Edges for Jun 12, 2026

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that S&P will assign SpaceX to Communication Services (18%) — more likely S&P will classify SpaceX in Industrials (Aerospace & Defense) given its rocket/manufacturing and defense business lines and recent independent assignments by Morningstar/CRSP.

Given two consecutive years (2025 and 2026) with >2,000 U.S. measles cases, it is overwhelmingly likely the 2025–2028 annual average will exceed the recent benchmark (~205/year). My independent probability for the "Yes" outcome (average >205) is 98%.

I assess a ~42% chance Elon Musk will be a trillionaire on paper before 2027; the event is plausibly driven by a SpaceX valuation/IPO in the short window, but that outcome is far from certain and the market’s 95% pricing looks substantially overconfident.

Independent assessment: the UK Prime Minister is a plausible candidate but is not the most likely first G7 leader to leave; I assign a 30% chance that the UK PM will be the first to depart office.

Independent assessment: there is a meaningful but not dominant chance Elon Musk will personally visit Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — I estimate it at 45% based on SpaceX's trajectory, Musk's personal incentives, and lifespan/health uncertainty.

I assess a materially higher-than-market chance that the 2026 'Trump bull case' occurs: a confluence of softer-than-expected inflation, a Fed pivot toward rate cuts, and sustained geopolitical de‑escalation can re-ignite a durable risk rally—I assign this a 40% probability.

I assess a solid but not certain chance that Elon Musk will be the world’s first trillionaire before 2030 — SpaceX going public at ~ $1.75–$1.8T gives him a clear path, but execution, valuation slippage, dilution and macro risks keep this far from a sure thing.

I assess a low but non-zero chance that the U.S. will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029 — about an 8% probability — because legal, political, and timeline barriers make a sovereign transfer unlikely despite occasional high-profile talk.

I assess that South Korea has a strong, but not certain, chance to reach the Round of 32 at the 2026 World Cup; favorable tournament structure and a historically reliable national program make advancement likely, but the three-team group format and draw uncertainty keep the risk of elimination material.

I assess a low probability that the U.S. will "take back" the Panama Canal during Trump's term — this would most likely require treaty abrogation or a coercive seizure, both highly costly and unlikely. My independent probability: 10%.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that USAID will be formally eliminated during Trump's current term — about 22% — because abolition requires durable Congressional action or an unusually aggressive and sustained executive campaign that faces major legal, political and operational headwinds.

Given no public evidence of federal exposure for Barron and the heavy political cost of pardoning one’s child, I assess a low single‑digit-to‑low‑double‑digit chance; my independent probability is 18%.

I assess roughly a 42% independent chance that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 — materially lower than the current market price (Yes 61%), because impeachment requires specific political conditions that are not presently in evidence.

There are credible early signs of an intraparty backlash that could metastasize into a broader 'bear case' for Trump in 2026, but those signs are limited and reversible — I assess a 35% chance the bear case plays out across 2026.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance the team will have completed a relocation to Indiana by opening day 2028 — the project is active and politically backed, but site selection, NFL approval, and realistic construction timelines make a 2028-ready move unlikely. My independent probability for Indiana by game 1 of 2028 is 30%.

I assess a low probability that the 25th Amendment will be invoked during Trump’s presidency — most likely it will remain unused because of extremely high procedural, political, and evidentiary barriers.

I assess a low probability that Trump will complete a purchase of any portion of Greenland during his term — about 8% — because of strong Danish/Greenlandic resistance, legal barriers, and readily available alternatives (leases/agreements) that satisfy U.S. strategic goals without a sovereignty transfer.

I assess a strong but not certain chance that Predict.fun's token will have an FDV above $50M one day after launch, given the market's heavy betting, typical tokenomics choices that make $50M attainable, and the long time window before the deadline.

Todd Blanche is my clear favorite: I assess a 78% chance he becomes Trump’s next Attorney General, with the main remaining risk being Senate confirmation fights or last‑minute withdrawal.

The likelihood of no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term is very high — I assess a 95% chance that Greenland will not be acquired.

I assess a low probability that Trump will be both impeached by the House and removed by the Senate before his term ends — around 5% — because removal requires an unusually large bipartisan break that is historically rare.

I assess a 20% independent probability that Scottie Scheffler completes the career Grand Slam (by winning the U.S. Open) before 2028 — materially higher than the market's ~7% price.

Based on the available public evidence (which is currently nil) and general patterns for A-list social networks, I estimate a ~35% chance Blake Lively will attend Taylor Swift & Travis Kelce’s wedding on 2028-12-31 — meaning attendance is plausible but far from likely.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Trump will secure a new, comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement by Jan 20, 2029 — about 20% — because political, legislative, and national-security barriers make a full FTA unlikely despite active negotiations and tariff truces.

I assess a materially positive chance that a future Trump presidency will formally invoke the Insurrection Act before Jan 20, 2029 — I place the independent probability at 30%, higher than the current market's 15% Yes price.

I assess a 65% probability that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 at least once by December 31, 2026, because historical traffic levels and the high baseline of tanker/container movement make a temporary or partial recovery likely, while geopolitical tail risks keep the probability well below certainty.

I assess a modest but non-negligible chance (12%) that Donald Trump will win the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, reflecting his durable base and institutional advantages counterbalanced by legal exposure, aging, and party dynamics that strongly weigh against him.

Given limited time (18 days) and the mixed incentives for rapid settlement, I assess a below-even chance that the United States and Iran will publicly announce a nuclear agreement by June 30, 2026, with the primary obstacles being negotiation complexity and domestic political constraints on both sides.

Based on the qualitative evidence of active, multi-front democratic backsliding under the current administration and the relatively small absolute drop required on the Economist Democracy Index, I assess a high probability that the US will fall below 7.60 on the Economist's Democracy Index at least once between 2025 and 2028.

I assess a 40% chance that the Fed will raise the upper bound of the federal funds rate at least once during 2026, reflecting a modest probability that inflation or labor data force a renewed tightening but a larger chance that disinflation and macro risks keep policy on hold or lower.

I assess an ~80% independent probability that Jay Clayton becomes Trump's next Director of National Intelligence before Jan 20, 2029 — high but meaningfully below the market's current 89% for Clayton.

I assess a low probability that President Trump will resign before his term ends; based on historical precedent, his incentives to stay, and the specific mechanics that would be required for a voluntary resignation, I assign a 12% chance of resignation before January 20, 2029.

Independent assessment: exceedingly unlikely — I assign a ~3% chance the U.S. will acquire any part of Canada before 2029. Current headlines show friction but no credible pathway to territorial transfer.

Based on the administration's consistent anti–high-skill-immigration posture and the recent court defeat of its primary restriction tool, I assess a low probability that President Trump will *expand* the H‑1B or high‑skill immigration program during his term.

I assess a 42% chance Clarence Thomas will voluntarily resign (retire) during President Trump's 2025–2029 term — a meaningful but not-favored outcome driven by age and ideological incentives balanced by Thomas's historical reluctance to leave the Court.

I assess a 15% probability that Marine Le Pen will win the 2027 French presidential election, above the market-implied 6.5% but still reflecting substantial structural and political barriers that make a Le Pen presidency unlikely.

I assess a 40% probability that no qualifying in-person diplomatic meeting between the United States and Iran will occur by June 30, 2026, reflecting the short time window and logistical/publicity hurdles but acknowledging active backchannels and strong incentives for mediated contact.

I assess a 30% chance that OpenSea's token will show a fully diluted valuation above $1 billion one day after a public, tradable launch, reflecting meaningful upside from brand recognition and potential airdrop-driven demand but significant downside from tokenomics, market conditions, and regulatory risk.

I assess a low probability that the United States will commence a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of Iran before 2027, because the operational, political, and international barriers to a ground invasion are very high and plausible triggers for such an extreme action remain unlikely within the remaining calendar window.

Given the short time window and the need for a sustained 7-day surge in transit calls, I assess a low but non-negligible probability that IMF Portwatch will record a 7-day moving average of at least 60 by June 30, 2026.

I assess a 42% chance Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's next Prime Minister after the 2026 election, recognizing his strong organizational base and coalition-building skill but also substantial legal and coalition obstacles that make his path uncertain.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that Bitcoin will hit $200,000 by the end of 2026; I assign an 8% chance, higher than the market-implied ~2% but still reflecting the long odds and the large demand shock required.

I assess a high probability that NVIDIA will be the largest company by market cap on June 30, 2026, driven by sustained AI-driven revenue growth and strong investor momentum, but material macro or sector shocks could still flip the outcome.

I assess a 72% chance Andy Burnham will win the 2026 Makerfield by-election, reflecting a high probability he will stand and strong Labour fundamentals in the seat tempered by the non-trivial chance he chooses not to run or faces local backlash.

I assess roughly an 18% chance Extended's token will show an FDV above $800M one day after launch, reflecting modest upside from tokenomics and brand recognition but significant execution, market, and deadline risks.

I estimate an 18% chance that George Russell will win the 2026 F1 Drivers' Championship, reflecting a measurable but limited upside above the current market price driven by Mercedes' resources and Russell's consistency balanced against likely continued competition from Red Bull and other top teams.

I assess a low probability that Ethereum reaches $10,000 by December 31, 2026; the most likely outcome is a substantial rally short of that level driven by supply dynamics and adoption but constrained by macro, liquidity and regulatory limits.

I assess that OpenAI is more likely than Anthropic to IPO first; my independent probability is 75% that OpenAI will list before Anthropic, driven by OpenAI's confidential S‑1 filing and explicit internal timing signal, though meaningful uncertainty remains.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (18%) that the United States will formally agree to accept Iran's continued uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026, with the most likely outcome being no definitive US acceptance before the deadline.