Will the 25th Amendment be used during Trump's Presidency?
**Independent assessment:** I assign a 45% probability that the 25th Amendment will be invoked at least once during Trump's presidency (through 2029-01-20). This mostly reflects a meaningful chance of a *Section 3* temporary transfer for a routine medical procedure or emergency; the probability of a *Section 4* removal is very small.
Analysis
**Stage 1 — Blind analysis (ignore market prices):**
The 25th Amendment has two practically distinct uses: (a) *Section 3* voluntary, temporary transfers of power when a president is incapacitated (e.g., medical procedures requiring anesthesia); and (b) *Section 4* involuntary transfer/removal when the vice president and a majority of the Cabinet declare the president unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office. The historical record shows the amendment has been invoked for temporary transfers in modern presidencies but has never been successfully used to permanently remove a president under Section 4. That difference matters: Section 3 is routine, administratively simple, and precedent exists; Section 4 is politically explosive, untested for removal, and requires cooperation (or a congressionally-designated body) that is very unlikely when the president's own party controls the executive branch.
I separate the two pathways and combine them into an overall probability of any use during the term. For Section 3: presidents commonly require at least one medical procedure or unforeseen medical issue over a four-year term that could justify a formal, temporarily transfer of power (colonoscopies, outpatient procedures, brief hospitalizations). Trump’s age and known health history increase the baseline medical risk modestly compared to younger incumbents; even a routine colonoscopy or similar procedure would normally lead to a Section 3 invocation, and those are both common and publicly visible. I estimate a roughly 40% chance that Section 3 will be invoked at least once during the term.
For Section 4: the procedural and political hurdles are high. It requires the vice president and a majority of the Cabinet (or a body designated by Congress) to act against the president. Historical evidence (e.g., the 2021 episode where Vice President Pence declined to invoke Section 4) shows close presidential allies resist. If the vice president is politically aligned and loyal (which is likely if the same party controls the White House), the chance of a coordinated Cabinet removal is tiny. However, extraordinary events (catastrophic neurological event, clear evidence of incapacity combined with a break in loyalty of the VP and several Cabinet members) could create a low-probability path. I assign Section 4 a roughly 5% chance.
Combining: treating Section 3 and Section 4 as mostly disjoint events, overall probability that some part of the 25th Amendment is *used* during the presidency is roughly 1 - (1-0.40)*(1-0.05) ≈ 43% (rounded to 45% to reflect tail risk and uncertainty in medical/procedural frequency).
**Stage 2 — Market calibration (considering current prices):**
Current market prices: Yes 0.25 / No 0.75. My independent estimate (45%) is substantially higher than the market. Possible reasons the market trades lower:
- Market participants may be conflating the political drama of Section 4 (rare, controversial) with the more prosaic Section 3 uses and therefore anchoring on the low historical frequency of *removal* rather than any invocation. - The market could overweight political loyalty dynamics (assume a VP and Cabinet will never defect) and underweight routine medical events that have historically led to temporary transfers. - Liquidity and trader composition: with ~143k contracts volume, the market is active but some traders may be ideologically driven or risk-averse, pressing the price down for Yes. Large partisan positions can skew market price away from unbiased expected probability. - Ambiguity in the event wording: if participants interpret “used” as specifically meaning Section 4 removal, they will price much lower. I infer the wording includes any Section, and I price accordingly; markets may not.
If the market indeed conflates the two meanings or understates the chance of a Section 3 transfer, it is underpricing the true probability by ~20 points. That suggests a potential value trade for someone who expects at least one Section 3 invocation (routine medical events) to occur.
Conversely, reasons to respect the market: voters and on-chain traders often have political insight into the president’s circle and the likely loyalty of the VP / Cabinet; if the vice presidency is filled by a particularly loyal figure or if the president systematically avoids standard procedures that would require a formal transfer, the true chance could be closer to 25–30%. Given uncertainty, my 45% is a calibrated, somewhat contrarian view that emphasizes the medical/routine pathway more than traders presently appear to.
Bottom line: independent probability = 45%. The market at 25% is plausibly underestimating **Section 3** use and/or suffering from ambiguity bias; if you believe the event text intends *any* use (not just forced removal), the market is likely mispriced downward.
Arguments
For
- Section 3 is an available, well-understood administrative tool for temporary transfers; presidents regularly have outpatient procedures that would normally trigger it.
- President Trump's age and health profile increase the baseline probability of medical events requiring temporary incapacity across a four-year term.
- The 25th Amendment has prior precedent for temporary use; invoking Section 3 carries far less political cost than a Section 4 removal and can be framed as routine and responsible.
- Unexpected acute medical events (stroke, heart event, severe infection) could force immediate invocation to maintain continuity of government.
- If the White House wishes to avoid ambiguity or public concern, staff may proactively invoke Section 3 for short procedures to demonstrate transparency.
Against
- Section 4 permanent removal is highly unlikely: it requires the VP plus a majority of Cabinet to act against the sitting president, a politically fraught and historically untested step.
- Political loyalty dynamics (a loyal VP and Cabinet) make any involuntary use unlikely, especially when the president's party controls the executive branch.
- The president may avoid formal procedures or prefer informal management of short incapacitation periods to prevent loss of political control or image costs.
- Publicity and legal fights over any Section 4 attempt would be enormous, deterring Cabinet members from initiating proceedings absent incontrovertible medical incapacity.
- Ambiguity in the event text and traders’ likely focus on removal rather than temporary transfers can reduce incentives for people to buy 'Yes' positions, lowering market odds.
Key drivers
- Frequency of routine medical procedures or urgent health events requiring temporary incapacity (drives Section 3 risk).
- Political loyalty of the vice president and a majority of Cabinet members (drives Section 4 feasibility).
- Public visibility and media pressure in any crisis — high visibility increases pressure either to invoke or to resist invocation.
- President's personal willingness to cede power temporarily or to seek routine procedures under formal mechanisms.
- Congressional posture or changes in law/designated body (if Congress designated another body for Section 4, the dynamics could shift).
Risk factors
- Ambiguity in market/event interpretation — traders may interpret 'used' to mean only permanent removal (Section 4), biasing prices.
- Low-liquidity, concentrated position risk — a few large partisan traders can push market prices away from fundamentals.
- Unpredictable medical events — rare catastrophic illness could either make invocation mandatory or create legal uncertainty that prevents invocation.
- Political consolidation — if the VP and Cabinet are tightly loyal, even clear incapacity could be denied or managed without invoking the amendment.
- Legal and procedural uncertainty — Congress-delegated mechanisms for Section 4 could create delays or disputes that prevent formal use despite incapacity.
Scenarios
Best case
Section 3 invoked at least once for a routine medical procedure (e.g., colonoscopy, outpatient surgery) and executed smoothly with a transparent handover and return; political consequences are minimal and the market's underpricing of this risk is exposed.
Most likely
A modest, low-drama invocation of Section 3 for a medical procedure or short hospitalization (or no invocation if the administration avoids formal transfer), with Section 4 remaining extremely unlikely unless an extraordinary and clear incapacity emerges plus a breakdown in political loyalty.
Worst case
A highly unusual, chaotic constitutional crisis occurs (e.g., disputed medical incapacity or political coup-like behavior) where the Cabinet fractures and either an attempted Section 4 fails spectacularly or produces prolonged legal/constitutional dispute; this produces severe instability and a protracted court battle or congressional fight.
More from this day
- FinancialsKalshi1y
What sector will SpaceX be assigned to in the S&P?
AI6%MKT95%Edge-89HypedI assess a low probability (~6%) that SpaceX will be assigned to Communication Services; the preponderance of evidence (Morningstar/CRSP and GICS-style classification logic) points to an Industrials assignment.
- CompaniesKalshi1y
Starbucks total global stores in 2026
AI45%MKT7%Edge+38Hidden GemBased on likely baseline store counts and plausible net openings in 2025–2026, I assess a ~45% chance Starbucks will report >41,800 global stores in its 2026 report — materially higher than the current market price (7% Yes).
- politicsPolymarketEnded
Iran agrees to end enrichment of uranium by June 30?
AI25%MKT60%Edge-35HypedI assess a 25% probability that Iran will publicly agree to end all uranium enrichment by June 30, 2026; a temporary or narrowly framed pledge could happen, but structural incentives, domestic politics, and verification hurdles make a full public pledge unlikely within the short remaining window.