How many executive orders will Trump sign in his second term?
I estimate a 28% chance that President Trump will sign between 400 and 449 Executive Orders in his second term — plausible given an early flurry and a governing style that favors EO use, but still an ambitious total relative to modern presidential norms.
Analysis
**Stage 1 — Blind analysis (ignore current market prices):**
- Historical baseline: modern presidents (post-1980) typically sign on the order of a few dozen to low‑hundreds of executive orders over a four‑year term. Reaching 400+ implies averaging roughly 100+ EOs per year (≈8–9 per month), which is well above recent norms for postwar presidents.
- Observed activity in this term: a heavy Day‑1 flurry (7+ EOs on Jan 20, 2025) plus multiple additional EOs in 2026 (notably on cryptographic security and regenerative agriculture). That demonstrates both administrative intent and the capacity to sign multiple orders quickly.
- Important definitional point: the market question asks whether the President will *sign* between 400 and 449 EOs. Legal challenges or injunctions do not undo the fact an EO was signed. A signed EO that is later enjoined still increases the signed‑EO count. Many traders conflate successful implementation with counting; for this contract, the act of signing is the relevant event.
- Trajectory assessment: if the administration keeps a high pace similar to the opening burst (a sustained combination of sweeping policy EOs and numerous narrow, targeted EOs), 400 is achievable. However, sustaining a 100+/year pace requires systematic, persistent use of EOs well beyond typical practice and would likely require the administration to prioritize signing many narrow, technical EOs in addition to headline items.
- Judge blocks and litigation: while injunctions slow implementation and may tamp down future EO enthusiasm, they do not erase already signed orders. Litigation may modestly reduce the rate of future signings if the White House becomes more cautious, but it may also encourage duplication (sign, litigate, sign alternative version) which would raise the signed count.
- My independent judgment: balancing an unusually active start and administration style against historical rates and likely friction, I assign a **28%** probability that total signed EOs will fall in the 400–449 band by Jan 20, 2029.
**Stage 2 — Market calibration (compare to current market prices):**
- Market price for 400–449 is **17%**. My independent 28% estimate is meaningfully higher. Possible reasons market is lower: - Traders may be conflating legal viability and policy effect with the plain counting of signed EOs; they see blocked orders and assume they won't be 'counted' or that litigation chills further signing. - Large parts of the market appear to be distributing probability across many high buckets (350–549) and not concentrating on a single band; that can depress individual-bin probabilities even when the overall belief in a high‑EO outcome is elevated. - Risk aversion and anchoring to modern historical EO rates lead many traders to under‑weight sustained high output scenarios.
- Conversely, there are plausible reasons the market might be correct or even conservative in the opposite direction: - Practical constraints (White House bandwidth, staff, administrative drafting resources, and political cost) could limit the frequency of legitimate EOs over time. - If the administration shifts to other vehicles (regulations, memos, proclamations counted differently) the count of formal EOs could remain lower.
- My read: the market is *slightly underpricing* the 400–449 bucket. The count is not the same as legal survival; because signed but blocked orders still count, the administration needs only to sign a large number of orders (not necessarily get them upheld) to reach the threshold. That favors a higher probability than the market currently implies.
- Trading implication: if you accept my premise that signed orders (even if later enjoined) count and that the administration will sustain a higher‑than‑historical cadence, buying the 400–449 bucket is a plausible value play against the market's 17% price.
Arguments
For
- Strong front‑loaded start (7+ EOs on inauguration day) shows the administration is willing to sign many orders quickly.
- Signed but later‑enjoined EOs still count toward the raw signed total — legal blocks do not reverse the signature tally.
- Policy agenda is broad and confrontational in areas (immigration, national security, regulatory rollbacks) that admit many discrete EOs rather than a single statute.
- The administration could deliberately use multiple narrow EOs and frequent revisions to inflate the signed count even if many are litigated or revised later.
Against
- To reach 400 EOs requires an unusually high sustained pace (~100/year), which exceeds modern presidential norms and strains drafting capacity.
- Frequent litigation and public backlash could slow or discourage the continued issuance of EOs, especially after early legal losses.
- Some policy needs can be addressed via memos, proclamations, regulations, or agency actions that are not counted as Executive Orders, reducing signed‑EO totals.
- Political turnover, shifting priorities, or external crises could reprioritize administration bandwidth away from signing many EOs.
Key drivers
- Administration's appetite for executive action (willingness to use EOs instead of legislation)
- Sustained cadence after initial flurry — whether early momentum continues into a steady stream of orders
- Legal environment and rate of injunctions (affects willingness to reissue or revise EOs)
- Operational capacity to draft and roll out many narrow EOs (staffing, agencies' cooperation)
Risk factors
- Historical precedent: modern presidents rarely approach 400 EOs in a single four‑year term
- Political and reputational costs that could curb the pace of signings
- Administrative constraints (drafters, agency review) that make high monthly EO throughput difficult
- Market misinterpretation risk: conflating 'signed' with 'effective' — traders who assume blocked orders don't count may price the market differently
Scenarios
Best case
The White House pursues a deliberate strategy of frequent EO use: continuing a high monthly cadence, issuing many narrow technical orders and reissued variants when courts intervene. Signed but enjoined orders are still counted, pushing the total above 400 and likely into the 400–449 or 450–499 band by Jan 2029.
Most likely
The administration maintains above‑normal EO activity relative to recent presidents but not an extreme cadence. Some orders are litigated, some revised, and many are narrow. The final signed total clusters in the 300–399 range, with a meaningful tail into 350–449; 400–449 is plausible but not the modal outcome.
Worst case
Litigation, political backlash, and internal capacity limits sharply curb EO use after the first year. The administration shifts to other instruments (regulatory, legislative attempts, memos) or slows signings. Total signed EOs stays well below 300 by Jan 2029.
Outcomes
| Outcome | AI | MKT |
|---|---|---|
| Between 400 and 449 | 28% | 17% |
| Between 350 and 399 | 24% | 13% |
| Between 450 and 499 | 12% | 10% |
| Between 500 and 549 | 6% | 10% |
| Below 300 | 30% | 8% |
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