Edges for Jun 19, 2026

Given Starbucks' stated expansion plan, the Q2 2026 U.S. store count, and plausible China growth, I assess a better-than-even chance that total global stores will exceed 41,800 in 2026 — despite the market strongly favoring No.

Assuming 'Yes' means the average annual U.S. measles cases during 2025–2028 exceeds 1,000, I assess a ~72% chance that the average will be above that threshold, driven by the large 2026 surge and persistent immunity gaps that make further large outbreaks likely.

I assess that the UK Prime Minister (Keir Starmer) is the most likely of the five listed G7 leaders to be the first to leave office, but not as overwhelmingly as the market currently prices — my independent probability is 52%.

I assess a roughly 42% chance that the 'bull case for Trump' — meaning U.S. markets and the economy remain broadly resilient and equities sustain their rally through 2026 — will occur; momentum and corporate fundamentals make it plausible, but tightening, trade friction, and geopolitical shocks make it far from certain.

Given the absence of any known federal exposure for Barron Trump and historical norms against pardoning family, I assess a low probability that he will be pardoned before Jan 21, 2029 — about 12%.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance the team relocates to a new Illinois site by the first game of the 2028 season — the legislative, construction, and approval timelines make an in-Illinois move by 2028 unlikely relative to an Indiana outcome.

Given historical Iranian behavior and the strong baseline incentive to retain enrichment capacity, but accounting for the market's high price and the contract's broad definition that counts even temporary pledges, I assess a 30% probability that Iran will publicly agree to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026.

I assess a low probability (8%) that the United States will "take back" the Panama Canal during Trump's term; current reporting shows strong rhetoric but no credible legal, diplomatic, or operational pathway to a successful transfer of control.

I assess a 40% independent probability that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029. The 2026 Supreme Court immunity ruling and political consolidation after the April 2026 assassination attempt reduce the baseline likelihood, but structural and political tail-risks keep the chance material.

Independent assessment: **40%** chance Blake Lively attends Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce's Dec 31, 2028 wedding. Evidence is thin and speculative, but social/professional overlap and the high-profile nature of the event make attendance plausibly common enough to warrant a materially higher probability than the market currently implies.

I assess a modestly better-than-even 53% probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $64,000 on the 1-minute candle at 12:00 ET on June 23, reflecting a slight bullish edge over the market-implied ~50.5% but acknowledging high short-term uncertainty and microstructure risk.

**Independent assessment:** Very unlikely — I estimate a ~5% chance that Trump (or the U.S. under his direct initiative) will complete a purchase of Greenland during his term.

I assign a low probability (~20%) that Trump will complete a new, comprehensive US–China free trade agreement (FTA) by Jan 20, 2029 — limited trade pacts are plausible, but a broad FTA is unlikely given political and strategic barriers.

I assess a very high probability (94%) that at least one of OpenAI or Anthropic will have completed an IPO before 2040 — Anthropic is the likelier near-term candidate, OpenAI is plausible but structurally more complicated.

Independent assessment: a meaningful but not likely 'bear year' — I assign ~30% probability that 2026 produces a true bear-case collapse for Trump (major legal/political/economic setbacks that substantially weaken him).

Scottie Scheffler is a strong candidate to complete the career grand slam, but given the U.S. Open's volatility and two-year window, I assess a significantly higher chance than the market: about 23% that he wins a U.S. Open in 2026 or 2027.

I assess a substantially higher chance than the market price but still a longshot: about an 18% probability that Donald Trump will be the Republican nominee in 2028, driven by his base strength and name recognition but constrained by legal exposure, age, and the party's incentive to coalesce around an alternative.

I assess a low probability that the United States will *acquire* any part of Greenland (interpreted as a formal transfer of territory or sovereign control) before 2029 — about 6% — because legal, political, and public-opinion barriers are high and Denmark/Greenland have strong incentives to resist. The market price (~21%) appears to overstate that likelihood, likely because of ambiguous wording and speculative trading tied to Trump-era rhetoric.

I assign a very high probability that there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term — the diplomatic, legal, and political barriers make a transfer of sovereignty highly unlikely within a single presidential term.

Given public statements, internal pressure from advisors, and a plausible trigger environment (large-scale unrest or perceived obstruction), I assign a meaningful but sub‑50% chance that President Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act during his term — my independent estimate: 30%.

I assess a very low probability (3%) that the United States will *acquire any sovereign part of Canada* before 2029; historical, legal, political, and military constraints make such an outcome extremely unlikely.

I assess a 65% probability that IMF Portwatch will publish a 7-day moving average of transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 on at least one date by July 31, 2026, reflecting a modestly higher-than-market conviction that shipping will recover within the short window given commercial incentives and data/revision rules, tempered by significant geopolitical downside risks.

I assess a relatively low probability that Justice Clarence Thomas will resign during President Trump's 2025–2029 term — about 22% — driven primarily by his past behavior and incentives to remain, with resignation most likely if a major health or ethics escalation occurs.

I assess a low but meaningful chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026, assigning a 12% probability due to the short time window, historical cycle timing, and macro/regulatory uncertainties counterbalanced by continued ETF/institutional demand and potential macro easing.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends; my best judgment is 15% independent probability, driven mainly by legal/health tail risks but countered by strong incentives to remain in office.

I estimate a 40% chance that U.S. real quarterly GDP will top 5% in at least one quarter between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 — plausible but not the baseline outcome given historical rarity and current macro constraints.

I assess a better-than-even chance that Israel and Saudi Arabia will formalize normalization by Jan 20, 2029 — likely driven by a U.S.-Saudi security bargain and pragmatic Saudi risk calculations despite Palestinian/domestic constraints.

I assess a modest but not negligible chance that USAID will be fully eliminated during Trump's term — about 30%. The administration's broad anti-agency pattern raises the risk, but concrete legal/political barriers and the absence of any explicit targeting of USAID in the available results make outright abolition unlikely.

I assess a ~35% chance that some part of the 25th Amendment will be used during Trump's current presidency — most likely a short, voluntary Section 3 medical transfer; an involuntary Section 4 removal remains unlikely.

I assess a substantially elevated chance that Robert F. Kennedy Jr. will be the next Cabinet member to depart — not a sure thing, but more likely than the current market price suggests due to sustained public pressure and policy friction with the administration.

I assess a low but not negligible chance that Trump will be both impeached by the House and removed by the Senate before his term ends; my independent probability is 12% based on political incentives, historical precedent, and the high constitutional threshold for removal.

I assess a low probability that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 — roughly a 12% chance — because closing the current nominal gap in the next ~3.5 years requires a combination of unusually large growth differentials, sizable RMB appreciation, or a major U.S. downturn.

I assess only a small chance that Trump will sign 400–449 EOs in a second term (10%). Historical pace and required issuance rates make the 400–449 band unlikely; the far likeliest outcome is that total EOs remain below 300.

I assess a 76% probability that Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 24 will be above $60,000, slightly below current market-implied odds due to short-horizon volatility and exchange-specific risks.

I assess a 12% probability that China will commence a military offensive aimed at seizing any administered territory of Taiwan by December 31, 2026, reflecting low but non-negligible risk driven by capability improvements and political tail risks balanced against strong deterrence and operational constraints.

I assess a high chance that South Korea will reach the Round of 32, estimating an 85% probability driven by favorable tournament format and South Korea's historically strong World Cup performances, tempered by the high variance of three-team groups and match-by-match volatility.

I assess a low likelihood that Congress will formally abolish the Department of Education before Jan 20, 2029 — about a 12% chance — despite aggressive administrative dismantling by the White House.

I assess a high probability that Binance's BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 25 will be above $54,000, but meaningful minute-level risks (flash crashes, exchange outages, or major news) keep the outcome from being effectively certain.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that Ether will reach $10,000 by the end of 2026, assigning a 7% chance based on required market conditions and plausible catalysts versus substantial macro and regulatory headwinds.

I assess a 9% probability that a CONCACAF nation (USA, Mexico, or Canada) wins the 2026 World Cup, a number above the current market-implied 3.6% but still reflecting long-standing competitive disadvantages versus top European and South American teams.

Given the short time window, need for a sustained 7-day rise in reported transits, and ongoing tail risks in the region, I assess a below-even chance that IMF Portwatch will record a 7-day moving average >= 60 by July 15, 2026.

I assess an 18% probability that George Russell will be the 2026 F1 Drivers' Champion, reflecting Mercedes and Russell's upside from development and consistency balanced against likely continued dominance from rivals and significant reliability/pace risks.

I assess a modest but real chance that Marine Le Pen could win in 2027, driven mainly by the absence of Macron and persistent RN strength, but significant structural and political barriers keep the probability low.

I assess a 43% chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will be sworn in as Israel's Prime Minister after the next election, reflecting his entrenched base and coalition-building ability offset by legal jeopardy, coalition fragility, and potential centrist consolidation.

I assess a 28% chance Shohei Ohtani leads MLB in runs in 2026: he has the talent and lineup context to be a top scorer, but two-way workload, PA limitations, and strong competition make him an underdog to finish first.

I assess a 20% chance Elon Musk personally visits Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — plausible given his control of SpaceX and stated intent, but strongly constrained by human mortality, mission risk, and corporate/regulatory pressures.