Edges for Sep 9, 2026

Anthropic appears materially more likely to go public before OpenAI, based on the latest reporting and each company’s stated timing. I assign only a low probability that OpenAI is first, because the newer evidence points to Anthropic’s nearer-term listing window and OpenAI’s delay into 2027.

Starbucks is very likely to clear 41,800 global stores sometime in 2026. The market appears to be pricing in a much slower store-opening cadence than Starbucks has historically maintained.

No Fed rate cuts in 2026 is plausible, but I still think it is less likely than not because the Fed has historically been willing to ease when labor data soften or inflation cools enough. The market’s very high Yes price looks too confident, but the official projection path and the remaining months still leave meaningful room for one cut.

Barron Trump receiving a pardon before 2029 looks very unlikely based on the available information. The main reason is simple: there is no sign he needs one, and a pardon requires an underlying offense or at least a credible legal predicament to resolve.

Beef is very likely to finish with 0 or 1 Primetime Emmy wins, and the strongest read is that it has no realistic path to multiple wins. The eligibility window alone makes a low-count outcome the default unless there is an unusual late-cycle nomination or a special eligibility wrinkle.

I think the chance that 2026 meaningfully qualifies as a Trump bear-case year is much higher than the market implies, because the year already contains multiple fresh legal setbacks and the pattern is accumulating rather than isolated. My estimate is 41%, with the main uncertainty being how broadly the market defines “bear case.”

The market is pricing in a high chance of a LAPTOP airdrop by September 30, but the absence of fresh confirming news makes that level of confidence look somewhat aggressive. I think Yes is more likely than not, but not as likely as the current price implies.

Robinhood has a credible path to clear 30.2 million funded customers in 2026, because it is already at 28.4 million and only needs roughly 1.8 million more from a business that is still adding users. I make this a meaningfully higher-probability outcome than the market, though not a lock because growth could slow from the recent pace.

Scottie Scheffler has a meaningful but not overwhelming chance to complete the career Grand Slam by early 2028. I make this substantially higher than the market, because one remaining major title is a realistic target for a player of his caliber over the next two seasons.

Tyler Robinson is more likely than not to be convicted of some homicide offense before the deadline, but the path is still uncertain because the case is only at the pretrial stage and a conviction is not guaranteed. I estimate a moderate chance of Yes, above the current market price but still short of a lock.

Impeachment is plausible but far from likely enough to justify a two-thirds-plus probability. I estimate the chance at about 42%, with the market appearing meaningfully overconfident on the Yes side.

The market is already very close to the threshold, and the broader rate backdrop still supports another push higher. I think Yes is more likely than the current price implies, with the main caveat being that the level is now close enough that mean reversion or a quiet month could leave it just short.

I think a move to a new Illinois location by the first game of the 2028 season is meaningfully less likely than the market implies. The timeline still looks too compressed, and the more likely near-term path is either an Indiana landing spot or continued delay beyond 2028.

I put the chance of Trump actually taking back the Panama Canal at very low, around 6%. The idea is politically dramatic but faces overwhelming legal, diplomatic, and military obstacles, so the market looks far too optimistic on Yes.

I think the market is pricing in a low chance of conviction, but the odds of at least one murder conviction by the end of 2026 are meaningfully higher than 5%. A fair estimate is 24%, driven by the seriousness of the charges and the possibility that the case reaches a jury before year-end, though mental-health defenses and procedural delays still make acquittal or no resolution more likely.

I think the chance Donald Trump posts a clear qualifying reference to $LAPTOP by September 30 is low, but not negligible. The market’s 11% implied probability looks a bit high for a niche memecoin mention, though Trump’s habit of posting unusual political and crypto-adjacent content leaves a small tail risk.

Anthropic is still a strong favorite to lead this specific text-arena leaderboard at the end of September, but the current price looks somewhat aggressive given how quickly top models can shuffle. I would price Yes below the market, though still as the most likely outcome.

The market’s Yes price already implies a fairly strong expectation that no qualifying U.S. strike on Iran occurred during the relevant window. With no recent reporting indicating an executed U.S. air or missile strike directly hitting Iranian territory, I lean Yes at roughly the current market level, slightly above it because the rule set is narrow and the absence of confirmed qualifying action matters a lot.

I think a 2027 recession is meaningfully more likely than the market suggests, but still not the most likely outcome. My independent estimate is 39% Yes, reflecting a real but not dominant chance that slower growth, tighter credit, or a policy shock tips the economy into contraction.

I think the market is somewhat underestimating the chance of a rebound, but the threshold is still far from guaranteed to be met. A reasonable estimate is a 33% chance that the Strait of Hormuz 7-day traffic average reaches 60 or higher by year-end.

I estimate a low single-digit to high single-digit chance that Trump voluntarily resigns before the end of the term. The market’s 22% Yes price looks too high for an event that has almost never happened in modern U.S. history and would require Trump to give up power on his own.

I think 2035 US real GDP growth is most likely to land in the 1.6% to 2.5% range, with a meaningful chance of slightly stronger growth. The market looks too pessimistic on the middle-of-the-road outcomes and gives too much weight to sub-1% or negative growth.

United Russia remains the clear favorite to gain the most seats in the 2026 Russian parliamentary election. In Russia’s heavily managed political environment, the ruling party has strong institutional advantages and is far more likely than any rival to finish first on seat gains.

I estimate a low chance that the U.S. acquires any part of Greenland before 2029, because the political and legal barriers to any sovereignty transfer remain enormous and there is no visible deal path. Continued U.S. interest raises the odds above zero, but not by much.

An official Tesla-SpaceX merger announcement by year-end looks very unlikely. The market’s 16.5% implied probability appears too high given the lack of strategic necessity, the extreme governance and valuation complexity, and the regulatory hurdles involved.

Alito is a plausible retirement candidate because of age and persistent speculation, but there is still no concrete signal that he plans to step down. I put the chance of a resignation during Trump’s term slightly below the market, at 52%.

The chance that Trump successfully buys even part of Greenland during this term is very low, but not literally zero. I would put it around 7%, well below the current market price.

I put the chance of no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term at 95%. The most plausible outcome is continued rhetoric, negotiation noise, or some limited cooperation arrangement, not an actual sovereign transfer.

I think the chance of a $250 billion government-spending decline before 2028 is meaningfully higher than the market implies, but still far from likely. My independent estimate is 18%, driven by the possibility of abrupt rescissions, shutdown-related compression, or a statistical year-over-year drop from a high baseline rather than durable policy restraint.

A Democratic sweep of both chambers is plausible but still not the base case. The House looks slightly favorable for Democrats, while the Senate remains the main hurdle and keeps this outcome below a coin flip despite a serious path.

NVIDIA is a strong favorite to finish 2026 as the world’s largest company by market cap, but the lead is not so secure that the outcome should be priced near certainty. The main question is whether its valuation can stay ahead of Microsoft and Apple through year-end without a major earnings miss, sector rotation, or broad market drawdown.

Trump has shown a real willingness to brandish the Insurrection Act, and the odds are meaningfully higher than the market implies, but formal invocation still requires a sufficiently serious domestic unrest trigger and would invite immediate legal and political blowback. My independent estimate is 26% for Yes.

Bayern Munich remains the clear favorite to win the 2026-27 Bundesliga, but the market may be pricing in a bit too much certainty for a league title still two seasons away. I think the chance of Yes is high, though not as extreme as the current price implies.

Boeing can clear 640 deliveries if 737 MAX production and 787 output both stay healthy through the year, but the bar is still high. I think the true probability is modestly below the market and closer to the high-50s than the mid-60s.

New Hampshire is still the most likely state to go first, but the market looks a bit too confident given ongoing Democratic calendar flexibility and the possibility of a South Carolina-led opening sequence. I make Yes about 78%, not 88%.

The market is pricing in an extremely high chance that LAPTOP launches on Base, and that seems plausible if the project has already signaled Base as its intended venue. Still, with no fresh news or on-chain confirmation in hand, I would leave a small but meaningful chance that the eventual launch happens elsewhere or does not occur at all.

JD Vance is very likely to repeat America-focused language throughout a convention speech, and the 20-plus threshold is plausible if the remarks are a standard-length keynote. Still, without the exact script, there is some chance he keeps the wording varied enough to fall short.

I estimate a moderate chance that Variational launches with an FDV above $800M one day after launch, but the absence of concrete launch and tokenomics details keeps this below the market price. The current market is leaning optimistic, and I think the true probability is somewhat lower than implied.

Andrew Oldham is a credible front-runner if the next vacancy arises under a Republican president, but the race is still highly contingent on timing, retirements, and White House preferences. I put his independent chance modestly above the market at 29%.

I think the Yes outcome is still unlikely, but not as close to impossible as the market implies. Because the question is broad and undefined in the prompt, I put meaningful weight on a partial or noisy definition of the “bull case” being realized in 2026 rather than requiring an extreme, all-or-nothing outcome.

I think the market is slightly overpricing the chance that Astra’s first Arena appearance clears 1480. OpenAI is capable of producing a top-tier model, but a debut score at or above this threshold is still a fairly demanding bar and the timing/labeling conditions add meaningful uncertainty.

I lean slightly toward the Fed leaving rates unchanged in December 2027, but not as strongly as the market does. With that much time horizon, the most likely setup is a policy regime that has settled into either modest easing or a late-cycle adjustment, which makes a no-change outcome plausible but far from dominant.

I գնահատimate a moderate chance that USAID is eliminated or functionally dismantled during Trump’s term, but not a majority chance. The legal and congressional barriers are real, so my independent probability is 34%.

I think the market is somewhat overconfident on a near-term launch. Doge-1 has had a long history of delays, so I put the chance of a successful launch by June 30, 2027 below the current price, though still meaningfully above a coin flip because there is ample time left.

A direct Zelenskyy-Putin meeting before January 1, 2027 is still unlikely, but not as close to impossible as the market suggests. I make it roughly a 15% event, with the main path being a negotiated ceasefire or high-level summit pushed by external pressure.

A direct U.S. invasion of Iran before the end of 2026 remains possible but still very unlikely. The market price looks somewhat high for such an extreme escalation, and I would put the chance of Yes at 8%.

The market is pricing in a strong chance that Predict.fun’s token launches with enough attention and liquidity to keep FDV above $50M the next day. I agree the threshold is more likely than not, but the absence of concrete launch details leaves some meaningful downside risk, so my estimate is a bit below the current implied level.

Ulf Kristersson still has a credible path to remain prime minister, but he is not the favorite because the center-left opposition has often been ahead in polling and the governing bloc needs a good final election result plus workable parliamentary support. I would put his chances meaningfully below 50%, but somewhat above the current market price given the recent tightening race.

The market is already pricing this as a very high-probability Yes, and that is broadly reasonable if the token launches with any meaningful attention or supply structure. Still, the main uncertainty is whether the token launches at all and whether the one-day-after-launch price and fully diluted supply remain above the threshold.

Anthropic looks like the leading candidate, but the market is probably pricing in too much certainty for a leaderboard that can change quickly in a few weeks. I would make Yes more likely than not, but not as high as the current price suggests.

I think the market is still a bit too optimistic on a formal OpenAI AGI announcement by year-end. The main obstacle is not only technical uncertainty, but also the strong incentive for OpenAI to avoid using an irreversible, high-stakes label unless the evidence and internal consensus are overwhelming.

The chance that the United States acquires any part of Canada before 2029 is extremely low. Even with heightened geopolitical noise, this would require a dramatic and highly unlikely break in allied relations, constitutional process, and international order.

It is overwhelmingly unlikely that Trump will actually end the Federal Reserve before January 20, 2029. He could pressure, weaken, or restructure parts of it, but outright abolition would require extraordinary political and legal alignment that is not realistic under normal conditions.

China overtaking the US in GDP by 2030 looks unlikely, mainly because the US still has stronger trend growth, better demographics, and a much more flexible policy and financial system. I would put the chance at 12%, slightly below the market price.

Trump is still more likely than not to keep H-1B policy restrictive, but a limited expansion is plausible if business groups and labor-market shortages create enough pressure. I put the chance of some meaningful expansion at 28%, modestly above the market.

My independent view is that Elon Musk visiting Mars personally before Aug. 1, 2099 is very unlikely, with the main drag being simple biology: he would need to remain alive and capable into an age far beyond normal human lifespan. The mission architecture also remains unresolved, and current Mars plans are about uncrewed or cargo flights, not a confirmed human trip for Musk himself.

NVIDIA has a real but modest path to becoming the third-largest company by year-end 2026, but the market is pricing in a much lower chance for good reasons. The most likely outcome is that it remains among the top few companies without landing exactly in third place on the final close.

A Fed hike in 2026 still looks more likely than not, but not as close to certain as the market price suggests. The path to a hike depends on inflation or financial conditions reaccelerating enough to push the Fed to tighten before year-end.

Base launching a token by June 30, 2027 is plausible but still more likely than not to remain unfulfilled. The current market’s 37.5% Yes price looks a bit optimistic given Base’s long-standing reluctance to introduce a token and the fact that a tradable token would require both strategic and regulatory confidence.

This looks like a plausible but far-from-certain booking that still has meaningful execution risk. I rate Yes at 38%, modestly above the market price because an announced October performance is evidence of intent, but the combination of travel, scheduling, and reputational friction makes completion less likely than not.