Edges for Jun 14, 2026

Assuming the market's 'Yes' means the 2025–2028 annual average exceeds 1,000 reported measles cases per year, I assess a very high probability (95%) that the average will be above that threshold given two consecutive >2,000-year starts and durable drivers keeping incidence elevated.

I assess Justin Gaethje has about a 22% chance to win; Ilia Topuria is the clear favorite due to youth, grappling, and stylistic matchup advantages, but Gaethje's finishing power and volatility keep his upset probability material.

Based on historical friendship patterns and how celebrity guest lists for close friends typically form, I assess a substantially greater than even chance that Blake Lively would attend a Taylor Swift–Travis Kelce wedding if it takes place — independent probability 65%.

Based on the recent news picture (no UK departure signals and active diplomacy from other leaders), I assess a moderate but not dominant chance that the UK Prime Minister will be the first G7 leader to leave office.

Conditional but plausible — the full “Trump bull case” happening in 2026 is possible if a sequence of macro and geopolitical catalysts align, but that sequence is sufficiently uncertain that I assign a sub-50% chance.

Given the short time window and the historically episodic, crisis-driven nature of U.S.–Iran diplomacy, I assess a 62% probability that no qualifying in-person diplomatic meeting will occur by June 30, 2026.

I assess a very low probability that Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his term — about 2% — because legal, diplomatic, economic, and military constraints make a successful reclamation extremely unlikely.

Independent assessment: I assign a 15% chance that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029. Absent any current federal legal exposure, a pardon is a low-probability tail event that rises if Barron becomes implicated in federal matters or if Trump chooses a preemptive, politically costly family pardon.

I assess a 30% probability that Australia vs Türkiye ends in a draw, slightly above the market-implied 25.5% because group-stage caution and defensive organization increase draw chances, but Turkey's attacking upside and match incentives keep a decisive result more likely.

I assess a materially higher chance than the market: Elon Musk has a meaningful personal incentive, unique control of SpaceX, and plausible early windows for a crewed Mars flight, but age and mission risk are large constraints — my independent probability is 34%.

I assess a roughly 35% chance that a credible "bear case" for Trump — a broadly damaging combination of economic pain, foreign-policy fallout, and legal/governance setbacks that meaningfully reduce his political standing in 2026 — will materialize before 2027.

I assess about a 10% chance the United States will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029. Large legal, political, and popular obstacles make a sovereignty transfer unlikely; only coercive or highly unconventional routes (leases, carve-outs, or forced bargaining) create a meaningful tail risk.

Scottie Scheffler has a materially better than negligible chance to complete the career Grand Slam by the end of 2027 — I estimate roughly a one-in-four chance, concentrated in the 2026 and 2027 U.S. Opens.

A comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement before Jan 20, 2029 is unlikely; I estimate roughly an 18% chance given political, strategic, and negotiation barriers despite incentives for narrow bargains.

Todd Blanche is the clear favorite after a formal nomination; I assess a high (78%) chance he will be Trump’s next Attorney General, with the remaining probability split among replacement, failed confirmation, or late changes favoring Zeldin, DeSantis, Pirro, or Dhillon.

Independent assessment: Andrew Oldham is very unlikely to be the next Supreme Court Justice by 20 Jan 2029; I estimate a ~4% chance based on lack of profile, lack of credible nomination signals, and historical patterns favoring seasoned appellate nominees.

I assess a modestly better-than-market chance that Riyadh and Jerusalem will normalize relations before Jan 20, 2029: plausible under an attractive US-Saudi package and a ‘Palestinian horizon’ formulation, but substantial political and regional obstacles make this far from likely.

Based on available reporting that OpenAI has confidentially filed and Anthropic has only recently listed paperwork, I assess OpenAI is more likely to IPO before Anthropic, but not a slam-dunk; I estimate a 65% probability that OpenAI will IPO first.

I assess modest odds that at least one U.S. quarterly GDP print exceeds 5% annualized between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — plausible as a short-lived cyclical spike but unlikely as a sustained trend; my independent probability is 39%.

Independent assessment: low but non-negligible chance. I estimate a ~12% probability that Trump (during his term) will succeed in buying at least part of Greenland; the far stronger outcome is expanded U.S. access without a sovereign transfer.

I assess a bit better-than-even chance that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029, driven mainly by the probability Democrats retake the House in 2026 and would be politically willing to pursue impeachment.

I assess a meaningful but not high chance that the Supreme Court will overturn nationwide marriage equality before 2029 — my independent probability is 18%. Overturning requires a clean vehicle plus five votes and is politically costly, but the post‑Dobbs Court has shown willingness to revisit substantive‑due‑process precedents.

I assess a 22% probability that Extended's token will have an FDV above $800M one day after launch, reflecting significant uncertainty around whether a launch occurs by the deadline and whether the tokenomics, exchange listings, and market demand will support such a high valuation.

Independent assessment: extremely unlikely. I assign a 3% chance that the United States will *acquire any part of Canada* before 2029, with most plausible paths being tiny, voluntary land transfers or legally complex provincial secession — both highly improbable in the timeframe.

China overtaking the U.S. in nominal GDP by 1 Jan 2030 is possible but unlikely; I assess about a 10% chance based on the 2023 starting gap, realistic nominal growth and exchange‑rate scenarios, and downside risk from China’s structural headwinds.

I assess a roughly coin‑flip but slightly favorable chance that NYC’s July 2027 population will be up by between 0.01% and 0.99% relative to July 2025 — my independent estimate: 47%.

I assess a **58%** chance the Chicago pro football team will relocate to a new location in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 regular season — I view Illinois as the slightly favored outcome, but the race is close given active Indiana negotiations and legislative uncertainty.

**Independent assessment:** I assign a 10% probability that Trump will be impeached and then removed from office before his term ends — impeachment is materially possible, but *removal by the Senate* remains an unlikely, high-bar outcome.

I assign a 30% independent probability that USAID will be fully eliminated during Trump's term; elimination is plausible politically but faces substantial legal, congressional, and operational barriers and definitional ambiguity that make it unlikely.

I assign a 10% probability that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026; the market-implied probability is extremely low, but there remains a non-negligible tail risk from large inflows or macro easing that could push price that high in the remaining six and a half months of 2026.

Trump has publicly announced Jay Clayton as his nominee and pushed for Senate confirmation; I assess a high but not certain chance he becomes DNI because confirmation, withdrawal, or a last-minute change remain possible.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (~10%) that total federal outlays will be lower by at least $250B at some point before 2028; large domestic cuts are plausible but likely offset (or overwhelmed) by big proposed defense increases and structural drivers of spending.

I assess a 15% probability that Marine Le Pen will win the 2027 French presidential election; her party's durable base and potential opportunity from a fragmented non-RN field provide upside, but the two-round system and historical anti-RN coalitions make victory unlikely.

I assess a 30% probability that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 on any date through June 30, 2026, reflecting a modest chance of rapid recovery but substantial downside risk from persistent security and commercial friction.

I assess a moderately better-than-even chance (about 63%) that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 on at least one date by July 31, 2026, driven by historically high baseline traffic and the short window needed to hit the threshold but moderated by ongoing regional security and insurance risks.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (~12%) that the Department of Education will be fully eliminated by Jan 20, 2029 — abolition is legally possible but politically and administratively difficult, making it an unlikely outcome in normal political conditions.

I assess a high probability that S&P will assign SpaceX to Communication Services (Alternative Carriers); the Bloomberg/S&P signal is strong but not flawless, so I put the independent chance at 90%.

I assess a high likelihood that Acting Secretary Keith Sonderling will be Trump's next Secretary of Labor — my independent estimate is that Sonderling is the frontrunner with roughly a 62% chance, with Riley Moore the main outside challenger and the remaining names longshots.

I assess the New York Yankees have about a 20% chance to win the 2026 World Series, higher than the market-implied 13.5% but still recognizing substantial competition and postseason variance.

I assess a 9% probability that a CONCACAF nation (most likely the United States) wins the 2026 World Cup, driven by host advantage and improved regional quality but constrained by historical trends and superior depth of European and South American powers.

I assess a 78% probability that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 on at least one date by December 31, 2026, reflecting a strong market consensus tempered by ongoing geopolitical downside risks.

I assess a roughly 30% chance that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $66,000 on the 1-minute candle at 12:00 ET on June 17, reflecting Bitcoin's high short-term volatility but the low market-implied probability and the difficulty of hitting a precise minute-level threshold.

I assess a 37% chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel’s next prime minister after the scheduled October 27, 2026 election, reflecting his proven political resilience but substantial headwinds from legal issues, coalition fragmentation, and potential shifts in public sentiment.

Given Andy Burnham's high regional profile, prior parliamentary experience, and Makerfield's strong Labour lean, I assess a substantially better-than-even chance that Burnham will win the by-election, with moderate downside risk from turnout, local resentment about parachuting, or an unusual third-party surge.

I assess a 90% chance South Korea will advance to the Round of 32 at the 2026 World Cup, reflecting their status as one of Asia's strongest teams plus the favorable 48-team/three-team-group format, tempered by the higher variance of two-match group mini-tournaments and the possibility of a difficult draw or early shocks.

I assess a 20% probability that George Russell will be the 2026 F1 Drivers' Champion, slightly above the market-implied 17% because he has the talent and team infrastructure to contend if Mercedes returns to outright title form, but significant hurdles make him an underdog relative to likely favorites.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability (12%) that the United States will commence a military offensive to establish control over any portion of Iran by December 31, 2026, because political, logistical, and strategic barriers are high while sudden escalatory triggers remain possible.

Given the market price and the balance of macro risks, I assess roughly a three-in-four chance that the Fed will not cut rates in 2026; persistent inflationary pressures, a tight labor market, and the Fed's cautious bias make zero cuts the most likely outcome, but a significant downside shock or rapid disinflation could still force at least one cut.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Arkham will record an outflow from a wallet it labels as Satoshi during 2026, driven more by attribution or platform-labeling changes and rare operational events than by a credible expectation that Satoshi intentionally moves coins.

I estimate a 60% probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 19 will be above $64,000, slightly more bullish than the market-implied 56% because the short 5-day horizon favors momentum and transient spikes that can push the 1-minute close past the threshold.