Edges for Jun 20, 2026

I estimate a 72% chance the Trump-driven bull case manifests in 2026 — a politically-fueled, broad market rally tied to diplomatic wins, investor narratives (e.g., 'Trump buy' stocks), and macro stability — though it's vulnerable to Fed action and valuation mean reversion.

I assess ~30% that the UK Prime Minister will be the first G7 leader to leave office — elevated by recent UK turbulence but far lower than the market price, which looks driven by recency and crowding.

Given Starbucks' stated expansion plan, the Q2 2026 U.S. store count, and plausible China growth, I assess a better-than-even chance that total global stores will exceed 41,800 in 2026 — despite the market strongly favoring No.

I assess essentially an even chance that Game 3 will end during in-game daytime; the market's 10% Yes appears to reflect a strong bias or incomplete information rather than an objective advantage for No.

Given the absence of any known federal exposure for Barron Trump and historical norms against pardoning family, I assess a low probability that he will be pardoned before Jan 21, 2029 — about 12%.

I assess a substantially higher-than-market chance that a broad “bear case” for Trump will materialize in 2026 — a 40% probability — driven mainly by a persistent Iran-related energy shock plus accumulation of governance and ethics controversies that meaningfully erode political standing.

I assess a substantially lower chance than the market that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 — impeachment is institutionally difficult absent a major catalyst or a House flip, so my independent probability is 35%.

Given historical Iranian behavior and the strong baseline incentive to retain enrichment capacity, but accounting for the market's high price and the contract's broad definition that counts even temporary pledges, I assess a 30% probability that Iran will publicly agree to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026.

I assess a low probability (8%) that the United States will "take back" the Panama Canal during Trump's term; current reporting shows strong rhetoric but no credible legal, diplomatic, or operational pathway to a successful transfer of control.

Independent assessment: I estimate a 40% chance Blake Lively will attend Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce’s wedding on Dec 31, 2028 — plausible given historical social ties and a very large guest list, but materially dampened by recent reporting of distancing and no confirmations.

**Independent assessment:** Very unlikely — I estimate a ~5% chance that Trump (or the U.S. under his direct initiative) will complete a purchase of Greenland during his term.

Scottie Scheffler is a strong candidate to complete the career grand slam, but given the U.S. Open's volatility and two-year window, I assess a significantly higher chance than the market: about 23% that he wins a U.S. Open in 2026 or 2027.

I assign a low probability (~20%) that Trump will complete a new, comprehensive US–China free trade agreement (FTA) by Jan 20, 2029 — limited trade pacts are plausible, but a broad FTA is unlikely given political and strategic barriers.

I assess a 76% probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 24 will be above $60,000, slightly below current market-implied odds due to short-horizon volatility and exchange-specific risks.

I assess a substantially higher chance than the market price but still a longshot: about an 18% probability that Donald Trump will be the Republican nominee in 2028, driven by his base strength and name recognition but constrained by legal exposure, age, and the party's incentive to coalesce around an alternative.

I assess a 72% probability that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 on at least one date by December 31, 2026, reflecting strong chances of traffic recovery but meaningful geopolitical and insurance-related downside risks.

I assess a low probability that the United States will *acquire* any part of Greenland (interpreted as a formal transfer of territory or sovereign control) before 2029 — about 6% — because legal, political, and public-opinion barriers are high and Denmark/Greenland have strong incentives to resist. The market price (~21%) appears to overstate that likelihood, likely because of ambiguous wording and speculative trading tied to Trump-era rhetoric.

I assess a very high probability that there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during President Trump's term — about 96% — because of legal, diplomatic, domestic political, and Greenlandic opposition barriers that make a completed purchase or transfer extremely unlikely.

With only 11 days left, a last-minute mediated or bilateral diplomatic meeting is plausible but not certain; I assess a modestly higher chance that a meeting will occur, putting the probability of no meeting at 38%.

Given public statements, internal pressure from advisors, and a plausible trigger environment (large-scale unrest or perceived obstruction), I assign a meaningful but sub‑50% chance that President Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act during his term — my independent estimate: 30%.

Given the short 3-day horizon, strong market-implied odds, and generally deep liquidity on Binance, I assess a high probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $60,000 at 12:00 ET on June 22, but minute-level flash events keep nontrivial downside risk.

I assess a low probability that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 — roughly 8% — because closing the current ~50% USD gap in ~3.5 years requires implausibly large nominal growth or a dramatic RMB appreciation, absent an extreme shock to the U.S. economy.

Given the remaining six-week window, typical seasonal shipping patterns, and the fact that a single seven-day spike is sufficient to resolve Yes, I assess a modestly better-than-even chance that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average >=60 by July 31, 2026.

Assuming the market's binary 'Yes' means the four‑year (2025–2028) average annual measles cases exceeds 2,000, I assess ~42% chance that the average will be >2,000 — elevated early years make it plausible but 2027–28 will decide the outcome.

Given the short time window, ongoing geopolitical risk, and likely depressed transit volumes relative to historical norms, I assess a low but non-negligible chance (20%) that IMF Portwatch's 7-day moving average for the Strait of Hormuz will reach or exceed 60 by June 30, 2026.

I estimate a 40% chance that U.S. real quarterly GDP will top 5% in at least one quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — plausible but not the baseline outcome given historical rarity and current macro constraints.

Very unlikely: I assess ~2% independent probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada by 21 Jan 2029.

I assess a relatively low probability that Justice Clarence Thomas will resign during President Trump's 2025–2029 term — about 22% — driven primarily by his past behavior and incentives to remain, with resignation most likely if a major health or ethics escalation occurs.

I assess a low but meaningful chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026, assigning a 12% probability due to the short time window, historical cycle timing, and macro/regulatory uncertainties counterbalanced by continued ETF/institutional demand and potential macro easing.

Jay Clayton is the named nominee and remains the frontrunner, but Trump’s surprise delay and installation of an inexperienced acting DNI meaningfully reduce his confirmation odds versus the market; I place Clayton at 58%.

I assess a modest but not negligible chance that USAID will be fully eliminated during Trump's term — about 30%. The administration's broad anti-agency pattern raises the risk, but concrete legal/political barriers and the absence of any explicit targeting of USAID in the available results make outright abolition unlikely.

I assess a better-than-even chance that Israel and Saudi Arabia will formalize normalization by Jan 20, 2029 — likely driven by a U.S.-Saudi security bargain and pragmatic Saudi risk calculations despite Palestinian/domestic constraints.

I assess a 43% chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's Prime Minister after the next election, reflecting his entrenched base and coalition-building ability offset by legal jeopardy, coalition fragility, and potential centrist consolidation.

I assess a low probability (18%) that Iran will publicly agree to end all uranium enrichment by December 31, 2026, because such a pledge would require unprecedented political concessions and credible external guarantees that are unlikely to be delivered within six months.

I assess a modestly better-than-even chance (56%) that the Chicago pro football team will relocate to a new site in Illinois (most likely Arlington Heights) by the first game of the 2028 regular season.

I assign Todd Blanche an 80% independent probability of being Donald Trump's next Attorney General, driven by a formal nomination, GOP committee-level acceptance, and alignment with Trump's recent staffing pattern; remaining probability is split among a small set of lower-momentum alternatives.

I assess a low but not negligible chance that Trump will be both impeached by the House and removed by the Senate before his term ends; my independent probability is 12% based on political incentives, historical precedent, and the high constitutional threshold for removal.

I assess a substantially elevated chance that Robert F. Kennedy Jr. will be the next Cabinet member to depart — not a sure thing, but more likely than the current market price suggests due to sustained public pressure and policy friction with the administration.

I assess only a small chance that Trump will sign 400–449 EOs in a second term (10%). Historical pace and required issuance rates make the 400–449 band unlikely; the far likeliest outcome is that total EOs remain below 300.

I assess a 20% chance the New York Yankees win the 2026 World Series, modestly above the market-implied 14.5% because franchise resources and offensive depth keep them perennial contenders, but significant uncertainty around pitching, competition, and randomness limits the probability.

I assess Lionel Messi has a modest but meaningful chance (~14%) to finish as the 2026 World Cup top scorer, driven by his role and Argentina's tournament prospects but limited by age, rotation risk, and strong competition from younger strikers.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends; my best judgment is 15% independent probability, driven mainly by legal/health tail risks but countered by strong incentives to remain in office.

I estimate ~22% chance Elon Musk personally visits Mars before Aug 1, 2099: a meaningful but modest probability driven by SpaceX’s technical trajectory and Musk’s remaining lifespan and willingness to travel.

I assess a ~30% chance that the DOJ obtains a definitive legal victory against Apple on its antitrust suit (through a judgment finding Apple liable and imposing meaningful injunctive relief) before 2030. The balance tilts toward Apple given past rulings and legal hurdles, but DOJ’s resources, evolving case law, and time to litigate keep a non-trivial chance alive.

I assess about an 18% chance that Binance BTC/USDT will close between $60,000 and $62,000 on the 1-minute candle at 12:00 ET June 22, reflecting a low but non-negligible probability driven by short-term volatility and microstructure effects.

I assess an 88% chance South Korea advances to the Round of 32, a bit below the market's 92.5% due to the high variance of 3-team groups and the possibility of an unfavorable draw or a single bad game altering tiebreakers.

I assess a modest but real chance that George Russell wins the 2026 Drivers' Championship (18%), reflecting his talent and membership of a top team balanced against the likely continued dominance of rivals, technical/regulatory uncertainty, and intra-team dynamics at Mercedes.

I assess a modest but real chance that Marine Le Pen could win in 2027, driven mainly by the absence of Macron and persistent RN strength, but significant structural and political barriers keep the probability low.

I assess a 10% probability that China will commence a military offensive to seize any portion of Taiwan by December 31, 2026; this is modestly above the market-implied ~6.5% and reflects persistent capability growth and political incentives but also substantial military, economic, and diplomatic barriers that make invasion unlikely in the near term.

I assess a 28% probability that Tunisia vs. Japan will finish in a draw, slightly above the market-implied 23.5% because of likely cautious group-stage tactics and Tunisia's defensive organization, but Japan remains the clear favorite to win.

I estimate Czechia has a 32% chance to beat Mexico on June 24, 2026; Mexico remains the favorite largely due to location, fan support, and deeper tournament experience, but Czechia has realistic pathways to an upset if key attackers and midfield control materialize.