Edges for Jun 30, 2026

I assess a low but non-zero chance (~10%) that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029 — legally possible (preemptive pardons exist) but politically unlikely given no current charges or investigations.

Interpreting the market question as whether the 2025–2028 average will exceed 1,500 measles cases/year, I assess a 65% chance that the four-year average will be >1,500 cases/year based on the already large 2026 total and persistent drivers lowering population immunity.

I assess a moderately high chance that the UK Prime Minister (Keir Starmer) will be the first of the current G7 leaders to leave office, but not as extreme as the market; I assign 60% to the UK being first, with the remainder split among plausible early exits from France, the US, Italy and Germany.

Given the Supreme Court’s major expansion of removal power and the still-healthy underlying economy, there is a meaningful chance the 'Trump bull case' materializes in 2026 — but significant legal setbacks, central-bank constraints, and tech volatility make it far from certain. My independent estimate: 38%.

I assess a low probability that any U.S. quarterly GDP (annualized) exceeds 5% between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — my independent estimate is 20% — because baseline forecasts, fiscal constraints, and recent quarterly momentum make a >5% annualized quarter an unlikely one-off event.

Near-zero probability. I assess a ~3% independent chance that Trump will “take back” the Panama Canal during his term — the weight of treaty, legal, logistical, regional, and diplomatic barriers makes outright seizure or legal reclamation extremely unlikely; only extraordinary, low-probability contingencies (major regional collapse, a willing Panamanian government, or extreme reinterpretation of treaty emergency clauses) could change that.

Based on borough-level trends (notably Brooklyn’s sharp decline) and citywide fiscal pressures, a small net population increase of 0.01–0.99% between July 2025 and July 2027 is unlikely; I assign a 15% probability to that outcome.

Given Messi's quality and likely central role if selected, he has a nontrivial shot at the Golden Boot, but age, minutes management, and competition from younger pure strikers make him an underdog; I assess roughly a 30% chance he finishes as the top goalscorer.

I assess a 62% probability that USAID will be formally eliminated (statutorily shuttered or subsumed such that it ceases to exist as a congressionally created independent agency) during Trump's term by 2029-01-20. The administration's clear intent and de facto dismantling make formal elimination more likely than not, but congressional and political constraints leave substantial uncertainty.

I assess a materially better-than-market chance that Starbucks will report above 41,800 global stores in 2026 — approximately a 38% probability based on projected gross openings, regional rollouts, and likely net additions once closures stabilize.

I estimate a 22% chance that Justice Clarence Thomas will resign during President Trump’s term — unlikely but not negligible given age and exposure to health or scandal shocks.

I estimate a low but non‑zero chance (~4%) that the United States will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029. Legal, diplomatic, and political barriers make acquisition highly unlikely, though aggressive diplomacy, Greenlandic independence, or a rushed lease/purchase of a small area create tail risk.

I assess a low probability (12%) that Trump will negotiate and secure a new, comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) with China during a term ending Jan 20, 2029.

Independent assessment: I assign a 40% chance the DOJ ultimately 'wins' its antitrust case against Apple before 2030 — meaning the government secures a judicially approved remedy (trial judgment or binding consent decree) that is materially favorable to the DOJ.

I assess a substantially better-than-market chance that Donald Trump will win the 2028 Republican nomination, but still consider it unlikely due to age, legal exposure, and likely intra-party competition; my probability is 20%.

Given the House is actively debating and a vote is expected today, I assign a high independent probability (78%) that the President will be impeached by the House before Jan 20, 2029.

**Independent assessment:** I estimate a roughly 28% chance the bear case for Trump materializes in 2026 — meaningful political/legal fallout and/or a macro shock that converts current tail risks into a clear negative year for the administration and markets.

I assign a 45% chance the 25th Amendment will be used at least once during President Trump’s current term (to 2029-01-20). The biggest single contributor is the non-zero chance of a voluntary, temporary Section 3 transfer for medical reasons; involuntary Section 4 removal remains remote but not impossible.

I assess a 38% chance that Israel and Saudi Arabia will normalize relations by Jan 20, 2029 — plausible if the U.S. delivers large, credible security/economic guarantees and Saudi calculates the domestic costs as manageable, but the unresolved Palestinian/Gaza issue and domestic/regional risks make formal normalization unlikely in the near term.

Based on persistent multi-year declines in reading across grades and districts, I assess a **62%** chance that U.S. reading scores will show a statistically meaningful decline in 2026; limited improvements for younger children reduce but do not erase the risk of further drops.

I assess a modestly under-50% chance that the Bears will relocate to a new site in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 season — Illinois is the leading single outcome but political and financial friction make an in-state announcement less certain than markets imply.

Given overwhelming Greenlandic/Danish opposition, extreme cost, legal/constitutional barriers, and Trump's public shift away from forced annexation, I assess a very high probability that the U.S. will not acquire Greenland during Trump's term.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that President Trump will resign before his term ends — about 12% — because US presidential resignations are historically rare and Trump’s incentives favor staying, though legal and health tail risks raise the probability above the historical baseline.

I assess an 80% probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $56,000 at the 1-minute 12:00 ET candle on July 3, 2026, reflecting strong market-implied odds tempered by short-horizon volatility and exchange-specific operational risks.

Based on 2026 baseline GDPs, required nominal growth and exchange-rate moves are implausibly large; I assign a low probability (10%) that China’s nominal GDP overtakes the U.S. by 1 Jan 2030.

I estimate an 86% chance Keith Sonderling is confirmed and becomes Trump's next Secretary of Labor; the nomination and a Republican Senate strongly favor confirmation, but narrow margins and routine confirmation risks make a ~14% chance of failure plausible.

I estimate a 28% chance that President Trump will sign between 400 and 449 Executive Orders in his second term — plausible given an early flurry and a governing style that favors EO use, but still an ambitious total relative to modern presidential norms.

I assess a modest but non-negligible 12% probability that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting a low market-implied chance but acknowledging a realistic upside tail driven by liquidity, macro easing, and cyclical momentum.

I assign a low probability (6%) that the U.S. will acquire sovereign control of any part of Greenland during Trump’s current term; sustained rhetoric and limited confidential talks make non‑sovereign arrangements plausible, but legal, political, and international barriers make an actual purchase extremely unlikely.

I assess a 72% probability that Mexico will reach the Round of 16 at the 2026 FIFA World Cup, driven by home advantage, a favorable tournament format for CONCACAF teams, and Mexico's consistent competitive level, tempered by the high variance of 3-team groups and single-elimination knockouts.

I assess an 8% chance that President Trump will be impeached by the House and then convicted and removed by the Senate before his term ends — the House vote makes impeachment plausible, but removal requires an overwhelmingly unlikely bipartisan Senate defection (or a resignation negotiated to look like "removal").

I assess an 18% probability that Marine Le Pen wins the 2027 French presidential election, reflecting her entrenched voter base and party organization balanced against the strong structural disadvantages posed by France's two-round system and likely broad opposition coalitions.

I assess a 72% probability that the Fed will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at the July 28–29, 2026 FOMC meeting, with the balance of risk tilted toward a surprise 25 bps move if key incoming data or financial conditions shift materially between now and the meeting.

I assess a 22% probability that Vladimir Putin will cease to be President of Russia by December 31, 2026, reflecting elevated but still limited risk driven by wartime strain, elite fracture potential, and health/contingency scenarios against strong institutional controls and repression.

Given reported progress from the June 22 talks but the very short window and logistical/political hurdles, I assess a modest probability that a new senior-level US–Iran in-person round will begin by July 3, 2026.

I assess a 25% independent probability that James Ho will be the next Supreme Court Justice by Jan 20, 2029 — he is a leading candidate but faces meaningful competition, vacancy timing uncertainty, and confirmation risk.

Hosting three strong CONCACAF sides raises the region's chances above historical norms, but Europe and South America still dominate; I assess a 12% probability that a CONCACAF country wins the 2026 World Cup.

I assess the chance that the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 (H.R.3633) will be enacted by December 31, 2026 at about 40%, below the current market-implied ~48% due to procedural hurdles, time pressure, and partisan/election-year uncertainty despite meaningful industry support.

Scottie Scheffler has a meaningful single-tournament chance to complete the Career Grand Slam at the 2027 US Open (Pebble Beach); I estimate his odds at about 14% to win that tournament and thus complete the slam before 2028.

Given the market's heavy buy-side conviction and how FDV is calculated, I assess a high probability that GRVT's FDV will exceed $100M one day after launch, while acknowledging uncertainty about tokenomics and liquidity that could push the outcome the other way.

I assess a 38% chance that STRC will register a TradingView 1-minute candle high of at least $100 by 2026-12-31, slightly below the market-implied probability due to limited recent public information and reliance on low-probability corporate actions or extreme volatility to reach that level.

I assess that Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the single most likely next Cabinet departure, but not a lock — I place his independent probability at 40% based on sustained insider friction, public controversies, and historical turnover patterns in this administration.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (12%) that Ethereum will touch $1,800 between June 29 and July 5, driven mostly by crypto volatility and potential one-week catalysts but constrained by the short time window and the market's heavy preference for No.

I assess an 8% probability that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by December 31, 2026, higher than the market-implied ~1.8% but still low given the magnitude of the required rally and known macro/regulatory headwinds.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of 60+ for the Strait of Hormuz by July 15, 2026, because the remaining time window is short and normalization requires sustained higher daily transits, though a sudden de-escalation or operational shift could push traffic above the threshold.

I assess a 20% chance that China will commence a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of Taiwan by December 31, 2027, reflecting continued PLA improvements and political tail risks but strong deterrence, high costs, and resilient Taiwanese defenses.

Given the market-implied probability (Yes ~98%) and typical short-term behavior, I assess a high likelihood that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $54,000 at the noon ET 1-minute candle on July 2, while discounting a small tail risk from flash crashes, exchange/data issues, or major macro shocks.

I assess a 72% probability that France wins this match, a bit below the market-implied 76.5% to account for Sweden's defensive profile and match-level uncertainty despite France's clear quality advantage.

Anthropic has the near-term procedural and commercial lead (earlier confidential S-1, stronger reported revenue run-rate), so I assess a high but not certain chance that Anthropic will IPO before OpenAI; my independent probability for the 'Yes' outcome is 78%.

I assess a 12% probability that this market resolves to Yes, reflecting a low inherent chance that genuine Satoshi-controlled private keys will be used in 2026 plus a nontrivial additional chance that Arkham labeling or misattribution produces an observed outflow or swap on a wallet it labels as Satoshi.

I assess an 8% probability that the Laso Finance public sale on MetaDAO will show more than $35M committed by the stated deadline, reflecting the high threshold, lack of public signals, and market-implied skepticism but acknowledging last-minute or private-backers-driven upside.