Who will be the next Prime Minister of Israel after the next election?
Given Netanyahu's enduring political resilience and coalition-building strengths but significant legal and political headwinds, I assess a 40% chance he will be sworn in as Israel's next prime minister after the October 27, 2026 election.
Analysis
The election is scheduled for October 27, 2026, and markets currently price Benjamin Netanyahu as the next prime minister at roughly 35.5% implied probability; I treat that as an informative market signal but adjust upward slightly to 40% because of structural advantages Netanyahu has historically enjoyed. Netanyahu benefits from an entrenched Likud base, a proven ability to assemble multi-party right-wing and religious coalitions, and the institutional mechanics of Israeli government formation that reward coalition managers who can deliver Knesset majorities. Those advantages make him a persistently viable candidate even when public approval is weak.
That said, there are sustained countervailing forces that materially reduce his probability of returning to the premiership. Ongoing legal exposures that date to the indictments and trials from 2019–2023 have been a persistent political liability and could culminate in convictions or political rulings that either damage his electability or complicate coalition partners' willingness to formally back him. Additionally, fragmentation on the right and the presence of credible alternative leaders on both the center and the right make coalition arithmetic fluid: a right-wing bloc without Netanyahu is a conceivable path to a non-Netanyahu PM, while a broad anti-Netanyahu coalition spanning centrists and Arab parties could also block him.
External and situational variables will be decisive between now and election day: major security events tend to produce a rally-around-the-incumbent effect that could boost Netanyahu, while sustained street mobilization, judicial reform backlash, or international pressure could depress turnout among his supporters or push fence-sitters away. Voter turnout dynamics—especially Arab-sector turnout, Haredi turnout, and differential mobilization of centrist voters—combined with tactical alliance choices (pre-election joint lists, withdrawals, or merger deals) will likely determine whether the right can coalesce behind Netanyahu or whether an alternative coalition form will prevail. Given these mixed forces, a 40% probability reflects a meaningful incumbent advantage tempered by significant, realistic obstacles.
Arguments
For
- Netanyahu has deep organizational control of Likud and a durable voter base that reliably delivers significant seat counts.
- He has a demonstrated track record of assembling multi-party coalitions and negotiating with ideological partners to reach 61-seat majorities.
- Security incidents can rapidly shift public sentiment toward incumbents, giving him an embedded advantage if such events occur.
- Many potential coalition partners on the right and among religious parties have historically preferred negotiating with Netanyahu over destabilizing alternatives.
Against
- Ongoing legal proceedings create political overhang and could culminate in rulings or convictions that erode support or complicate swearing-in.
- Persistent public protests and fatigue with long-term leadership reduce his net approval and make coalition partners warier of reputational costs.
- Right-wing fragmentation or a credible alternative leader could create a majority that excludes Netanyahu even if the right bloc remains large.
- A broad anti-Netanyahu coalition combining centrists, leftists, and Arab parties could surpass the fragmented right in seat totals and form government.
Key drivers
- Netanyahu's ability to assemble a governing Knesset majority with reliable partners after the election.
- Legal outcomes and court rulings stemming from his long-standing indictments, which could affect coalition partners' willingness to swear him in.
- Security developments between now and election day, since acute security crises historically boost incumbents and shift voter preferences.
- Fragmentation of the right-wing bloc or the emergence of a single viable anti-Netanyahu coalition that can command 61+ seats.
- Turnout differentials in Arab, Haredi, and center-left constituencies that can swing seat allocations in close races.
- Pre-election strategic alliances, list mergers, or defections that change the effective distribution of seats and kingmaker dynamics.
Risk factors
- A final criminal conviction or a legal ruling that effectively disqualifies or politically cripples Netanyahu before government formation.
- A major right-wing split where key partners refuse to serve under Netanyahu and instead back an alternative leader from the bloc.
- High mobilization of anti-Netanyahu voters and low turnout among his core base reducing Likud's seats below a workable threshold.
- An internationally driven diplomatic backlash or aid conditionality that compels coalition partners to distance themselves from Netanyahu.
- A sudden health or personal crisis that prevents him from being sworn in or leading coalition talks effectively.
- Electoral system quirks or threshold effects that disproportionately reward small-party maneuvers and alter expected seat shares.
Scenarios
Best case
Netanyahu's bloc wins enough seats and the allied parties coalesce rapidly after the election, aided by a security event that boosts incumbency sentiment and by legal developments that leave him free to be sworn in, resulting in his reappointment as prime minister.
Most likely
The election yields a fragmented Knesset where both blocs must negotiate intensely, with a plausible but not dominant chance that Netanyahu can piece together a coalition; the outcome hinges on post-election negotiations and a small set of kingmaker parties.
Worst case
Legal developments produce a conviction or decisive legal barrier, or key right-wing partners refuse to serve under him and instead back a non-Netanyahu leader, while centrist and Arab parties form a broad anti-Netanyahu majority that blocks his path to swearing-in.
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