Edges for Jun 17, 2026

I assess a low probability (~6%) that SpaceX will be assigned to Communication Services; the preponderance of evidence (Morningstar/CRSP and GICS-style classification logic) points to an Industrials assignment.

Based on likely baseline store counts and plausible net openings in 2025–2026, I assess a ~45% chance Starbucks will report >41,800 global stores in its 2026 report — materially higher than the current market price (7% Yes).

I assess a 25% probability that Iran will publicly agree to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026; a temporary or narrowly framed pledge could happen, but structural incentives, domestic politics, and verification hurdles make a full public pledge unlikely within the short remaining window.

Independent assessment: very unlikely — I assign an 8% chance that Barron Trump is granted a federal presidential pardon before 2029, because there is no known federal exposure and presidents rarely preemptively pardon private-family members absent clear legal necessity.

I assess a ~38% independent chance that the specific ‘Trump bull case’ narrative (a continuation/renewal of the Trump-era rally driven by AI monetization, major IPOs and resilient macro/earnings) will materialize in 2026 — plausible but still the minority outcome.

I assess a substantially higher chance than the market that the bear case for Trump will materialize in 2026: the combination of sustained energy-driven price pressure, weakening consumer demand, and escalating legal/political conflict creates a realistic pathway to a politically damaging 'bad year.' My independent probability is 40%.

I assess a very low chance — about 3% — that the United States will "take back" the Panama Canal during a Trump presidency through any direct seizure or effective transfer of sovereignty. The legal, diplomatic, economic, and operational barriers make outright reclamation highly implausible absent an extreme, low-probability catalyst.

Independent view: Keith Sonderling is a plausible nominee but not the favorite; I assess a roughly 30% chance he becomes Secretary of Labor, with Rep. Riley Moore the single most likely pick given current reporting and political incentives.

Assuming the market threshold is an average above 2,000 measles cases per year across 2025–2028, I assess a **57%** probability that the Trump Administration’s four-year average will exceed 2,000 cases — slightly more likely than not given two consecutive years already above 2,000 and the persistence signals from public-health reporting.

I assess a 32% chance the Chicago pro football team will relocate to Hammond, Indiana by the first game of the 2028 regular season — Indiana is a serious option, but the evidence points to negotiation leverage and a tight, risky timeline rather than a completed relocation.

I assess about a 26% chance Scottie Scheffler wins at least one U.S. Open before 2028 (i.e., completes the career grand slam by end of 2027). This is materially higher than the market's ~6% Yes price, which I view as underpricing his true odds across two attempts.

**Independent assessment:** I assign a 45% probability that the 25th Amendment will be invoked at least once during Trump's presidency (through 2029-01-20). This mostly reflects a meaningful chance of a *Section 3* temporary transfer for a routine medical procedure or emergency; the probability of a *Section 4* removal is very small.

Based on reported disengagement, internal friction, and mounting public scrutiny, I assess that Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is the single most likely next Cabinet departure — but timing is uncertain. My independent probability for him being the next to leave is 50%.

Independent assessment: the UK Prime Minister (Keir Starmer) is the single most likely individual among the listed G7 contenders to be the next to leave office, but the probability is closer to a coin flip than the market implies. I assess a 51% chance the UK PM will be the first to leave among these named contenders.

I assess about a 20% chance that Donald Trump will win the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, higher than the market price but well below even odds because his durable primary base and campaign infrastructure remain significant while legal exposure, age, and likely establishment resistance are substantial limiting factors.

I assess a 45% chance that President Trump will be impeached by the House before Jan 20, 2029. This reflects the combination of his unusually high political/legal risk profile and the significant institutional and political barriers that make impeachment far from certain.

**Independent assessment:** I assign a low probability that Trump will conclude a formal, bilateral U.S.–China free trade agreement (FTA) before Jan 20, 2029 — about **22%**. The balance of incentives, politics, and institutional constraints makes a full FTA unlikely, though limited tariff deals or branding of a smaller agreement as a 'trade deal' are more plausible.

I assess that Bitcoin has a meaningful but not high chance of reaching $200,000 by Dec 31, 2026; current market pricing is extremely negative so I put the probability substantially above the market-implied 2.15% but still below coin-flip odds.

I assess a 20% probability that no qualifying in-person US–Iran diplomatic meeting will occur by June 30, 2026, implying an 80% chance that at least one publicly reported diplomatic contact happens in the next ~13 days.

I estimate an 18% chance that Clarence Thomas will resign during President Trump’s term (through 20 Jan 2029). I think controversy and impeachment chatter have inflated the market price (Yes = 33%), and the objective baseline — age, past behavior, incentives — implies a substantially lower probability.

After reviewing legal, political, and popular constraints, I assess a low chance the U.S. will acquire any part of Greenland before 2029 — roughly 8% — with most risk coming from rare constitutional/political disruptions or an unlikely negotiated transfer tied to Greenlandic independence or emergency geopolitics.

Extremely unlikely — I assess a ~2% independent probability that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029. Legal, political, and practical barriers make a transfer of Canadian sovereign territory very implausible in this window.

I assess a 40% chance that Hyperliquid will hit $100 by Dec 31, 2026, reflecting balanced market interest but significant uncertainty about tokenomics, required market-cap expansion, and macro/regulatory tail risks.

I assess a below‑even chance that U.S. real quarterly GDP will exceed 5% in any quarter from Q1 2025–Q4 2028; I place the probability at 38% based on historical rarity, realistic policy impacts, and plausible but unlikely shock scenarios that could create a one‑off spike.

Moderately unlikely but plausible: I assess a ~28% chance Trump will expand high-skill immigration/H-1B–style access during his term, via limited administrative fixes or a narrow legislative carve‑out rather than a large statutory cap increase.

Independent assessment: I judge it unlikely that President Trump will voluntarily resign before his term ends — my best estimate is a ~15% chance — because resignation runs counter to his historical behavior and political incentives; only exceptional legal, health, or political-catastrophe scenarios make it plausible.

I assess a 28% independent probability that USAID will be formally eliminated during President Trump's term; a functional transfer/downsizing is substantially more likely than a clean statutory abolition.

I assess a ~45% chance Saudi Arabia will publicly normalize relations with Israel before Jan 20, 2029 — plausible given active U.S. mediation and shared security incentives, but materially constrained by Saudi insistence on an irreversible Palestinian-state pathway and the still-unresolved Gaza war.

I assess a low probability that Trump will successfully buy any sovereign portion of Greenland during his term — the idea is rhetorically alive but faces steep legal, political, and diplomatic barriers.

I assess a better-than-even chance that the United States will publicly accept continued Iranian uranium enrichment in some limited, monitored form by June 30, 2026, driven by diplomatic incentives and market expectations but constrained by strong regional and domestic opposition.

I assess a low probability that Trump will be impeached and removed from office before his term ends; the independent probability is 10%—removal is possible only under a dramatic, bipartisan-triggering event, which current reporting does not show.

Independent assessment: OpenAI is more likely than Anthropic to be the first to complete an IPO before 2040, but the probability is not overwhelming — I assign a 68% chance that OpenAI will IPO before Anthropic by 2040.

I assess a 78% probability that o1's Fully Diluted Valuation will exceed $100M one day after launch, reflecting strong market-implied confidence and the tendency for exchange-related tokens to reach this scale at listing, offset by nontrivial execution, tokenomic, and regulatory risks.

Abolishing the Department of Education before Jan 20, 2029 is possible but unlikely — it faces large legal, legislative, and practical barriers; my independent probability is 12%.

I assess a 12% chance Blake Lively will attend Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce’s wedding. Recent, consistent reporting and the absence of supportive evidence point against her attendance, though the wedding’s size and secrecy leave a small non-zero possibility.

Independent assessment: China overtaking US nominal GDP by 2030 is possible but highly unlikely — I assign a 12% probability based on the current GDP gap, plausible growth and FX scenarios, and the short time horizon.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that total federal outlays will be reduced by at least $250B by end of 2027 (Yes probability ~10%). Targeted administrative cuts and program rescissions make small reductions plausible, but political and structural constraints make a large net decline unlikely.

Marine Le Pen has a material but limited chance to win in 2027: structural barriers in France's two-round system and the historic anti-RN coalition keep her win probability low, but an open-field election, possible mainstream fragmentation, and adverse economic or security shocks could lift her odds significantly.

I assess a 20% chance that China will commence a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of Taiwan by December 31, 2027, modestly above the market-implied 14.5% because PLA pressure operations, political incentives, and plausible lower-cost seizure options raise near-term risk even as major obstacles and deterrence remain substantial.

Given strong market-implied odds and heavy volume betting on a Yes outcome, I assess a high probability that Binance BTC/USDT will close above $64,000 at the 12:00 ET 1-minute candle on June 19, while acknowledging significant short-term microstructure and macro tail risks that justify a modest discount to the market price.

Given the market-implied near-certainty and typical liquidity on Binance for BTC/USDT, I assess a high probability that the Binance 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 22 will be above $60,000, but I discount for tail risks like flash crashes, exchange outages, and minute-level microstructure manipulation.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that Extended's token will show an FDV above $800M one day after launch, with most indicators favoring No due to the high threshold and timing/regulatory risks.

I estimate a low but non-negligible chance (6%) that Bitcoin will dip to $58,000 during June 15–21, 2026, reflecting the short time window, strong market consensus against such a move, but recognizing tail risks from rapid deleveraging or macro shocks.