, I assess a materially higher but still modest probability given his enduring base strength, media dominance, and the unique delegate mechanics of the GOP.

Based on persistent multi-year declines in reading across grades and districts, I assess a **62%** chance that U.S. reading scores will show a statistically meaningful decline in 2026; limited improvements for younger children reduce but do not erase the risk of further drops.

Independent assessment: **~5%** chance the United States acquires any part of Greenland before 2029. Strong legal, political, and diplomatic barriers make a transfer of sovereignty highly unlikely within the available timeline.

I assess there is a meaningful but not dominant chance that Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act before Jan 20, 2029—my independent probability is 35% driven by repeated threats, policy imperatives, and multiple possible trigger events, tempered by strong legal, institutional, and political restraints.

I assign a 45% chance the 25th Amendment will be used at least once during President Trump’s current term (to 2029-01-20). The biggest single contributor is the non-zero chance of a voluntary, temporary Section 3 transfer for medical reasons; involuntary Section 4 removal remains remote but not impossible.

Independent assessment: I assign a very low probability (2%) that Trump will succeed in buying any part of Greenland during his term; massive legal, political, diplomatic and fiscal barriers make an actual purchase extremely unlikely, though minor edge-case paths (leases, concessions, or coerced deals) keep the probability non-zero.

**Independent assessment:** I estimate a roughly 28% chance the bear case for Trump materializes in 2026 — meaningful political/legal fallout and/or a macro shock that converts current tail risks into a clear negative year for the administration and markets.

Given Messi's quality and likely central role if selected, he has a nontrivial shot at the Golden Boot, but age, minutes management, and competition from younger pure strikers make him an underdog; I assess roughly a 30% chance he finishes as the top goalscorer.

I assess a low probability that Zelenskyy and Putin will meet face-to-face before 1 Jan 2027 — roughly 18% — because public posture, escalation dynamics, legal/travel barriers, and the absence of a credible mediating framework make a bilateral summit unlikely in the remaining six months.

Given the House is actively debating and a vote is expected today, I assign a high independent probability (78%) that the President will be impeached by the House before Jan 20, 2029.

I assess a modestly under-50% chance that the Bears will relocate to a new site in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 season — Illinois is the leading single outcome but political and financial friction make an in-state announcement less certain than markets imply.

I assess an 80% probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $56,000 at the 1-minute 12:00 ET candle on July 3, 2026, reflecting strong market-implied odds tempered by short-horizon volatility and exchange-specific operational risks.

I assess an 8% chance that President Trump will be impeached by the House and then convicted and removed by the Senate before his term ends — the House vote makes impeachment plausible, but removal requires an overwhelmingly unlikely bipartisan Senate defection (or a resignation negotiated to look like "removal").

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that President Trump will resign before his term ends — about 12% — because US presidential resignations are historically rare and Trump’s incentives favor staying, though legal and health tail risks raise the probability above the historical baseline.

I estimate a 28% chance that President Trump will sign between 400 and 449 Executive Orders in his second term — plausible given an early flurry and a governing style that favors EO use, but still an ambitious total relative to modern presidential norms.

I assess a modest but non-negligible 12% probability that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting a low market-implied chance but acknowledging a realistic upside tail driven by liquidity, macro easing, and cyclical momentum.

I assess a very high probability that there will be no formal U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term — the political, legal, and diplomatic obstacles make a treaty or purchase extremely unlikely; I place the independent probability at 92%.

Independent assessment: I assign a 15% probability that Scottie Scheffler completes the career Grand Slam before 2028 (i.e., wins the 2027 U.S. Open), meaning I view the current market (6% Yes) as materially underpricing his chances.

Based on 2026 baseline GDPs, required nominal growth and exchange-rate moves are implausibly large; I assign a low probability (10%) that China’s nominal GDP overtakes the U.S. by 1 Jan 2030.

I assess that Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the single most likely next Cabinet departure, but not a certainty — I place a 42% independent chance he leaves next given the legal/ethical exposure, absenteeism, and media amplification.

I assess a 22% probability that Vladimir Putin will cease to be President of Russia by December 31, 2026, reflecting elevated but still limited risk driven by wartime strain, elite fracture potential, and health/contingency scenarios against strong institutional controls and repression.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (12%) that Ethereum will touch $1,800 between June 29 and July 5, driven mostly by crypto volatility and potential one-week catalysts but constrained by the short time window and the market's heavy preference for No.

I assess a modest but meaningful chance that the US will publicly announce a naval blockade on Iran by December 31, 2026, driven mainly by the possibility of a rapid escalation in the Gulf or a decisive incident against commercial or allied vessels, but constrained by legal, political, and escalation risks.

I assess an extremely low probability (~2%) that the United States will acquire any sovereign part of Canada by 2029; diplomatic friction and administrative changes make this event highly implausible, though tiny, legally ambiguous or accidental pathways keep nonzero risk.

I assess a 30% probability that George Russell wins the 2026 F1 Drivers' Championship, reflecting a meaningful but not leading chance driven by Mercedes' resources and the unknown impact of the 2026 technical regulations versus strong competition from Red Bull and other top teams.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of 60+ for the Strait of Hormuz by July 15, 2026, because the remaining time window is short and normalization requires sustained higher daily transits, though a sudden de-escalation or operational shift could push traffic above the threshold.

I assess Jay Clayton has a strong but not certain path to confirmation as DNI; my independent probability that Clayton becomes Trump's next Director of National Intelligence before Jan 20, 2029 is 70%.

I assess an 8% probability that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting a low but plausible tail outcome driven by a major crypto bull market or exceptional institutional inflows.

Anthropic has the near-term procedural and commercial lead (earlier confidential S-1, stronger reported revenue run-rate), so I assess a high but not certain chance that Anthropic will IPO before OpenAI; my independent probability for the 'Yes' outcome is 78%.

I assess a 93% probability that the Binance ETH/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on July 3 will be above $1,300, slightly below the market-implied ~98% because of low-probability but high-impact tail risks such as a flash crash or exchange outage.

Given Netanyahu's enduring political resilience and coalition-building strengths but significant legal and political headwinds, I assess a 40% chance he will be sworn in as Israel's next prime minister after the October 27, 2026 election.

I assess a 12% probability that this market resolves to Yes, reflecting a low inherent chance that genuine Satoshi-controlled private keys will be used in 2026 plus a nontrivial additional chance that Arkham labeling or misattribution produces an observed outflow or swap on a wallet it labels as Satoshi.

Given the market-implied probability (Yes 0.835) and the short five-day horizon, I assess a high likelihood that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on July 6 will be above $56,000, but tail risks and the single-minute resolution keep the probability below certainty.