Edges for Jun 21, 2026

I estimate a 72% chance the Trump-driven bull case manifests in 2026 — a politically-fueled, broad market rally tied to diplomatic wins, investor narratives (e.g., 'Trump buy' stocks), and macro stability — though it's vulnerable to Fed action and valuation mean reversion.

I assess ~30% that the UK Prime Minister will be the first G7 leader to leave office — elevated by recent UK turbulence but far lower than the market price, which looks driven by recency and crowding.

I assess a better-than-even chance that Starbucks will report more than 41,800 global stores in 2026 — the company is already near that threshold and management growth targets make reaching +800 net stores plausible despite closures and remodeling.

Given no specific news and Musk's historically bursty but inconsistent posting patterns, I assess a modestly less-than-even chance that he will post fewer than 40 main-feed tweets over the 48-hour window, assigning a 40% probability to Yes (<40 tweets).

I assess a 62% probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 21 will be between $62,000 and $64,000, reflecting a modestly elevated likelihood driven by the market-implied price and the moderate width of the bracket relative to typical intraday volatility.

I assess a 15% chance that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029 — low because there is no current legal exposure and pardoning a family member carries heavy political cost, but nonzero because presidents can and sometimes do issue preemptive clemency and Trump has shown a willingness to use pardons broadly.

I assess a substantially higher-than-market chance that a broad “bear case” for Trump will materialize in 2026 — a 40% probability — driven mainly by a persistent Iran-related energy shock plus accumulation of governance and ethics controversies that meaningfully erode political standing.

Independent assessment: ~3% probability that Donald Trump will successfully "take back" the Panama Canal during his term (through force, coercive seizure, or formal transfer of sovereignty). Forcible seizure is effectively zero; the small residual probability reflects low‑likelihood diplomatic/coercive scenarios or semantic/contractual reinterpretations of "take back."

I assess a substantially lower chance than the market that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 — impeachment is institutionally difficult absent a major catalyst or a House flip, so my independent probability is 35%.

I assess a 22% chance Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican nomination, reflecting his durable political infrastructure and base support tempered by large legal, health, and political uncertainties over a multi-year horizon.

I assess a 28% probability that Marine Le Pen wins the 2027 French presidential election, reflecting stronger structural barriers in France's two-round system and persistent anti-RN coalitions but recognizing an elevated baseline risk due to Macron being ineligible and ongoing political realignments.

Independent estimate: Scottie Scheffler has a substantially better-than-market chance to complete the career grand slam before 2028 — I estimate ~26% probability, driven by meaningful per-tournament win chances in the 2026 and 2027 U.S. Opens.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that a formal U.S.–China free trade agreement (FTA) will be signed and implemented during Trump's term — my independent probability is 22%. Ongoing tariff-framework talks raise the chance of meaningful deals but do not, by themselves, make an FTA likely.

I assess a 72% probability that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 on at least one date by December 31, 2026, reflecting strong chances of traffic recovery but meaningful geopolitical and insurance-related downside risks.

I assess roughly a 45% chance that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 23 will be above $64,000, slightly below the market-implied probability and reflecting minute-level noise and near-term volatility risks.

I assess a ~18% chance Justice Clarence Thomas resigns during Trump's term. Age and tenure make retirement plausible, but historical patterns, his past behavior, and lack of public signals lower the odds compared with common heuristics.

Independent assessment: ~8% chance the United States will acquire any part of Greenland by 2029. The probability is low because of entrenched Danish sovereignty, Greenlandic political preferences, and normative/legal hurdles; the market (Yes 22%) appears to be overpricing ambiguous interpretations and geopolitical noise.

Very unlikely: I assess ~2% independent probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada by 21 Jan 2029.

I assess a low probability that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 — roughly 8% — because closing the current ~50% USD gap in ~3.5 years requires implausibly large nominal growth or a dramatic RMB appreciation, absent an extreme shock to the U.S. economy.

Independent assessment: It is very likely there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term — I assess ~92% that no acquisition occurs, with only a small tail probability distributed across high-value purchase outcomes.

Jay Clayton is the named nominee and remains the frontrunner, but Trump’s surprise delay and installation of an inexperienced acting DNI meaningfully reduce his confirmation odds versus the market; I place Clayton at 58%.

I assess a 38% chance that U.S. annualized quarterly real GDP will exceed 5% in at least one quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028. This reflects the rarity of >5% quarters in normal times, modest upside from possible Trump-era policy shocks, and sizable downside/constraint from political and macro limits.

I assess a strong but not certain chance that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $60,000 at the 12:00 ET 1-minute candle on June 24, assigning an 85% probability based on market pricing, typical short-term volatility, and exchange liquidity versus minute-level execution risk and tail events.

I assess a 42% chance Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the next Cabinet member to leave the Trump administration — elevated by heavy public speculation and documented friction but restrained by denials and no confirmed departure.

Given the remaining six-week window, typical seasonal shipping patterns, and the fact that a single seven-day spike is sufficient to resolve Yes, I assess a modestly better-than-even chance that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average >=60 by July 31, 2026.

Assuming the market's binary 'Yes' means the four‑year (2025–2028) average annual measles cases exceeds 2,000, I assess ~42% chance that the average will be >2,000 — elevated early years make it plausible but 2027–28 will decide the outcome.

I assess a modest chance that USAID will be formally eliminated during Trump's term — likely it will be sharply weakened or have functions moved, but complete statutory abolition is unlikely. My independent probability for 'Yes' is 28%.

I assess a modest but material chance that Bitcoin will hit $200,000 by Dec 31, 2026, higher than the market-implied ~1.9% but still unlikely given macro/regulatory headwinds and the short time window.

I assess a better-than-even chance that Israel and Saudi Arabia will normalize relations before Jan 20, 2029 — my independent probability is 65% based on Riyadh's strategic incentives, likely U.S. security brokerage under Trump, and the multi-year timeline available for a deal.

Independent assessment: low but non-negligible chance that Trump secures a sovereignty transfer (any part of Greenland) during his term — I assess this at about 12% by 2029-01-20.

I assess a ~30% chance that the DOJ obtains a definitive legal victory against Apple on its antitrust suit (through a judgment finding Apple liable and imposing meaningful injunctive relief) before 2030. The balance tilts toward Apple given past rulings and legal hurdles, but DOJ’s resources, evolving case law, and time to litigate keep a non-trivial chance alive.

I estimate a 72% chance Mexico reaches the Round of 16, slightly above the market-implied 64% because co-host status and the expanded 48-team format materially increase Mexico's probability of surviving the group stage and winning a Round of 32 tie, though knockout volatility and draw luck remain important constraints.

I assess Lionel Messi has a modest but meaningful chance (~14%) to finish as the 2026 World Cup top scorer, driven by his role and Argentina's tournament prospects but limited by age, rotation risk, and strong competition from younger strikers.

I assess a 72% probability that the FOMC will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at the July 28–29, 2026 meeting, slightly below the current market-implied 78.5% consensus due to non-negligible upside data risks and policy discretion.

Independent assessment: I estimate a 40% chance Blake Lively will attend Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce’s wedding on Dec 31, 2028 — plausible given historical social ties and a very large guest list, but materially dampened by recent reporting of distancing and no confirmations.

I assign Todd Blanche an 80% independent probability of being Donald Trump's next Attorney General, driven by a formal nomination, GOP committee-level acceptance, and alignment with Trump's recent staffing pattern; remaining probability is split among a small set of lower-momentum alternatives.

I assess an 88% chance South Korea advances to the Round of 32, a bit below the market's 92.5% due to the high variance of 3-team groups and the possibility of an unfavorable draw or a single bad game altering tiebreakers.

I estimate ~22% chance Elon Musk personally visits Mars before Aug 1, 2099: a meaningful but modest probability driven by SpaceX’s technical trajectory and Musk’s remaining lifespan and willingness to travel.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (about 8%) that Zelenskyy and Putin meet before Jul 1, 2026 — public refusal and near-term logistical constraints make it unlikely, but active mediation and last-minute tactical incentives create a small upside.

Based on reported IPO paperwork and preparatory steps by OpenAI and the absence of similar regulatory steps from Anthropic, I assess OpenAI is substantially more likely to IPO before Anthropic; my independent probability is 80%.

Independent assessment: modestly likely that NYC's population change from July 2025 to July 2027 will fall in the -0.99% to 0% band (small decline / near-flat) — I put the probability at 38%.

I assess a modestly favorable probability that GMGN's token will have an FDV above $200M one day after launch, primarily because FDV calculations can be driven above $200M by tokenomics and strong initial listing demand, but the outcome is highly sensitive to whether the token launches, exchange listings, and macro/regulatory conditions.

I assess a modest but real chance that George Russell wins the 2026 Drivers' Championship (18%), reflecting his talent and membership of a top team balanced against the likely continued dominance of rivals, technical/regulatory uncertainty, and intra-team dynamics at Mercedes.

I assess a 10% probability that China will commence a military offensive to seize any portion of Taiwan by December 31, 2026; this is modestly above the market-implied ~6.5% and reflects persistent capability growth and political incentives but also substantial military, economic, and diplomatic barriers that make invasion unlikely in the near term.

I assess a low probability that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 on any date through June 30, 2026, primarily because the 7-day average requirement and the short time window make a sustained rebound unlikely absent a clear and rapid surge in traffic.

Given the ongoing conflict dynamics, domestic political incentives in Iran, and the short time remaining, I assess a low probability that Iran will publicly agree to allow fully unrestricted commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz by June 30, 2026.

I estimate a 22% independent probability that President Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act before the market deadline — non-negligible because of internal advocacy and public rhetoric, but still unlikely given legal, military, and political constraints.

I assess the probability of a draw at 19%; Uruguay's superior quality and goal threat make a decisive result more likely, while Cabo Verde's defensive setup and the inherent variance of a single match leave a meaningful but below-market chance of a draw.

Given a publicly announced rematch with Max Holloway for July 11, 2026 and UFC promotional material plus McGregor’s statement about two contract dates, it is very likely Conor McGregor will fight next (independent probability ~97%).

I assess a modestly better-than-even chance that Cambria will have an official, actively tradable token by September 30, 2027, with a probability of 56% driven by web3 adoption momentum and a manageable 15+ month runway, tempered by regulatory and listing risks.