Edges for Jun 11, 2026

I assess a ~42% chance Elon Musk will be a trillionaire on paper before 2027; the event is plausibly driven by a SpaceX valuation/IPO in the short window, but that outcome is far from certain and the market’s 95% pricing looks substantially overconfident.

Independent assessment: there is a meaningful but not dominant chance Elon Musk will personally visit Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — I estimate it at 45% based on SpaceX's trajectory, Musk's personal incentives, and lifespan/health uncertainty.

I assess a materially better-than-market chance that the 2026 “Trump” bull case will occur — not a coinflip majority outcome, but a substantial ~38% probability driven by a plausible Fed pivot, continued AI-driven earnings upside, and residual momentum in risk assets.

I assess a low but non-zero chance that the U.S. will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029 — about an 8% probability — because legal, political, and timeline barriers make a sovereign transfer unlikely despite occasional high-profile talk.

I assess a solid but not certain chance that Elon Musk will be the world’s first trillionaire before 2030 — SpaceX going public at ~ $1.75–$1.8T gives him a clear path, but execution, valuation slippage, dilution and macro risks keep this far from a sure thing.

Given no public evidence of federal exposure for Barron and the heavy political cost of pardoning one’s child, I assess a low single‑digit-to‑low‑double‑digit chance; my independent probability is 18%.

I assess a low probability that the U.S. will "take back" the Panama Canal during Trump's term — this would most likely require treaty abrogation or a coercive seizure, both highly costly and unlikely. My independent probability: 10%.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that USAID will be formally eliminated during Trump's current term — about 22% — because abolition requires durable Congressional action or an unusually aggressive and sustained executive campaign that faces major legal, political and operational headwinds.

I assess a meaningful but minority chance (~35%) that the 2026 ‘bear case’ for Trump — a politically debilitating combination of legal defeats, institutional pushback, and coalition fracture — will materialize within the year.

I assess a ~22% chance that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, reflecting his persistent base strength but significant legal, institutional, and electability headwinds that make his path unlikely but plausible.

I assess a 22% probability that Bitcoin will hit $200,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting a low-but-plausible tail outcome driven by outsized institutional inflows and macro easing but constrained by large market-cap requirements and regulatory and liquidity risks.

I estimate a 40% chance Blake Lively will attend Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce's wedding. Public information is thin and speculative, but a nontrivial chance exists because the event is high-profile and likely to include many A-list invites despite current rumor framing.

I assess a 70% independent probability that the U.S. will fall below 7.60 on The Economist’s Democracy Index sometime during 2025–2028 under the Trump administration — significant risk but not a near-certainty.

I assess roughly a 42% independent chance that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 — materially lower than the current market price (Yes 61%), because impeachment requires specific political conditions that are not presently in evidence.

I assess a low probability that Trump will complete a purchase of any portion of Greenland during his term — about 8% — because of strong Danish/Greenlandic resistance, legal barriers, and readily available alternatives (leases/agreements) that satisfy U.S. strategic goals without a sovereignty transfer.

I assess a very high probability (97%) that at least one of OpenAI or Anthropic will complete an IPO before 2040 — both firms have confidential S‑1 activity, strong incentives to list, and the time horizon is long.

Given Blanche's formal nomination and his incumbency as acting Attorney General, I assign a high probability that Todd Blanche will be confirmed and be Trump's next Attorney General, though confirmation risks and political shocks leave nontrivial downside.

I assess a materially positive chance that a future Trump presidency will formally invoke the Insurrection Act before Jan 20, 2029 — I place the independent probability at 30%, higher than the current market's 15% Yes price.

Resignation remains unlikely; based on historical precedent, Trump's temperament, and institutional constraints I assess a low chance he will voluntarily resign before Jan 20, 2029.

The likelihood of no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term is very high — I assess a 95% chance that Greenland will not be acquired.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Trump will secure a new, comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement by Jan 20, 2029 — about 20% — because political, legislative, and national-security barriers make a full FTA unlikely despite active negotiations and tariff truces.

I assess a low probability that Trump will be both impeached by the House and removed by the Senate before his term ends — around 5% — because removal requires an unusually large bipartisan break that is historically rare.

I assess a 20% independent probability that Scottie Scheffler completes the career Grand Slam (by winning the U.S. Open) before 2028 — materially higher than the market's ~7% price.

I assess a 40% chance that the Fed will raise the upper bound of the federal funds rate at least once during 2026, reflecting a modest probability that inflation or labor data force a renewed tightening but a larger chance that disinflation and macro risks keep policy on hold or lower.

Multiple reputable outlets and UFC promotion list Max Holloway vs. Conor McGregor as the UFC 329 main event on July 11, 2026; I view it as very likely McGregor will fight next and that Holloway is the overwhelmingly probable opponent.

Marine Le Pen has a real but limited path to victory in the 2027 French presidential election; structural barriers of the two-round system and historical runoff dynamics keep her probability well below even odds, but party organization, voter realignment, and fragmentation of the anti-RN field create non-negligible upside.

I assess Pete Hoekstra as the single most likely nominee but not the frontrunner to the degree the market implies; my independent estimate gives Hoekstra ~30% with a more even spread among other plausible Trump-aligned, Senate-acceptable picks.

I assess an extremely low probability that the United States will formally acquire any part of Canada before 2029 — the most plausible paths are extraordinarily remote and require breakdowns in normal political, legal, and diplomatic constraints.

I assess a high probability that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 15 will be above $54,000, but I discount near-certainty to account for minute-level microstructure risks and exchange-specific outages or manipulation.

I assess a 65% probability that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls at or above 60 at least once by December 31, 2026, because historical traffic levels and the high baseline of tanker/container movement make a temporary or partial recovery likely, while geopolitical tail risks keep the probability well below certainty.

I estimate a modestly below-even chance that any quarter from Q1 2025–Q4 2028 posts >5% quarterly GDP; my independent assessment is 42% Yes — the hurdle is high and requires an unusually large rebound, stimulus, or investment surge.

I assess an 18% independent probability that the 25th Amendment will be invoked at least once during Trump’s presidency (2025–2029) in any section (temporary transfer, involuntary declaration, or replacement). This reflects routine medical-transfer risk plus a small chance of an extraordinary political/medical crisis, weighed against very high institutional hurdles and historical precedent.

Based on public reporting of a serious Hammond, Indiana plan and strong political support but material timetable and approval risks, I assess a **60%** chance the Chicago pro football team will relocate to Indiana by the first game of the 2028 regular season.

I estimate a modest but not dominant chance that NYC’s population will be *slightly* higher (0.01–0.99%) in July 2027 vs July 2025; the evidence is weak and noisy, so the most likely outcome is a near-zero net change but with a slight tilt to a small increase.

I assess an 8% probability that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by December 31, 2026, reflecting a low but non-negligible tail outcome that requires a sustained, large-capital crypto bull market and favorable on-chain and institutional flows.

Given Makerfield's strong Labour history, Andy Burnham's high profile in Greater Manchester, and current market sentiment, I assess a high but not certain probability that Burnham will win the 2026 Makerfield by-election.

Market prices strongly favor Yes, but the one-minute resolution and Binance-specific risks mean a non-negligible chance of a No; I estimate a 92% probability that BTC/USDT close at 12:00 ET on June 16 will be above $54,000.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance (18%) that the United States will commence a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of Iran before 2027, with market-implied probability close to that level but slightly adjusted for low strategic appetite and high escalation costs.

I assess a high probability that NVIDIA will be the largest company by market cap on June 30, 2026, driven by sustained AI-driven revenue growth and strong investor momentum, but material macro or sector shocks could still flip the outcome.

I assess a high probability that the FOMC will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at its July 2026 meeting, but there are credible upside and downside surprises that make a nontrivial tail risk that the Committee will change rates.

I assess a 46% chance that Joshua Van will be the UFC Flyweight champion on December 31, 2026, reflecting meaningful upside if he continues to progress but also substantial uncertainty from injuries, matchmaking, and division volatility.

I estimate a ~15% independent probability that the Supreme Court will fully overturn Obergefell (national marriage-equality precedent) before 2029; the market price (~7%) looks meaningfully lower than my independent view and may be underpricing latent risk.

I estimate an 18% chance that George Russell will win the 2026 F1 Drivers' Championship, reflecting a measurable but limited upside above the current market price driven by Mercedes' resources and Russell's consistency balanced against likely continued competition from Red Bull and other top teams.

I assess a 15% probability that a US official will definitively state that extraterrestrial life or technology exists by December 31, 2026; this reflects continued institutional caution and evidentiary hurdles with a modest chance of an unexpected, decisive disclosure event.

I assess a roughly three-in-four chance that the Fed will not cut rates at all in 2026, reflecting continued emphasis on price stability, a still-tight labor market, and the market's strong current conviction against cuts while acknowledging nontrivial tail risks that could force at least one cut.

Given the short time window and the need for a sustained 7-day surge in transit calls, I assess a low but non-negligible probability that IMF Portwatch will record a 7-day moving average of at least 60 by June 30, 2026.

Given the tight timeline, deep mutual mistrust, and technical/verification hurdles, I assess a low but non-negligible chance of a formal US–Iran nuclear agreement by June 30, 2026, with limited upside for a last-minute breakthrough.

I assess a modestly higher-than-market probability that both teams will score, at 56%, based on team attacking tendencies, expected lineups prioritizing goals, and the market's near-even pricing which underestimates the offensive strengths and defensive vulnerabilities of both sides.

Assuming the binary asks whether the 4‑year average (2025–2028) will be at least 2,000 measles cases/year, I judge **~35%** probability that the average will meet or exceed 2,000 — meaning continued high transmission through 2027–28 is possible but not the most likely path.