Edges for Jun 15, 2026

Assuming the market's 'Yes' means the 2025–2028 annual average exceeds 1,000 reported measles cases per year, I assess a very high probability (95%) that the average will be above that threshold given two consecutive >2,000-year starts and durable drivers keeping incidence elevated.

Given the short time window and the historically episodic, crisis-driven nature of U.S.–Iran diplomacy, I assess a 62% probability that no qualifying in-person diplomatic meeting will occur by June 30, 2026.

Based on historical friendship patterns and how celebrity guest lists for close friends typically form, I assess a substantially greater than even chance that Blake Lively would attend a Taylor Swift–Travis Kelce wedding if it takes place — independent probability 65%.

Based on the recent news picture (no UK departure signals and active diplomacy from other leaders), I assess a moderate but not dominant chance that the UK Prime Minister will be the first G7 leader to leave office.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Barron Trump is granted a presidential pardon by Jan 21, 2029 — most plausibly via a preemptive or reactive pardon issued by Donald Trump if he regains the presidency; absent that, the chance is near zero.

Independent assessment: I estimate a 30% chance Israel and Saudi Arabia will normalize relations before Jan 20, 2029 — possible but unlikely absent a clear, rapid breakthrough on the Palestinian question or a major regional realignment.

Scottie Scheffler has a meaningful path to complete the career Grand Slam before 2028, but it is far from a longshot — my independent assessment is that he has a ~35% chance, considerably higher than the current market price of 6%.

Conditional but plausible — the full “Trump bull case” happening in 2026 is possible if a sequence of macro and geopolitical catalysts align, but that sequence is sufficiently uncertain that I assign a sub-50% chance.

I assess a very low probability that the United States will formally ‘take back’ the Panama Canal during Trump's term — it's a headline-level tail risk, not a realistic policy outcome.

I assess about a 25% chance that U.S. quarterly real GDP will exceed an annualized 5% in at least one quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — well below the market's near‑50/50 pricing.

I assess a roughly 35% chance that a credible "bear case" for Trump — a broadly damaging combination of economic pain, foreign-policy fallout, and legal/governance setbacks that meaningfully reduce his political standing in 2026 — will materialize before 2027.

I assess a low probability that Trump will negotiate and complete a new, comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement during his term — my estimate is 15% based on political constraints, strategic competition, and the required congressional buy-in.

Given the very short timeline, the political costs for Trump, and the absence of public negotiations, I assess a low probability that the United States will definitively accept Iran's continued uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026 (estimated probability 25%). A narrow path exists only if a rapid, high-value quid pro quo (e.g., large prisoner swaps, regional de-escalation, or verifiable caps) is brokered and presented as a politically defensible 'win.'

I assess a materially higher chance than the market: Elon Musk has a meaningful personal incentive, unique control of SpaceX, and plausible early windows for a crewed Mars flight, but age and mission risk are large constraints — my independent probability is 34%.

I assess a very low probability that Trump will buy any part of Greenland during a presidential term that falls before 2029 — about 2% unconditional. Legally and politically the transaction is effectively infeasible; only extremely remote political/legal workarounds could produce a 'Yes'.

I assess a 20% probability that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, balancing his entrenched base and organizational advantages against substantial legal, health, and political headwinds that make his path difficult but not impossible.

I assess a 40% chance that OpenSea's token will have a fully diluted valuation above $1 billion one day after launch, balancing the brand's ability to generate speculative demand against regulatory, tokenomics, and market headwinds.

Given Curaçao's status as a clear underdog but the possibility that they will still produce a handful of on-target attempts, I assess a materially better-than-even chance that Manuel Neuer records two or more saves, at about 68%.

I judge it unlikely but plausible that USAID will be fully eliminated as a standalone statutory agency during Trump's term; my independent probability is 22%.

I assess a roughly 30% chance that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $66,000 on the 1-minute candle at 12:00 ET on June 17, reflecting Bitcoin's high short-term volatility but the low market-implied probability and the difficulty of hitting a precise minute-level threshold.

I assess a low probability that Justice Clarence Thomas will voluntarily resign during Trump's term — about 15% — because he has shown no indication of stepping down, historically long tenure, and strong incentives to remain unless forced by health or scandal.

Todd Blanche is the clear favorite after a formal nomination; I assess a high (78%) chance he will be Trump’s next Attorney General, with the remaining probability split among replacement, failed confirmation, or late changes favoring Zeldin, DeSantis, Pirro, or Dhillon.

I estimate a 60% probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 19 will be above $64,000, slightly more bullish than the market-implied 56% because the short 5-day horizon favors momentum and transient spikes that can push the 1-minute close past the threshold.

I assess a 38% chance that the DOJ obtains a winning antitrust judgment against Apple by 1 Jan 2030 — a plausible but still-disfavored outcome given legal hurdles and Apple's advantages in litigation and appeals.

Based on available reporting that OpenAI has confidentially filed and Anthropic has only recently listed paperwork, I assess OpenAI is more likely to IPO before Anthropic, but not a slam-dunk; I estimate a 65% probability that OpenAI will IPO first.

Independent assessment: low probability. Given legal, diplomatic, and political obstacles, I assign a 12% chance the U.S. will acquire any part of Greenland before Jan 21, 2029 — Trump rhetoric raises the risk but does not overcome near-certain barriers to transfer of territory.

I assess a very high probability that there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term — structural, legal, political, and timing obstacles make a sovereignty transfer highly unlikely.

I assess a **58%** chance the Chicago pro football team will relocate to a new location in Illinois by the first game of the 2028 regular season — I view Illinois as the slightly favored outcome, but the race is close given active Indiana negotiations and legislative uncertainty.

I assess a high but not-certain chance that Conor McGregor's next opponent will be Max Holloway and that McGregor will fight again soon; promotional material strongly points to Holloway but non-public confirmation and cancellation risk keep my confidence below full certainty.

I assess a bit better-than-even chance that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029, driven mainly by the probability Democrats retake the House in 2026 and would be politically willing to pursue impeachment.

I assess a roughly 18% chance that the 25th Amendment will be formally used during President Trump’s current term; the institutional bar is high and use is historically rare, but advanced age and medical/extraordinary-event tail risk keep a non-trivial probability.

China overtaking the U.S. in nominal GDP by 1 Jan 2030 is possible but unlikely; I assess about a 10% chance based on the 2023 starting gap, realistic nominal growth and exchange‑rate scenarios, and downside risk from China’s structural headwinds.

I assess a 37% chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel’s next prime minister after the scheduled October 27, 2026 election, reflecting his proven political resilience but substantial headwinds from legal issues, coalition fragmentation, and potential shifts in public sentiment.

Trump has publicly announced Jay Clayton as his nominee and pushed for Senate confirmation; I assess a high but not certain chance he becomes DNI because confirmation, withdrawal, or a last-minute change remain possible.

I assess IR Iran has a modest but clear edge to win this World Cup group-stage match against New Zealand, reflecting stronger squad depth and higher international standing balanced against single-game variance and travel-related uncertainties.

Given the low legal threshold for a qualifying signature, strong mutual incentives to reach a deal, and the high market-implied probability, I assess a materially above‑50% chance that the United States and Iran will sign a written agreement by June 22, 2026, but domestic political obstacles and last‑minute technical disputes make the outcome uncertain.

I assess a low probability that President Trump will voluntarily resign before 2029-01-21—resignation is historically rare and would require exceptional, broadly bipartisan, and sudden pressures; I place the independent chance at 12%.

Independent assessment: extremely unlikely. I assign a 3% chance that the United States will *acquire any part of Canada* before 2029, with most plausible paths being tiny, voluntary land transfers or legally complex provincial secession — both highly improbable in the timeframe.

I estimate a low probability that Trump will sign 400–449 Executive Orders in a single second term — the required pace (~100–112 EOs/year) is far above modern norms and unlikely to be sustained.

I assign a 10% probability that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026; the market-implied probability is extremely low, but there remains a non-negligible tail risk from large inflows or macro easing that could push price that high in the remaining six and a half months of 2026.

I assess a meaningful but not high chance that the Supreme Court will overturn nationwide marriage equality before 2029 — my independent probability is 18%. Overturning requires a clean vehicle plus five votes and is politically costly, but the post‑Dobbs Court has shown willingness to revisit substantive‑due‑process precedents.

I assess a 15% probability that Marine Le Pen will win the 2027 French presidential election; her party's durable base and potential opportunity from a fragmented non-RN field provide upside, but the two-round system and historical anti-RN coalitions make victory unlikely.

I assess an 87% probability that South Korea will advance to the knockout stages at the 2026 World Cup; the expanded 48-team format (groups of three with two teams advancing) materially raises the baseline, and South Korea's international strength and qualifying pedigree make advancement likely, though single-match variance and potential tough draws keep meaningful downside risk.

Given Sinner's age, game profile and status as a consistent top-level contender on hard courts, he is a live favorite for the 2026 US Open but faces a deep, volatile field and two-week physical demands, so I assign a 30% chance he wins.

I assess the New York Yankees have about a 20% chance to win the 2026 World Series, higher than the market-implied 13.5% but still recognizing substantial competition and postseason variance.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Arkham will record an outflow from a wallet it labels as Satoshi during 2026, driven more by attribution or platform-labeling changes and rare operational events than by a credible expectation that Satoshi intentionally moves coins.

I assess a 35% chance that IMF Portwatch will report a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 on any date through June 30, 2026; the probability is below even odds because a sustained weekly rebound is possible but faces meaningful operational and security headwinds.

I assess Saudi Arabia has an 18% chance to beat Uruguay on 2026-06-15, slightly above the market-implied 12.5% because of variance and historical upset potential, but still a clear underdog given Uruguay's greater squad quality and tournament pedigree.

Given Mercedes' resources and Russell's proven pace but against the backdrop of recent Red Bull/Ferrari supremacy and intra-team competition with Lewis Hamilton, I assess Russell's chance to win the 2026 drivers' championship at 22%.

Given the competitive landscape of mid-2020s Formula 1 and the lack of concrete 2026-season data here, McLaren has a small but non-negligible chance to win the 2026 Constructors' Championship driven mainly by development pace and rivals' reliability or strategic failures.

Given Andy Burnham's high regional profile, prior parliamentary experience, and Makerfield's strong Labour lean, I assess a substantially better-than-even chance that Burnham will win the by-election, with moderate downside risk from turnout, local resentment about parachuting, or an unusual third-party surge.

I assess a modestly better-than-even (52%) chance that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute candle close at 12:00 ET on June 20 will be above $66,000, slightly higher than the market-implied ~47.5% probability based on current prices.

I assess a low but meaningful probability that Bitcoin will dip to $64,000 on June 15, primarily driven by typical intraday volatility and derivatives risk, but constrained by likely bid support and the market's current pricing of this tail event.