Edges for Jun 6, 2026

I assess a substantially lower chance than the market that the UK Prime Minister will be the first G7 leader to leave office; I estimate ~22% for the UK PM being first, with Japan's leader (Sanae Takaichi) the single largest individual risk.

I assess a better-than-even chance (60%) that 2026 will look like a genuine ‘bear year’ for Trump — characterized by sustained legal and institutional setbacks, damaging headlines, and meaningful reputational/operational pain — even if it stops short of catastrophic criminal or financial collapse.

I assess a 68% chance that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 8 will be above $62,000, slightly higher than the market-implied probability due to the single-minute resolution and recent structural bid-support in the market.

Given the absence of any known criminal exposure for Barron Trump and the political costs of pardoning a child, I assess a low probability that he will receive a presidential pardon by Jan 21, 2029 — ~8%.

I assess a very low probability (~3%) that Trump will *actually* take back legal/control of the Panama Canal during his term — rhetoric and congressional signaling raise the chance of attempts or threats, but legal, diplomatic and military barriers make a successful transfer extremely unlikely.

Board action toward Hammond improves the odds the Bears will choose Indiana as their future home, but the timeline and missing approvals make relocation by the 2028 season unlikely; I assign a 35% independent probability that the team will relocate to Indiana by the first game of the 2028 regular season.

Based on the SpaceX IPO reports and Musk’s existing asset base, I assess a strong but not certain chance that Elon Musk becomes the world’s first trillionaire before 2030 — my independent probability is 70%.

I assess a 65% chance that the U.S. will fall below 7.60 on the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index at some point during the 2025–2028 Trump administration — plausible given elevated institutional stress, but far from certain because many democratic inputs change slowly and the EIU scoring has inertia.

I assess a substantially better-than-market chance that Trump achieves a tangible "bull case" in 2026 — meaningful, enforceable immigration and enforcement wins paired with visible political momentum — but it remains far from certain due to legal and administrative headwinds.

Independent assessment: I estimate a **45%** chance Blake Lively will attend Taylor Swift & Travis Kelce’s wedding on 2028-12-31 — a near coin-flip leaning slightly toward attendance based on celebrity social-networks and typical wedding invitation behavior, but limited by lack of concrete evidence and many plausible barriers.

**Independent assessment:** I estimate a 75% chance that U.S. federal debt (as used by the official tracker counted for this market) will hit $40 trillion before the Trump administration ends in March 2029 — likely late in the term but not guaranteed.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that the U.S. acquires any part of Greenland before 2029 — most likely through non-sovereign instruments (leases, concessions) rather than a transfer of territory; outright sovereignty transfer is highly unlikely.

I assess a ~30% independent probability that Elon Musk will physically visit Mars before Aug 1, 2099 — higher than the market's 10% Yes price because early crewed Mars missions plus Musk's willingness and control of SpaceX make a pre-2050 trip plausible.

I assess a low-to-moderate chance that USAID will be fully eliminated during a Trump term; elimination is possible in extreme political alignments but more likely is heavy restructuring or de-funding rather than statutory abolition.

I assess a low likelihood that a formal, comprehensive U.S.–China free trade agreement will be signed and implemented by Jan 20, 2029 — the best estimate is 18% based on political, institutional, and geopolitical barriers.

Very unlikely — I assess a low single-digit chance (~7%) that Trump will successfully purchase any part of Greenland during a presidential term, because of overwhelming legal, political, and diplomatic obstacles despite his past interest.

I assess a 72% chance Elon Musk will be a trillionaire before 2027, driven mainly by a likely SpaceX IPO this year at a valuation high enough to push his paper net worth over $1T, with Tesla moves and small other channels as secondary contributors.

I assess there is a low probability that the four-year (2025–2028) average annual measles case count will meet the high threshold implied by the 'Yes' outcome (I interpret 'Yes' as the average ≧ 2,000 cases/year). One very large 2026 year makes a high average possible but not likely without sustained multi-year large outbreaks.

A U.S. acquisition of Greenland during Trump’s term is extremely unlikely; I assess ~94% probability that there will be no acquisition and only a small tail for improbable purchase deals in various price bands.

Anthropic is the clear near-term favorite given reports of a confidential S-1 filing; on a 2040 horizon I assess a very high probability that *at least one* of them (most likely Anthropic) will IPO first. My independent probability for the 'Yes' outcome is 92%.

I assess a ~20% independent probability that Scottie Scheffler will complete a career grand slam before 2028. This is materially higher than the current market price (6%), largely because Scheffler's elite win-rate per major and the number of remaining opportunities make the event plausibly likely enough to be mispriced by the market.

I assess a 78% probability that NVIDIA will be the largest company by market cap on June 30, 2026, reflecting strong market confidence in NVIDIA’s AI-driven momentum balanced against nontrivial macro, competitive, and event risks that could reverse its lead in a short window.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that President Trump will *voluntarily announce* his resignation before Jan 21, 2029 — my independent estimate is 12%.

I assess a relatively low but non-negligible chance that the 25th Amendment will be invoked at least once during Trump's presidency—most likely via a voluntary Section 3 transfer for a routine medical procedure rather than a forcible Section 4 removal. My independent probability: 15%.

I assess a materially non-negligible but still modest chance that the Supreme Court will overturn Obergefell before 2029 — about a 22% probability — driven by doctrinal willingness to revisit substantive-due-process precedents and the possibility of a certiorari vehicle, but constrained by procedural hurdles, political costs, and the Respect for Marriage Act.

I assess **Todd Blanche** as the most likely nominee and eventual Attorney General — I assign him a 72% chance based on incumbency as acting AG, Trump's prior relationship, and a GOP-controlled Senate pathway to confirmation.

I assess that Karen Bass has a strong but not certain chance to win the 2026 Los Angeles mayoral election, with a probability of 72% driven primarily by incumbency, fundraising, and the city's Democratic tilt, tempered by persistent governance challenges and turnout uncertainty.

Independent assessment: there is a meaningful but still-subdued chance Trump will invoke the Insurrection Act before 2027-01-01; I place that probability at 28%, higher than the market's 16% because of his rhetorical willingness and plausible triggers, but tempered by high legal, institutional, and political barriers.

Independent assessment: extremely unlikely — about a 1% chance that the United States will acquire any part of Canada before 2029. Only dramatic, low-probability collapse or a very narrow technical transfer would make this happen.

I assess a ~20% independent chance that Justice Clarence Thomas will voluntarily resign during the 2025–2029 Trump term. He is active with no announced intention to leave; age and rare-but-possible scandal/health events create non-trivial but modest risk.

I assess a low probability that Trump will be impeached and convicted (removed) before his term ends — roughly an 8% chance — because removal requires a bipartisan two‑thirds Senate conviction, a threshold that is historically unprecedented and politically unlikely absent an extraordinary, unifying scandal.

I assess roughly a 51% chance that President Trump will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029 — slightly more likely than not, driven mainly by the 2026 House midterms and the high probability of a Democratic majority enabling an impeachment vote if a compelling catalyst appears.

I assign a 40% probability that any U.S. quarterly GDP print will exceed an annualized 5% at least once between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028. Strong policy-driven or inventory-driven surges could get there, but structural constraints and likely Fed responses make a >5% quarter more unlikely than the current market price implies.

I assess Marine Le Pen's chance of winning the 2027 French presidential election at about 15%, meaning a low but non-negligible possibility driven by France's polarized politics and potential vote fragmentation, while structural barriers and the historic anti-extremist coalition make her victory unlikely.

I assess a strong but not certain probability that Karen Bass and Nithya Raman will be the top two vote-getters in the June 2, 2026 LA mayoral primary; I assign an 86% chance they advance to the runoff based on incumbency advantage, progressive base consolidation, and vote-splitting dynamics among other challengers, while acknowledging risks from late entries, turnout shifts, and the possibility of an outright Bass majority.

I assess a low but non-negligible chance that Bitcoin will reach $200,000 by December 31, 2026; about a 10% probability driven by the possibility of a rapid risk-on turn or massive inflows but constrained by macro, regulatory, and time-limiting factors.

Given the market's near-certainty but limited public reporting, I assess a strong but not absolute probability that Graham Platner will win the Maine Democratic Senate primary, reflecting likely establishment support or lack of a credible challenger but leaving room for late developments.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that Donald Trump will win and accept the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, largely because of his persistent influence in the party but tempered by legal, health, and competitive obstacles.

I assess about an 18% chance the New York Yankees win the 2026 World Series, slightly higher than the market-implied 12.5% because organizational resources, payroll flexibility, and postseason experience give them a meaningful edge, but roster uncertainty, AL competition, and baseball variance keep the probability modest.

I assess a 90% probability that the FOMC will leave the upper bound of the target federal funds rate unchanged at the July 2026 meeting, reflecting strong market consensus tempered by a modest chance of a 25 bp move if incoming data surprises.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability that Ethereum will reach $10,000 by 31 Dec 2026; this requires a large market-wide risk-on rally, strong institutional flows, and materially higher on-chain demand all converging over the next 7 months.

I assess a 45% probability that Russia and Ukraine will reach a mutually agreed, general ceasefire by 11:59 PM ET on December 31, 2026, because political and economic incentives for a deal are real but entrenched strategic and domestic obstacles make such an agreement more likely to be delayed or fragile than decisive within the stated timeframe.

I assess Cal Raleigh has a low but non-negligible chance (~12%) to win the 2026 AL Platinum Glove, reflecting solid defensive upside but long odds against more highly regarded AL defenders and the fan-vote dynamics of the award.

The market currently prices this outcome as nearly certain; after adjusting for Bitcoin's short-term volatility and tail risks I assign a high but slightly lower probability that BTC will be above $50,000 on June 12 at 12:00 ET.

I assess a low but non-negligible probability (12%) that Arkham will record an Outflow or Swaps transaction from a wallet labeled as Satoshi Nakamoto in 2026, with the main pathways being reclassification of addresses or a limited on-chain movement rather than a large, deliberate liquidation by Satoshi himself.

I assess a low probability that Ukraine will publicly agree not to join NATO by June 30, 2026, because doing so would require a rapid, high-cost political concession (likely tied to a major, fast-moving peace deal) that remains unlikely within the three-week window.

I estimate a 72% chance ETH will be above $1,500 on the Binance 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 8, slightly below the market-implied probability but reflecting short-term volatility and limited known downside catalysts over the next 48 hours.

Given the market-implied confidence and typical short-term behavior of Bitcoin, I assess a high probability that the Binance BTC/USDT 1-minute close at 12:00 ET on June 11 will be above $54,000, but tail risks from minute-level volatility and exchange microstructure prevent a near-certain call.