Edges for Jun 18, 2026

Assuming 'Yes' means the average annual U.S. measles cases during 2025–2028 exceeds 1,000, I assess a ~72% chance that the average will be above that threshold, driven by the large 2026 surge and persistent immunity gaps that make further large outbreaks likely.

I estimate a modest-to-strong chance SpaceX would be assigned to Communication Services (55%) if/when S&P makes a classification by 1 Jan 2028, but substantial uncertainty remains — Industrials is a plausible alternative and the current market (95% Yes) looks overconfident given the information gap.

Based on likely baseline store counts and plausible net openings in 2025–2026, I assess a ~45% chance Starbucks will report >41,800 global stores in its 2026 report — materially higher than the current market price (7% Yes).

I assess a roughly 42% chance that the 'bull case for Trump' — meaning U.S. markets and the economy remain broadly resilient and equities sustain their rally through 2026 — will occur; momentum and corporate fundamentals make it plausible, but tightening, trade friction, and geopolitical shocks make it far from certain.

Independent assessment: very unlikely — I assign an 8% chance that Barron Trump is granted a federal presidential pardon before 2029, because there is no known federal exposure and presidents rarely preemptively pardon private-family members absent clear legal necessity.

Independent view: Keith Sonderling is a plausible nominee but not the favorite; I assess a roughly 30% chance he becomes Secretary of Labor, with Rep. Riley Moore the single most likely pick given current reporting and political incentives.

I assess a 25% probability that Iran will publicly agree to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026; a temporary or narrowly framed pledge could happen, but structural incentives, domestic politics, and verification hurdles make a full public pledge unlikely within the short remaining window.

Given strong market-implied odds and heavy volume betting on a Yes outcome, I assess a high probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $64,000 at the 12:00 ET 1-minute candle on June 19, while acknowledging significant short-term microstructure and macro tail risks that justify a modest discount to the market price.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance the team relocates to a new Illinois site by the first game of the 2028 season — the legislative, construction, and approval timelines make an in-Illinois move by 2028 unlikely relative to an Indiana outcome.

I assess a very low chance — about 3% — that the United States will "take back" the Panama Canal during a Trump presidency through any direct seizure or effective transfer of sovereignty. The legal, diplomatic, economic, and operational barriers make outright reclamation highly implausible absent an extreme, low-probability catalyst.

I assess a 40% independent probability that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029. The 2026 Supreme Court immunity ruling and political consolidation after the April 2026 assassination attempt reduce the baseline likelihood, but structural and political tail-risks keep the chance material.

Independent assessment: **40%** chance Blake Lively attends Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce's Dec 31, 2028 wedding. Evidence is thin and speculative, but social/professional overlap and the high-profile nature of the event make attendance plausibly common enough to warrant a materially higher probability than the market currently implies.

I assess that the UK Prime Minister (Keir Starmer) is the most likely of the five listed G7 leaders to be the first to leave office, but not as overwhelmingly as the market currently prices — my independent probability is 52%.

I assess about a 26% chance Scottie Scheffler wins at least one U.S. Open before 2028 (i.e., completes the career grand slam by end of 2027). This is materially higher than the market's ~6% Yes price, which I view as underpricing his true odds across two attempts.

I assess a modest but meaningful chance that Opensea's FDV will exceed $1B one day after launch, primarily because FDV can be engineered via total supply and initial price, but substantial uncertainty around tokenomics, listing timing, and market appetite makes a sub-50% probability most likely.

Independent assessment: a meaningful but not likely 'bear year' — I assign ~30% probability that 2026 produces a true bear-case collapse for Trump (major legal/political/economic setbacks that substantially weaken him).

I assess about a 20% chance that Donald Trump will win the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, higher than the market price but well below even odds because his durable primary base and campaign infrastructure remain significant while legal exposure, age, and likely establishment resistance are substantial limiting factors.

**Independent assessment:** I assign a low probability that Trump will conclude a formal, bilateral U.S.–China free trade agreement (FTA) before Jan 20, 2029 — about **22%**. The balance of incentives, politics, and institutional constraints makes a full FTA unlikely, though limited tariff deals or branding of a smaller agreement as a 'trade deal' are more plausible.

I assess that Bitcoin has a meaningful but not high chance of reaching $200,000 by Dec 31, 2026; current market pricing is extremely negative so I put the probability substantially above the market-implied 2.15% but still below coin-flip odds.

I estimate an 18% chance that Clarence Thomas will resign during President Trump’s term (through 20 Jan 2029). I think controversy and impeachment chatter have inflated the market price (Yes = 33%), and the objective baseline — age, past behavior, incentives — implies a substantially lower probability.

After reviewing legal, political, and popular constraints, I assess a low chance the U.S. will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029 — roughly 8% — with most risk coming from rare constitutional/political disruptions or an unlikely negotiated transfer tied to Greenlandic independence or emergency geopolitics.

Given the imminence of the June 19 signing and the lack of public signals that Pakistan is a formal participant or guarantor, I assess that Shehbaz Sharif attending is possible but unlikely; I assign a 20% probability to his attendance.

I assess a below‑even chance that U.S. real quarterly GDP will exceed 5% in any quarter from Q1 2025–Q4 2028; I place the probability at 38% based on historical rarity, realistic policy impacts, and plausible but unlikely shock scenarios that could create a one‑off spike.

I assess a very low probability (3%) that the United States will *acquire any sovereign part of Canada* before 2029; historical, legal, political, and military constraints make such an outcome extremely unlikely.

I assess a low probability that Trump will successfully buy any sovereign portion of Greenland during his term — the idea is rhetorically alive but faces steep legal, political, and diplomatic barriers.

I assess a better-than-even chance that the United States will publicly accept continued Iranian uranium enrichment in some limited, monitored form by June 30, 2026, driven by diplomatic incentives and market expectations but constrained by strong regional and domestic opposition.

I assign a very high probability that there will be no U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump's term — the diplomatic, legal, and political barriers make a transfer of sovereignty highly unlikely within a single presidential term.

Independent assessment: I judge it unlikely that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends — my best estimate is a ~15% chance — because resignation runs counter to his historical behavior and political incentives; only exceptional legal, health, or political-catastrophe scenarios make it plausible.

I assess a 28% independent probability that USAID will be formally eliminated during President Trump's term; a functional transfer/downsizing is substantially more likely than a clean statutory abolition.

I assess a ~45% chance Saudi Arabia will publicly normalize relations with Israel before Jan 20, 2029 — plausible given active U.S. mediation and shared security incentives, but materially constrained by Saudi insistence on an irreversible Palestinian-state pathway and the still-unresolved Gaza war.

I assess a 90% probability that the Fed will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at the July 2026 FOMC meeting, a touch below the market-implied 92.5% to reflect tail risks from incoming data and shocks.

I estimate a low but non-negligible chance that aggregate government spending will fall by 250 (market unit) before 2028 — about 12% — because selective, real cuts are happening but are unlikely to overcome automatic entitlement and interest-driven growth within the window.

I assess a high chance that South Korea will reach the Round of 32, estimating an 85% probability driven by favorable tournament format and South Korea's historically strong World Cup performances, tempered by the high variance of three-team groups and match-by-match volatility.

I assess a low probability that Trump will be impeached and removed from office before his term ends; the independent probability is 10%—removal is possible only under a dramatic, bipartisan-triggering event, which current reporting does not show.

I assess a ~35% chance that some part of the 25th Amendment will be used during Trump's current presidency — most likely a short, voluntary Section 3 medical transfer; an involuntary Section 4 removal remains unlikely.

I assess a 30% probability that IMF Portwatch's 7-day moving average for Strait of Hormuz transit calls will reach or exceed 60 on any date by June 30, 2026, reflecting limited time left and substantial upside scenarios but meaningful downside risks from security, reporting, and structural shifts in routing.

I assign a 20% chance that the Supreme Court will explicitly overturn Obergefell (national marriage equality) by 2029. The risk is real given post-Dobbs precedent-skepticism, but constrained by statutory safeguards, public opinion, and institutional caution.

Marine Le Pen has a material but limited chance to win in 2027: structural barriers in France's two-round system and the historic anti-RN coalition keep her win probability low, but an open-field election, possible mainstream fragmentation, and adverse economic or security shocks could lift her odds significantly.

Andy Burnham is the clear favorite to win the Makerfield by-election given Labour's historical strength in the area and his high regional profile, but there are non-trivial risks (candidate selection, turnout, and protest voting) that keep the probability below near-certainty.

I assess a low probability that the Trump administration will *expand* high‑skill immigration (broadly increase H‑1B access or overall high‑skill inflows) during the remainder of the term — most policy moves point toward contraction and selective privileging of very high‑wage talent rather than expansion.

I assess a low probability that China will overtake U.S. nominal GDP by 2030 — roughly a 12% chance — because closing the current nominal gap in the next ~3.5 years requires a combination of unusually large growth differentials, sizable RMB appreciation, or a major U.S. downturn.

I assess a 12% probability that China will commence a military offensive aimed at seizing any administered territory of Taiwan by December 31, 2026, reflecting low but non-negligible risk driven by capability improvements and political tail risks balanced against strong deterrence and operational constraints.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that Cap's token will show an FDV above $500M one day after launch, most likely because a token could be launched with supply/price set to yield a high FDV but offset by regulatory, timing, and demand risks.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that Ether will reach $10,000 by the end of 2026, assigning a 7% chance based on required market conditions and plausible catalysts versus substantial macro and regulatory headwinds.

I assess a 9% probability that a CONCACAF nation (USA, Mexico, or Canada) wins the 2026 World Cup, a number above the current market-implied 3.6% but still reflecting long-standing competitive disadvantages versus top European and South American teams.

I assess a 20% chance Elon Musk personally visits Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — plausible given his control of SpaceX and stated intent, but strongly constrained by human mortality, mission risk, and corporate/regulatory pressures.

I assess an 18% probability that George Russell will be the 2026 F1 Drivers' Champion, reflecting Mercedes and Russell's upside from development and consistency balanced against likely continued dominance from rivals and significant reliability/pace risks.

I assess a 20% probability that no qualifying in-person US–Iran diplomatic meeting will occur by June 30, 2026, implying an 80% chance that at least one publicly reported diplomatic contact happens in the next ~13 days.

I assess about a 45% chance that Russia and Ukraine will announce a mutually agreed ceasefire by December 31, 2026, reflecting a roughly even chance driven by battlefield attrition and diplomatic pressure counterbalanced by strong incentives on both sides to continue fighting.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that Extended's token will show an FDV above $800M one day after launch, with most indicators favoring No due to the high threshold and timing/regulatory risks.

I assess a very low probability that Marco Rubio will sign an agreement that has both the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran as parties by July 31, 2026, because there are very few realistic paths by which a sitting senator with Rubio's political profile would be an official signatory to a bilateral U.S.–Iran agreement in the short remaining timeframe.