Which agencies will Trump eliminate?
I assess a low-to-moderate chance that USAID will be formally eliminated during Trump's current term — about 22% — because abolition requires durable Congressional action or an unusually aggressive and sustained executive campaign that faces major legal, political and operational headwinds.
Analysis
**Stage 1 — Blind analysis (ignore current market price):**
I treat "eliminated" as the formal ending of USAID as a standalone agency with its statutory authorities terminated or transferred out of existence. Historically, major federal agencies are rarely abolished; changes more commonly take the form of budget cuts, reorganization, rescoping, or transfer of some functions. Legally and practically, abolishing USAID requires either positive Congressional legislation repealing or significantly altering the statutory basis for the agency and reassigning its authorities, or an extraordinary executive reorganization that is sustained despite likely Congressional, administrative law, and judicial pushback.
Key structural facts that drive a low baseline probability:
- USAID's core authorities, programs, and funding are embedded in numerous statutes (e.g., foreign assistance authorizations, appropriations acts) and in long-standing bilateral/multilateral commitments. Eliminating the agency cleanly requires rewriting or repealing parts of those laws or establishing durable funding and programmatic alternatives. - Congress controls appropriations and has rarely surrendered that leverage; even a President hostile to an agency still typically needs Congress to enact abolition or to defund it completely. - There is strong institutional inertia: thousands of staff, contractors, foreign partners, and program commitments. Removing that infrastructure quickly is costly, disruptive, and politically salient.
Balancing those constraints against the political likelihood of an administration-driven push to end USAID leads me to a low base probability. Trump has both motive and a track record of pursuing dramatic reorganizations and of trying to shrink foreign-aid commitments. He can (and likely will) pursue aggressive budget proposals, convert program funding priorities, appoint leadership hostile to the agency, and attempt to subsume USAID into State or a new White House-led structure. Those tactics can substantially reduce USAID's effective operations without legally abolishing it.
Given the above, my independent assessment is **22%** that USAID will be formally eliminated during the term.
**Stage 2 — Market calibration (compare to current market price Yes=0.44 / No=0.56):**
The market currently prices a considerably higher chance (~44%) of elimination than my independent 22% estimate. There are plausible reasons for that divergence:
- Market interpretation differences: Traders may be treating any decisive functional dismantling, renaming, or transfer of USAID's programs into another office (e.g., a USAID->State transfer or a White House-managed foreign aid office) as "elimination". If the market uses a broader, looser definition that includes functional death or absorption, the probability should be higher than my stricter statutory interpretation. - Political tail risk and asymmetric payoff-seeking: Prediction markets often over-weight tail events when participants speculate on politically volatile outcomes. Trump’s unpredictability, recent history of ambitious executive efforts, and the possibility of unified Republican control of Congress at some point raise the perceived tail risk. - Information asymmetry / event-driven trades: Large political players or participants with inside knowledge of administration plans or Congressional intent (rumored reorganization proposals, drafts, or deals) could be driving the price up even if the normative legal and institutional hurdles remain significant.
Why I stick to 22% despite the higher market price:
- Formal abolition is materially different from heavy restructuring or defunding. While I think a strong campaign to neuter USAID operationally is plausible and likely, I do not think statutory elimination is the most probable route within this term. - The legislative and legal barriers, international fallout, and domestic pushback make a successful complete abolition within four years unlikely unless Republicans control both chambers of Congress and make elimination an explicit legislative priority — a political configuration and level of sustained commitment that has nontrivial probability but is not the baseline.
Trading implications: If you believe the market is pricing a broad definition of "elimination" (functional death or absorption), then the market price may be more justified. If you insist on a legal/statutory abolition, the market appears to be offering value on No (i.e., predict No). The appropriate trade depends on how you define "eliminated" and your time horizon for legal/legislative processes.
Arguments
For
- The Trump administration has ideological incentive to shrink or dismantle bodies associated with 'globalist' foreign aid and has a recent record of pushing for dramatic administrative changes.
- Budgetary pressure and executive proposals can defund or hollow out USAID programs, making functional elimination more feasible even without formal statutory repeal.
- If Republicans control both chambers and make eliminating USAID a priority, Congress can repeal or restructure statutory authorities relatively quickly compared with entrenched norms.
- A well-executed plan to subsume USAID into State or a new White House office could be presented as efficiency/anti-corruption reform and might attract GOP and certain centrist support.
Against
- Formal abolition requires statutory changes and Congressional cooperation; appropriations control gives Congress a strong check and incentive to preserve programs and jobs.
- USAID's activities are embedded in international commitments and multiyear contracts; abrupt abolition would cause diplomatic and operational fallout that many lawmakers and stakeholders would resist.
- Bureaucratic inertia, contractor and NGO networks, and bipartisan constituencies for development assistance make outright abolition politically costly.
- Legal challenges and administrative-law constraints on sweeping executive reorganizations create additional procedural obstacles to unilateral elimination.
Key drivers
- Congressional control and willingness to pass abolition or repeal legislation
- Administration strategy: executive reorganization orders, budget proposals, and appointments to leadership posts
- Public opinion and interest-group pushback (NGOs, contractors, foreign partners)
- International events/crises that affect the political appetite for foreign assistance
- Legal and statutory entrenchment of USAID authorities in U.S. law
Risk factors
- Unified Republican control of the House and Senate with an explicit legislative drive to eliminate USAID
- A sudden diplomatic or foreign-policy realignment that reduces domestic political costs of elimination
- Administrative actions that transfer functions or freeze operations effectively removing the agency before Congress can react
- Court rulings that either enable or constrain executive reorganization powers relevant to abolishing an agency
Scenarios
Best case
Full legislative abolition: Republicans control both chambers, prioritize repeal, and enact statutes that dissolve USAID and transfer or terminate its statutory authorities, with implementation completed before the term ends. This would involve coordinated appropriations, statutory language, and likely replacement mechanisms for critical programs.
Most likely
Partial dismantling / functional neutering: Significant budget cuts, institutional downgrades, leadership hostile to existing program priorities, transfer of some programs into State or a White House office, and rebranding/renaming. USAID continues to exist on the books but with sharply reduced capacity and visibility.
Worst case
Complete failure to materially change USAID: Congressional pushback, public and international backlash, legal challenges, or sudden foreign-policy crises that increase the perceived need for USAID lead to the agency remaining intact or even receiving a stabilization package; attempts to defund or restructure are reversed or blocked.
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