Who will be the next Prime Minister of Israel after the next election?
Given Netanyahu's entrenched position in Israeli politics and coalition-building experience, I assign him a meaningful chance to return as Prime Minister after the October 2026 election, but legal exposure, coalition fragility, and dynamic security/economic conditions make that outcome less likely than not.
Analysis
Netanyahu is historically the dominant individual actor in Israeli politics with deep organizational capacity inside Likud, a reliable right-wing and religious bloc that has repeatedly delivered him to power, and the experience to stitch disparate partners into a governing coalition; those structural advantages translate into a persistent baseline probability of winning the premiership even when public sentiment is weak. Even if he is not the sitting Prime Minister in mid-2026, his name recognition, fundraising networks, and control of a major party give him an outsized ability to shape the electoral field and to be the first ask when coalition talks begin.
Legal exposure is the single largest idiosyncratic constraint on Netanyahu's path back to the premiership: ongoing indictments and trials (and the potential for new charges) create both a legal risk and a political liability that opponents can exploit, while judicial rulings or plea outcomes between now and the election could materially change his electability or practical ability to serve after the vote. Historically Israel’s institutions have allowed indicted figures to run and serve, but a conviction, particularly if it includes custodial elements or an effective disqualification mechanism, would sharply reduce his odds and could produce rapid realignments among right-wing partners.
Coalition arithmetic matters more than raw vote share in Israel’s parliamentary system, and here Netanyahu benefits from a relatively cohesive bloc of religious-nationalist parties that frequently prefer him to unknown alternatives; however, those parties also exact high policy and ministerial costs, and fractious personal dynamics inside the right can produce defections or motivate alternative right-wing leaders to form post-election coalitions without him. External shocks — major security incidents, an upsurge of violence, or a tangible economic downturn — could either bolster Netanyahu by consolidating security-focused voters or crater his coalition prospects if they increase public demand for change.
Market-implied probability (Yes ~35%) signals that participants see Netanyahu as an underdog but far from impossible; after weighing structural advantages, legal overhang, coalition fragility, and the large role of contingent events in Israeli politics, I set a somewhat higher independent probability at 40 percent, reflecting his baseline organizational advantage but tempered by significant near-term risks that make a return far from a foregone conclusion.
Arguments
For
- Long incumbency and name recognition give Netanyahu an enduring baseline vote and first-mover advantage in coalition talks.
- Strong ties to religious and nationalist parties increase the practical likelihood he can be the coalition choice for Prime Minister.
- Experienced campaign infrastructure and donor networks allow rapid mobilization and message discipline close to the election.
- Security credentials and a narrative of experience can attract undecided voters during times of heightened risk perception.
- Likelihood of opposition fragmentation raises the probability that no single alternative can unambiguously replace him.
Against
- Ongoing criminal prosecutions create legal and reputational hurdles that opponents can exploit and which could lead to disqualification.
- Public fatigue and protest movements against his leadership reduce the ceiling of his electoral support compared with earlier peaks.
- Coalition partners demand high concessions, making long-term agreeability harder and opening paths for alternatives to assemble a majority.
- A unified centrist or anti-Netanyahu bloc could form a post-election coalition without him even if his party remains large.
- Unforeseen crises or scandals between now and the election could rapidly erode his advantage and trigger defections.
Key drivers
- Netanyahu’s control of Likud and ability to mobilize a disciplined voter base will determine his baseline vote share.
- The arithmetic and stability of the right-wing and religious parties will decide whether a coalition can be formed around him.
- Outcomes or developments in his legal cases between now and the election could materially alter his eligibility and public support.
- Security events or crises close to the election can swing undecided voters toward a perceived experienced leader or away from the incumbent if blamed.
- Voter turnout patterns, especially among secular centrist and Arab voters, will shape whether opposition blocs can overcome the right.
- Economic performance—cost of living, housing, employment—will affect voters’ appetite for continuity versus change.
Risk factors
- A major conviction or legal ruling that effectively prevents him from serving would eliminate his chances.
- A credible right-wing alternative leader consolidating anti-Netanyahu votes could produce a No outcome even if his bloc wins many seats.
- A severe security or economic collapse that voters directly blame on his political network could erode his coalition partners’ support.
- Fragmentation within Likud or defections by senior allies during negotiations could prevent him from assembling a majority.
- Unexpected early election timing or pre-election realignments could advantage opponents and reduce Netanyahu’s bargaining room.
Scenarios
Best case
Netanyahu enters the campaign as either the sitting Prime Minister or the undisputed leader of a cohesive right-religious bloc, avoids damaging legal rulings, benefits from a security-focused electorate, wins sufficient seats, and successfully negotiates a coalition to be sworn in as Prime Minister after the October 2026 election.
Most likely
Netanyahu remains a leading figure who attracts a strong plurality of right-wing voters but faces enough legal pressure, coalition instability, or opposition coordination that he falls short of being able to form a stable coalition, resulting in a different individual becoming Prime Minister after the election.
Worst case
Material legal developments (a conviction, disqualifying ruling, or incarceration) or a major political collapse lead to him being sidelined, right-wing partners coalesce around an alternative leader, or political deadlock prevents any prime minister from being sworn before the deadline, producing either a different Prime Minister or an Other resolution.
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