Edges for Jun 25, 2026

I assess a better-than-even chance that the "bear case" for Donald Trump will materialize in 2026: legal, regulatory, and institutional pressures make a materially bad year more likely than markets currently price.

Independent assessment: very unlikely — I estimate an 8% chance Barron Trump receives a presidential pardon before Jan 21, 2029, because there is no present legal basis and the political cost of pardoning a child is extremely high, though not impossible if circumstances change.

Keith Sonderling is overwhelmingly likely to be the correct answer — he assumed the office on April 20, 2026 and is effectively the Department of Labor Secretary; I assign ~96% probability that he is Trump's next Secretary of Labor as defined by this market.

**Independent assessment:** I assess a ~60% chance the 25th Amendment will be used at least once during President Trump's term — most likely via a voluntary, temporary Section 3 transfer for routine medical care rather than a Section 4 removal attempt.

I assess an independent probability of 1% that Trump will "take back the Panama Canal" during his term — rhetorically possible but practically and legally vanishingly unlikely.

Independent assessment: ~0% — the question, as written (average measles cases during a 'Trump Administration' from 2025–2028), is unresolvable because Donald Trump is not serving a 2025–2028 administration; a Yes outcome is effectively impossible under ordinary resolution rules.

Despite market odds, I assess a materially higher chance that Elon Musk will personally visit Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — primarily because a crewed Mars capability is plausibly achievable on a timescale when Musk is still able and motivated to go.

Independent estimate: Scottie Scheffler has a meaningful (roughly 30%) chance to complete the Career Grand Slam before 2028, driven by two remaining U.S. Open opportunities (June 2026 in progress and June 2027 at Pebble Beach) and his elite, sustained form.

I assess a low probability that USAID will be fully eliminated during Trump's term; I put the independent chance at 15% based on statutory, political, and institutional constraints even while recognizing paths that could severely weaken or absorb the agency.

I assess a 32% probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $64,000 on the 1-minute candle at 12:00 ET on June 27, reflecting slightly higher odds than the market-implied 30.5% because short-term volatility and microstructure effects give a modest edge to price spikes, but no dominant catalyst pushes this above coin-flip levels.

I assess a 28% chance that U.S. quarterly real GDP will exceed 5% in at least one quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — possible but still unlikely given historical rarity and the scale of shock required.

Given Messi's age, role, and the strong pool of competing scorers, I assess a relatively low probability that he will finish as the 2026 World Cup top goalscorer, lower than the market-implied 37% and estimated here at 18%.

I assess a 25% chance that the 2026 'Trump bull case' materializes — a plausible but still-difficult path that requires earnings breadth beyond tech, stabilization of the AI/tech sell-off, and favorable policy or energy developments that restore investor confidence.

Independent assessment: Andrew Oldham is extremely unlikely to be the next Supreme Court justice; I assign a 2% chance based on his lack of appellate pedigree, public consideration, and historical nomination patterns.

I assess a low probability that Trump will finalize a comprehensive new U.S.–China free trade agreement during his term — the political, security, and legislative obstacles are large and time-consuming, making a true FTA unlikely before Jan 20, 2029.

I assess a ~38% chance the DOJ obtains a substantive legal victory against Apple (a court ruling for DOJ on core monopolization claims that produces meaningful remedies) before 2030 — higher than current market odds but far from a coin flip.

Independent assessment: virtually certain (99%) that there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term; any market odds implying material chance of a purchase are mispricing confusion or edge-case scenarios.

Independent assessment: ~5% chance that Trump will buy at least part of Greenland during his term. Legal, political, and practical barriers make a purchase overwhelmingly unlikely; the market price of 20% appears to overstate the realistic tail risk.

I assess a very low independent probability (7%) that the United States will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029; the most likely outcome is continued U.S. strategic engagement without any transfer of territorial sovereignty.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that Justice Clarence Thomas will voluntarily resign during Trump's 2025–2029 term: my independent estimate is 22% (Yes).

I assess a modest but meaningful chance that Cap's token will sport an FDV above $500M one day after launch, driven by tokenomics choices and exchange listing decisions but constrained by regulatory and liquidity risks.

Given the economic importance of the Strait and the typical inelasticity of Persian Gulf exports, I assess a better-than-even chance that IMF Portwatch will record a 7-day moving average at or above 60 by July 31, 2026, with a probability of 62%. The balance reflects plausible near-term recovery drivers offset by persistent security and insurance-related frictions that slow a full traffic rebound.

I assess a low probability that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends; my independent estimate is 10%—resignation is a plausible tail outcome but unlikely given his incentives, party support, and historical precedent.

Independent assessment: modest chance (~30%) that NYC's net population change from July 2025–July 2027 falls in the narrow range -0.99% to 0% (a small decline or near-flat). Larger declines (>1%) are more likely given observed 2025–26 losses and continuing outmigration pressures.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Starbucks reports above 41,800 global stores in 2026 — my independent probability is 22% based on recent growth rates, China/India upside, and downside from maturity and economic headwinds.

I assess a 92% probability that South Korea will advance to the 2026 World Cup knockout stages, slightly below the market-implied 93.5% to account for single-match variance and tiebreaker risk despite strong underlying advantages.

I assess an 80% probability that GRVT's FDV will exceed $100M one day after launch, reflecting strong market conviction and the relative ease of surpassing a $100M FDV given common tokenomics, while accounting for nontrivial operational and price risks that could push the outcome to No.

**Independent assessment:** Virtually zero chance — I assign a 1% probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029. This allows for tiny, atypical legal or political edge cases while reflecting the overwhelming structural barriers to any sovereignty transfer.

I assess Marine Le Pen has a meaningful but still minority chance of winning the 2027 French presidency; I assign an 18% probability based on structural barriers to a far-right victory offset by plausible scenarios of fragmentation, poor turnout, and economic or security shocks that could boost her support.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican nomination; the market-implied probability is extremely small (≈2%), but structural advantages and uncertainty around rivals and legal outcomes keep the realistic probability higher.

I assess Jay Clayton is the most likely permanent DNI but not a lock; I assign him a 68% chance, with the remaining probability split among loyalists (Ratcliffe, Pulte), an alternative Trump pick (Aaron Lukas), and a low-probability Flynn comeback.

I assess a 72% probability that the Fed will not cut rates at any point in 2026, reflecting a modestly lower conviction than the market-implied ~80% but still a strong likelihood given likely inflation and labor dynamics and the Fed's demonstrated reluctance to ease prematurely.

Todd Blanche is the clear favorite and, in my independent assessment, has a high probability of becoming Trump's next Attorney General given his formal nomination and scheduled Senate hearings; I assign him a 76% chance.

I assign a 15% chance that the Department of Education will be legally eliminated before Jan 20, 2029. Abolition requires congressional repeal and faces major political, legal, and operational barriers, producing a low but non-negligible tail probability if extraordinary political alignment and maneuvers occur.

I assess a 56% independent chance that President Trump will be impeached by the House before Jan 20, 2029 — above 50% but lower than most current market aggregates, because impeachment probability is driven by the 2026 House outcome and subsequent political incentives, which I judge less certain than market consensus implies.

Market prices imply near-certainty, but accounting for short-term volatility, exchange-specific risks, and a six-day horizon I assess a high but not absolute probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on July 1 will be above $52,000.

Given the market-implied 90% Yes price and typical short-term persistence of crypto trends, I assess a strong but not certain chance that ETH will close above $1,600 on the Binance 1-minute candle at 12:00 ET on June 25.

I assess a low probability that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 — roughly 12% — because the current dollar-denominated gap is very large and would require implausibly fast nominal growth or dramatic currency revaluation over 2026–2030.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that total federal outlays will fall by $250 billion (nominal) at some point before 2028 — about 12% probability — because big, politically difficult reforms or a major fiscal shock would be required, but those remain possible.

Independent assessment: Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is *unlikely* to be the next Cabinet member to leave; I assign a 15% chance he is the next to go, with other more volatile, higher-visibility aides more likely to depart next.

I assess a modestly higher-than-market probability that China will initiate a military offensive to establish control over any part of Taiwan by the end of 2026, driven by political incentives and growing PLA capabilities but constrained by serious operational, deterrent, and cost barriers.

Given the market's strong pricing and the short six-day horizon, I assess a high probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $56,000 at the 1-minute 12:00 ET candle on June 30, but minute-level volatility and exchange-specific quirks keep the outcome from being certain.

Given Netanyahu's entrenched position in Israeli politics and coalition-building experience, I assign him a meaningful chance to return as Prime Minister after the October 2026 election, but legal exposure, coalition fragility, and dynamic security/economic conditions make that outcome less likely than not.

I assess the probability of a draw at 28%; the market-implied probability is 22.5% but I raise this marginally to account for tournament dynamics and the defensive solidity Türkiye can show against the typically attack-minded United States.

Conor McGregor is extremely likely to fight next — I assess a 98% chance he will compete next, and the most likely opponent is the officially scheduled Max Holloway rematch at UFC 329 on July 11, 2026.

I assess a low probability that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026, assigning roughly a 6% chance, because the market-implied probability is very low and the remaining time horizon is short relative to the size of the rally required, although low-probability tail events could push price that high.

Given the 7-day moving-average requirement and the short time left, a return to a Portwatch 7-day average >=60 by June 30 is unlikely but not impossible; I assess an 8% probability of a 'Yes' outcome.

I assign a low probability that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by December 31, 2026 — about 6% — because hitting $10k would require more than doubling ETH’s prior peak and depends on several strong, concurrent bullish macro and crypto-specific developments.

I assess Tunisia's chance of beating the Netherlands tomorrow at about 7%; the market price (3.65%) underprices the small but real upset tail while Netherlands remain clear favorites.