Edges for Jun 13, 2026

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that S&P will assign SpaceX to Communication Services (18%) — more likely S&P will classify SpaceX in Industrials (Aerospace & Defense) given its rocket/manufacturing and defense business lines and recent independent assignments by Morningstar/CRSP.

Given two consecutive years (2025 and 2026) with >2,000 U.S. measles cases, it is overwhelmingly likely the 2025–2028 annual average will exceed the recent benchmark (~205/year). My independent probability for the "Yes" outcome (average >205) is 98%.

Independent assessment: the UK Prime Minister is a plausible candidate but is not the most likely first G7 leader to leave; I assign a 30% chance that the UK PM will be the first to depart office.

I assess a materially higher-than-market chance that the 2026 'Trump bull case' occurs: a confluence of softer-than-expected inflation, a Fed pivot toward rate cuts, and sustained geopolitical de‑escalation can re-ignite a durable risk rally—I assign this a 40% probability.

I assess a very low probability that Trump will "take back" the Panama Canal during his term — about 2% — because legal, diplomatic, economic, and military constraints make a successful reclamation extremely unlikely.

Independent assessment: I assign a 15% chance that Barron Trump will receive a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029. Absent any current federal legal exposure, a pardon is a low-probability tail event that rises if Barron becomes implicated in federal matters or if Trump chooses a preemptive, politically costly family pardon.

There are credible early signs of an intraparty backlash that could metastasize into a broader 'bear case' for Trump in 2026, but those signs are limited and reversible — I assess a 35% chance the bear case plays out across 2026.

Scottie Scheffler has a materially better than negligible chance to complete the career Grand Slam by the end of 2027 — I estimate roughly a one-in-four chance, concentrated in the 2026 and 2027 U.S. Opens.

A comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement before Jan 20, 2029 is unlikely; I estimate roughly an 18% chance given political, strategic, and negotiation barriers despite incentives for narrow bargains.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (18%) that the United States will formally agree to accept Iran's continued uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026, with the most likely outcome being no definitive US acceptance before the deadline.

I assess about a 10% chance the United States will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029. Large legal, political, and popular obstacles make a sovereignty transfer unlikely; only coercive or highly unconventional routes (leases, carve-outs, or forced bargaining) create a meaningful tail risk.

Todd Blanche is my clear favorite: I assess a 78% chance he becomes Trump’s next Attorney General, with the main remaining risk being Senate confirmation fights or last‑minute withdrawal.

Based on the available public evidence (which is currently nil) and general patterns for A-list social networks, I estimate a ~35% chance Blake Lively will attend Taylor Swift & Travis Kelce’s wedding on 2028-12-31 — meaning attendance is plausible but far from likely.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance the team will have completed a relocation to Indiana by opening day 2028 — the project is active and politically backed, but site selection, NFL approval, and realistic construction timelines make a 2028-ready move unlikely. My independent probability for Indiana by game 1 of 2028 is 30%.

Independent assessment: Andrew Oldham is very unlikely to be the next Supreme Court Justice by 20 Jan 2029; I estimate a ~4% chance based on lack of profile, lack of credible nomination signals, and historical patterns favoring seasoned appellate nominees.

I assign a 30% independent probability that USAID will be fully eliminated during Trump's term; elimination is plausible politically but faces substantial legal, congressional, and operational barriers and definitional ambiguity that make it unlikely.

I assess a low probability that the 25th Amendment will be invoked during Trump’s presidency — most likely it will remain unused because of extremely high procedural, political, and evidentiary barriers.

I assess an ~80% independent probability that Jay Clayton becomes Trump's next Director of National Intelligence before Jan 20, 2029 — high but meaningfully below the market's current 89% for Clayton.

I assess modest odds that at least one U.S. quarterly GDP print exceeds 5% annualized between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — plausible as a short-lived cyclical spike but unlikely as a sustained trend; my independent probability is 39%.

Given limited time (18 days) and the mixed incentives for rapid settlement, I assess a below-even chance that the United States and Iran will publicly announce a nuclear agreement by June 30, 2026, with the primary obstacles being negotiation complexity and domestic political constraints on both sides.

Independent assessment: low but non-negligible chance. I estimate a ~12% probability that Trump (during his term) will succeed in buying at least part of Greenland; the far stronger outcome is expanded U.S. access without a sovereign transfer.

I assess a modest but non-negligible chance (12%) that Donald Trump will win the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, reflecting his durable base and institutional advantages counterbalanced by legal exposure, aging, and party dynamics that strongly weigh against him.

Given limited time remaining and continued regional risk drivers, I assess a modest probability that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transits ≥60 by June 30, 2026, assigning a 28% chance of Yes.

Based on the qualitative evidence of active, multi-front democratic backsliding under the current administration and the relatively small absolute drop required on the Economist Democracy Index, I assess a high probability that the US will fall below 7.60 on the Economist's Democracy Index at least once between 2025 and 2028.

I assess a roughly coin‑flip but slightly favorable chance that NYC’s July 2027 population will be up by between 0.01% and 0.99% relative to July 2025 — my independent estimate: 47%.

**Independent assessment:** I assign a 10% probability that Trump will be impeached and then removed from office before his term ends — impeachment is materially possible, but *removal by the Senate* remains an unlikely, high-bar outcome.

I assess a low probability that President Trump will resign before his term ends; based on historical precedent, his incentives to stay, and the specific mechanics that would be required for a voluntary resignation, I assign a 12% chance of resignation before January 20, 2029.

Independent assessment: I estimate a low probability (10%) that the Department of Education will be legally abolished before Jan 20, 2029 — substantial dismantling is plausible, statutory elimination is unlikely.

Independent assessment: exceedingly unlikely — I assign a ~3% chance the U.S. will acquire any part of Canada before 2029. Current headlines show friction but no credible pathway to territorial transfer.

Based on the administration's consistent anti–high-skill-immigration posture and the recent court defeat of its primary restriction tool, I assess a low probability that President Trump will *expand* the H‑1B or high‑skill immigration program during his term.

Independent assessment: there is a meaningful but modest chance the Supreme Court will overturn Obergefell by 2029 — I estimate ~20% — because a conservative Court could take a properly framed vehicle, but substantial procedural, legal, and political barriers make reversal more likely to be avoided or narrowed than outright overturned.

I assess a 15% probability that Marine Le Pen will win the 2027 French presidential election, above the market-implied 6.5% but still reflecting substantial structural and political barriers that make a Le Pen presidency unlikely.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that Bitcoin will hit $200,000 by the end of 2026; I assign an 8% chance, higher than the market-implied ~2% but still reflecting the long odds and the large demand shock required.

I assess a low probability that the United States will commence a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of Iran before 2027, because the operational, political, and international barriers to a ground invasion are very high and plausible triggers for such an extreme action remain unlikely within the remaining calendar window.

I assess a 42% chance Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's next Prime Minister after the 2026 election, recognizing his strong organizational base and coalition-building skill but also substantial legal and coalition obstacles that make his path uncertain.

I assess a ~22% probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 17 will be above $66,000, reflecting a low-but-plausible chance given the short five-day horizon, typical BTC volatility, and market positioning.

Given the market price and the balance of macro risks, I assess roughly a three-in-four chance that the Fed will not cut rates in 2026; persistent inflationary pressures, a tight labor market, and the Fed's cautious bias make zero cuts the most likely outcome, but a significant downside shock or rapid disinflation could still force at least one cut.

I assess a low probability that Ethereum reaches $10,000 by December 31, 2026; the most likely outcome is a substantial rally short of that level driven by supply dynamics and adoption but constrained by macro, liquidity and regulatory limits.

I assess a 90% chance South Korea will advance to the Round of 32 at the 2026 World Cup, reflecting their status as one of Asia's strongest teams plus the favorable 48-team/three-team-group format, tempered by the higher variance of two-match group mini-tournaments and the possibility of a difficult draw or early shocks.

I assess a 78% probability that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 on at least one date by December 31, 2026, reflecting a strong market consensus tempered by ongoing geopolitical downside risks.

Scotland is the clear favorite to win this group-stage match based on squad quality, tactical organization, and historical strength versus CONCACAF qualifiers, but the probability is tempered by soccer's low-scoring variance and Haiti's physicality and set-piece threat.

The Atlanta Braves are the favorites to win the 2026 NL East but not a lock; I assess roughly a 78% probability based on franchise continuity, roster depth, and recent division dominance balanced against quality rivals and variance from injuries/trades.

I assess a small but non-negligible chance that a company will *explicitly* announce it has achieved AGI before July 1, 2026 — about 7%, driven mainly by PR-driven or opportunistic claims from smaller firms despite major labs' caution.

I assess a 10% probability that Propr will have an officially launched, actively tradable token by 11:59 PM ET on June 30, 2026, reflecting low market-implied odds but acknowledging a nonzero chance from quick DEX or OTC-to-public paths.

I estimate a 27% chance Scottie Scheffler wins the 2026 TOUR Championship, slightly above the market-implied 23% because his elite baseline skill and likely high FedEx Cup seeding materially boost his odds but are counterbalanced by a very strong, small field and one-week event variance.

I assess a 30% probability that Australia vs Türkiye ends in a draw, slightly above the market-implied 25.5% because group-stage caution and defensive organization increase draw chances, but Turkey's attacking upside and match incentives keep a decisive result more likely.

I assess that OpenAI is more likely than Anthropic to IPO first; my independent probability is 75% that OpenAI will list before Anthropic, driven by OpenAI's confidential S‑1 filing and explicit internal timing signal, though meaningful uncertainty remains.

I assess a low probability that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 — around an 18% chance — because China needs sustained, high nominal growth (or large RMB appreciation) while facing demographic and structural drags, and the U.S. has plausible upside from productivity gains.